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Encyclopedia of Philosophy: A priori ?

Publié le 09/01/2010

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Many philosophers deny that having a priori knowledge requires having innate concepts, concepts that do not derive from, or depend for their being understood on, sensory experience. (Some theorists, in the tradition of  Platonism, hold that mathematical concepts, among others, are innate.) Propositions, one might suppose, consist of concepts, perhaps analogously to the way in which sentences consist of terms. Propositions knowable a priori, according to the philosophers in question, need not consist of innate concepts. The notion of a priori knowledge depends on a notion of a priori warrant, not on a notion of a non-empirical origin of the concepts constituting the known proposition. A notion involving special conditions for the justification of a believed proposition is not automatically a notion involving special conditions for either the origin or one’s understanding of the belief in question.

 The notion of a priori knowledge, construed as a notion of non-empirically grounded knowledge, is not the same as a notion of epistemic certainty. Philosophers have understood ‘epistemic certainty’ in various ways: for instance, as epistemically indubitable belief or as self-evident belief. A belief is epistemically indubitable if and only if it would not be epistemically justifiable to doubt that belief under any circumstance. It is not obvious that a priori warrant for a proposition requires epistemic indubitability of this proposition. A proposition’s being warranted a priori for someone seemingly allows for an expansion of their relevant evidence, whereby a proposition justified on the original evidence ceases to be justified on the expanded evidence. (One might, for example, come to appreciate further implications of a proposition that was justified a priori.) A priori justification for a proposition apparently can be subject to ‘epistemic defeat’ given a change in a priori evidence.

« automatically a notion involving special conditions for either the origin or one's understanding of the belief inquestion.The notion of a priori knowledge, construed as a notion of non-empirically grounded knowledge, is not the same as anotion of epistemic certainty.

Philosophers have understood ‘epistemic certainty' in various ways: for instance, asepistemically indubitable belief or as self-evident belief.

A belief is epistemically indubitable if and only if it would notbe epistemically justifiable to doubt that belief under any circumstance.

It is not obvious that a priori warrant for aproposition requires epistemic indubitability of this proposition.

A proposition's being warranted a priori for someoneseemingly allows for an expansion of their relevant evidence, whereby a proposition justified on the original evidenceceases to be justified on the expanded evidence.

(One might, for example, come to appreciate further implicationsof a proposition that was justified a priori.) A priori justification for a proposition apparently can be subject to‘epistemic defeat' given a change in a priori evidence.Philosophical talk of ‘self-evidence' is often unclear.

On a literal construal, a self-evident proposition is justified butdoes not depend on anything else for its justification.

The problem in linking a priori warrant to such self-evidence isthat a priori warrant is compatible with inferential warrant, wherein a proposition owes its warrant to inferentialrelations with other propositions, as might a theorem in a mathematical system.

(It is a separate issue whether all apriori warrant might be inferential.) The notion of a priori knowledge should thus be explained independently of aliteral construal of self-evidence.

Other construals of self-evidence will contribute here only if they elucidate anotion of non-empirical warrant that differs from notions of necessary truth, analyticity and certainty as epistemicindubitability. 3 Prominent explanations of the a priori Philosophers have long sought an account of the defining feature of truths that humans can know a priori.

Oneresult is a variety of accounts of the a priori in circulation.

Psychologism about the a priori, advanced initially butlater opposed by Husserl, claims that a true proposition is knowable a priori by humans if and only if ourpsychological constitution precludes our regarding that proposition as false.

Linguisticism about the a priori,endorsed by A.J.

Ayer and various other twentieth-century empiricists, states that a true proposition is knowable apriori if and only if our denying that proposition would violate rules of coherent language-use; this view denies theexistence of synthetic a priori truths.

Pragmatism about the a priori, advanced by C.I.

Lewis, claims that a trueproposition is knowable a priori by a person if and only if it describes their pragmatically guided intention to use acertain conceptual scheme of classification for the organizing of experiences.

Lewis argued that pragmaticconsiderations regarding what suits one's needs guide the way in which one formulates a conceptual scheme.

Adifferent view, supported by Roderick Chisholm and many others, affirms that a true proposition is knowable a prioriby us if and only if our understanding that proposition is all the evidence we need to see that the proposition inquestion is true.

Yet another view about the a priori is suggested by the later writings of Wittgenstein: A biology and cultural history) preclude the intelligibility for us of the denial of that proposition.

(Wittgenstein did not offer adetailed account of ‘forms of life' or of their role in determining what is a priori.) These are the most influential, butnot the only, accounts of the a priori in circulation.A theory of a priori knowledge should identify the strengths and weakness of the aforementioned accounts of the apriori.

It should also identify the feature of a priori justification that requires limitation of the set of propositionsknowable a priori to the distinctive kind of propositions specified by that theory.

Such a theory must avoidconfusing the notion of what is a priori with the notions of what is necessarily true, what is analytically true, whatis innate, and what is certain.

It must also draw a clear distinction between what is a priori and what is a posteriori.. »

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