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		<title>Dernières dissertations ajoutées sur Devoir-de-philosophie.com</title> 
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		<title>	Chisholm, Roderick Milton	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-chisholm-roderick-milton-116969.html</link>
		<description>Chisholm is an important analytic philosopher of the second half of the twentieth century. His work in
epistemology, metaphysics and ethics is characterized by scrupulous attention to detail, the use of a few basic,
undefined or primitive terms, and extraordinary clarity. One of the first Anglo-American philosophers to make
fruitful use of Brentano and Meinong, Chisholm translated many of Brentano's philosophical writings. As one of
the great teachers, Chisholm is widely known for the three editions of Theory of Knowledge, a short book and the
standard text in US graduate epistemology courses. An ontological Platonist, Chisholm defends human free will
and a strict sense of personal identity.
Roderick Milton Chisholm (born in North Attleboro, Massachusetts, USA) has come as close as any philosopher
ever does to actually living the good life: marrying happily, teaching graduate philosophy at his Alma Mater and,
in later years, living by the ocean. Upon completing an undergraduate philosophy major at Brown University,
Chisholm entered the doctoral programme at Harvard, finishing in 1942. The subsequent three years of military
experience, administering psychological tests to recruits, had little influence on his philosophy, nor did his brief
stint at the Barnes Foundation lecturing on the philosophy of art. Chisholm returned to Brown in 1947 where he
taught for the next forty years, heavily influencing Anglo-American epistemology and metaphysics.

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		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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		<title>	Chinul	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-chinul-116968.html</link>
		<description>Chinul was the founder of the Korean Chogye school of Buddhism. He sought to reconcile the bifurcation between
Kyo (doctrinal) thought and Sôn (Zen) practice that rent the Korean Buddhist tradition of his time, by showing the
symbiotic connection between Buddhist philosophy and meditation. He also advocated a distinctive program of
soteriology that became emblematic of Korean Buddhism from that time forward: an initial sudden awakening to
the nature of the mind followed by gradual cultivation of that awakening until full enlightenment was achieved.

</description>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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		<title>	Chinese room argument	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-chinese-room-argument-116967.html</link>
		<description>John Searle's 'Chinese room' argument aims to refute 'strong AI' (artificial intelligence), the view that
instantiating a computer program is sufficient for having contentful mental states. Imagine a program that
produces conversationally appropriate Chinese responses to Chinese utterances. Suppose Searle, who understands
no Chinese, sits in a room and is passed slips of paper bearing strings of shapes which, unbeknown to him, are
Chinese sentences. Searle performs the formal manipulations of the program and passes back slips bearing
conversationally appropriate Chinese responses. Searle seems to instantiate the program, but understands no
Chinese. So, Searle concludes, strong AI is false.
Searle (1980) argues that, since in the imaginary case he does everything the computer would do and he still does
not understand a word of Chinese, it follows that a computer successfully programmed to pass a Chinese Turing
test (Turing, A.M. §3) would not understand Chinese either. The problem, according to Searle, is that computer
programs, whether executed by electronic devices or by Searle inside the room, concern only syntax, or strings of
symbols characterized only by spelling, not meaning, while thought and understanding require meaning and
semantics. And he claims you cannot get semantics from mere syntax, no matter how subtle or complicated it may
be.

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		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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		<title>	Chinese philosophy	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-chinese-philosophy-116966.html</link>
		<description>Any attempt to survey an intellectual tradition which encompasses more than four thousand years would be a
daunting task even if it could be presumed that the reader shares, at least tacitly, many of the assumptions
underlying that tradition. However, no such commonalities can be assumed in attempting to introduce Asian
thinking to Western readers. Until the first Jesuit incursions in the late sixteenth century, China had developed in
virtual independence of the Indo-European cultural experience and China and the Western world remained in
almost complete ignorance of one another.
The dramatic contrast between Chinese and Western modes of philosophic thinking may be illustrated by the fact
that the tendency of European philosophers to seek out the being of things, the essential reality lying behind
appearances, would meet with little sympathy among Chinese thinkers, whose principal interests lie in the
establishment and cultivation of harmonious relationships within their social ambiance. Contrasted with
Anglo-European philosophic traditions, the thinking of the Chinese is far more concrete, this-worldly and, above
all, practical.

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		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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		<title>	Chillingworth, William	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-chillingworth-william-116965.html</link>
		<description>Chillingworth was one of the most notable English-speaking contributors to debates between Protestants and
Catholics in the seventeenth century. His use of a distinction between metaphysical and moral certainty proved
extremely influential, as did his rationalist and fallibilist approach to issues of faith and authority.
William Chillingworth was born in England at Oxford, and was educated there at Trinity College, where he
became a fellow in 1628. In the same year he renounced his allegiance to the Church of England, resigned his
fellowship and became a Roman Catholic. He travelled abroad to a Catholic seminary in the Netherlands, probably
at Douai, possibly at St Omer, but soon found the life uncongenial and returned to England. In the early 1630s he
had no clear religious allegiance, but was reconciled to the Church of England by 1635. From 1634 he lived at
Viscount Falkland's house at Great Tew in Oxfordshire; Falkland's posthumously published Discourse of
Infallibility (1645) owes much to Chillingworth's arguments. In the autumn of 1637 Chillingworth published his
chief work, The Religion of Protestants a Safe Way to Salvation, directed against the Jesuit Edward Knott. When
the Civil War broke out he sided with the King, and died as a prisoner of war in January 1644, following his
capture at Arundel.

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		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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		<title>	Chernyshevskii, Nikolai Gavrilovich	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-chernyshevskii-nikolai-gavrilovich-116964.html</link>
		<description>Nikolai Chernyshevskii was the main theorist of the Russian democratic radicalism of 'the 1860s' or, more
precisely, of the period of political 'thaw' and liberal reforms which followed Russian defeat in the Crimean War
and the enthronement (in 1855) of Alexander II. He was also the best representative of the non-conformist
elements among the raznochintsy, that is, the educated commoners, who at that time began to figure prominently
in Russian intellectual and social life. As such, he exerted a powerful formative influence on the Russian
intelligentsia.
In 1862 Chernyshevskii was arrested, brought to trial and, despite insufficient evidence, condemned to lifetime
banishment in Siberia. In exile, preserving his integrity to the end, he stoutly refused to ask for clemency (as a
result, he remained in a remote Siberian village until 1883). In prison, waiting for trial, he wrote the novel Chto
Delat' (What Is To Be Done?) in which he showed the 'new men' of Russia - 'rational egoists', devoted to the
cause of progress, and even a type of ascetic, self-sacrificing revolutionist. Thanks to a strange oversight of the
censor the novel was serialized in the journal Sovremennik (The Contemporary) and, despite lack of literary
distinction, became a powerful source of inspiration for several generations of Russian progressive youth.

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		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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		<title>	Cheng Hao	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-cheng-hao-116963.html</link>
		<description>Cheng Hao was a pivotal figure in the creation of a Confucian tradition that was to become the basis for
intellectual and state orthodoxy in China from the thirteenth century to the twentieth century. His decision to seek
the Confucian Way (dao) through a direct and personalized reading of the classics was later projected as the
beginning of this movement. From a new perspective, he redirected Confucian discourse on such cardinal
concepts as humaneness and human nature.
Born into a family which for three generations had distinguished itself in high offices, Cheng Hao accompanied his
father to a succession of posts in central China. At the age of twenty he passed the national civil service
examination and, for most of the years until 1180, had a notable official career which culminated in 1169-70 with
service at the emperor's court. During audiences with the emperor and in written memorials, he followed the
example of Mencius in admonishing his ruler to follow benevolence and refusing even to discuss what would bring
profit and advantages. So critical was he of Wang Anshi's utilitarian obsession with maximizing advantages and
the happiness of the greatest number of people that Cheng was demoted to a local post and eventually dismissed
entirely. The last five years of his life he devoted to teaching an increasing number of disciples, drawn in part by
his exceptionally gracious and warm disposition.

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		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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		<title>	Cheng	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-cheng-116962.html</link>
		<description>In early Confucian writings, cheng describes the quality of authentically realizing or 'completing' a given thing's
true nature. It appears together with xin (trustworthiness), a character to which it is related in sense. Cheng refers
primarily to the fulfilment of a thing's true nature, while xin refers to the quality resulting from this. With regard
to human beings, cheng is the authentic realization of ones nature. In texts such as the Xunzi and Zhongyong, the
idea is related to the role human beings are believed to play in realizing or 'completing' a greater universal
pattern. This development becomes centrally important for later neo-Confucian thinkers, who see these as different
aspects of a single project.
Cheng ('integrity' or 'sincerity') is not a central term of art for Confucius, but it takes on greater significance in
the thought of Mencius and Xunzi. According to the Mengzi (4A12), cheng requires an understanding of the good.
One cannot be cheng unless one understands why one is acting as one does. To be cheng is to be true to one's self,
that is, one's true nature (hence 'sincerity'). Thus cheng is necessary for the cultivation of genuine virtue. Since
such self-cultivation results in the most satisfying of lives (Self-cultivation, Chinese theories of), there is no
greater joy than to find that one is cheng.

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		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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		<title>	Chemistry, philosophical aspects of	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-chemistry-philosophical-aspects-116961.html</link>
		<description>Chemistry, like all theoretical sciences, is deeply rooted in philosophical inquiry. Early Greek atomism was a
response to Parmenides' argument that the very concept of change is unintelligible. Aristotle in turn argued that a
vacuum is impossible and proposed that qualitative change could be better understood in terms of four elements
and an underlying prime matter.
During the Arabic and Latin Middle Ages, philosophical commentaries on the nature of materials were brought
into juxtaposition with the practical arts of the alchemist, miner and pharmacist. As chemical speculations became
more closely connected to observations during the time of the Scientific Revolution, natural philosophers became
more and more interested in the methodological aspects of chemistry. Galileo and Locke tried to clarify the
relationship between primary and secondary qualities. Boyle struggled to understand how the selective affinities
so characteristic of chemical reagents could be explained within the framework of Descartes' mechanical
philosophy. Lavoisier's textbook was organized around principles drawn from philosophes such as Condillac.
As chemistry became an autonomous science, chemists turned less often to philosophy as a source of theoretical
inspiration. However, they frequently appealed to philosophies of science in order to defend their own theories or
criticize those of their opponents. The so-called 'atomic debates' amongst chemists in the British Association
during the 1860s were primarily disputes about the epistemological legitimacy of appeals to unobservable entities.
Many of the same issues were taken up at the end of the century by Ostwald, Mach and Duhem.

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		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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		<title>	Chatton, Walter	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-chatton-walter-116960.html</link>
		<description>Chatton was an English philosopher and theologian who developed a detailed critique of the work of William of
Ockham, causing the latter to revise some of his earlier writings. Chatton was also at times an opponent of Peter
Aureol and Richard of Campsall; he generally, though not always, followed John Duns Scotus and responded to
his critics. He is known also for his writings on physics, where he held views in line with those of Pythagoras and
Plato, and on the Trinity, where he was strongly attacked by Adam Wodeham.
The English Franciscan philosopher and theologian Walter Chatton was born in the village of Catton, near
Durham, around 1290. He was a contemporary of William of Ockham and Adam Wodeham at the Franciscan
custodial school in London from 1321 to 1323. There he delivered his Reportatio lectures on all four Books of the
Sentences of Peter Lombard, in preparation for his later Lectura on the Sentences at Oxford sometime between
1324 and 1330 (most likely in 1328-30). He was one of the examiners of the works of Durandus of Saint-Pourçain
and Thomas Waleys at the papal court in Avignon, and is believed to have died there in 1343.

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		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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		<title>	Chartres, School of	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-chartres-school-116959.html</link>
		<description>In the first half of the twelfth century, the most advanced work in teaching and discussion of logic, philosophy and
theology took place in the schools attached to the great cathedrals. Chartres was undoubtedly one of the more
important of these schools, and Gilbert of Poitiers and Thierry of Chartres were certainly connected with it. To
some historians, Chartres was the great intellectual centre of the period, and the greatest achievement of early
twelfth-century thought was a brand of Platonism distinctive of this school. However, this view has been
challenged by scholars who stress the pre-eminence of Paris, where the schools emphasized logic.

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		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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		<title>	Charron, Pierre	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-charron-pierre-116958.html</link>
		<description>Pierre Charron was a French Catholic priest of the late sixteenth century who used Montaigne's sceptical
thought, which he presented in didactic form, in order to refute Calvinists, non-Christians, and atheists. He
advanced a fideistic defence of religious thought which was based on accepting complete scepticism while
appealing to faith alone as the source of religious knowledge. His De la Sagesse (On Wisdom) (1601) is one of the
first significant philosophical works to be written in a modern language. It is also one of the first modern works to
set forth a naturalistic moral theory independent of religious considerations, and based primarily on Stoic ideas.
Charron's views were extremely popular in the seventeenth century, and they influenced many sceptically inclined
thinkers in France and England. His sceptical 'defence' of religion was regarded as insincere by some of the
orthodox theologians, but other important religious thinkers defended him.

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		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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		<title>	Charleton, Walter	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-charleton-walter-116957.html</link>
		<description>The physician Walter Charleton was the first to introduce Epicurean atomism into England in the form advocated
in France by Gassendi. Charleton's version of atomism, although largely derivative, was nevertheless influential.
Together with his advocacy of a Christian hedonism, it helped to make both atomism in natural philosophy (with
its associated mechanistic account of nature) and utilitarian theories in ethics acceptable to such thinkers as
Robert Boyle, Isaac Newton, John Locke and others associated with the foundation of the Royal Society, of which
Charleton was himself an active early member.
Walter Charleton was a physician who served both Charles I and Charles II, but his interests were always broader
than medicine. He entered practice after studying at Magdalen Hall, Oxford, under John Wilkins, also one of the
founders of the Royal Society. Charleton's quick rise to fame made him enemies, which in part explains his sad
decline to poverty in later years after serving as President of the College of Physicians from 1689-91.
Charleton's major philosophical writings were two books on the philosophy of Epicurus and two on central
religious themes (the absurdity of atheism and the immortality of the soul). But it is important to appreciate that
although he clearly saw himself as an exponent of a modified Christian version of the philosophy of Epicurus, in
which he substantially followed in the footsteps of Gassendi, he was also almost equally influenced by the
philosophy of Descartes. In each of them he found a commitment to mechanism as the basic explanatory concept
for an understanding of nature, together with a theism which rejected a materialist account of the mind.

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		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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		<title>	Principle of Charity	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-principle-charity-116956.html</link>
		<description>The principle of charity governs the interpretation of the beliefs and utterances of others. It urges charitable
interpretation, meaning interpretation that maximizes the truth or rationality of what others think and say. Some
formulations of the principle concern primarily rationality, recommending attributions of rational belief or
assertion. Others concern primarily truth, recommending attributions of true belief or assertion. Versions of the
principle differ in strength. The weakest urge charity as one consideration among many. The strongest hold that
interpretation is impossible without the assumption of rationality or truth.
The principle has been put to various philosophical uses. Students are typically instructed to follow the principle
when interpreting passages and formulating the arguments they contain. The principle also plays a role in
philosophy of mind and language and in epistemology. Philosophers have argued that the principle of charity
plays an essential role in characterizing the nature of belief and intentionality, with some philosophers contending
that beliefs must be mostly true. A version of the principle has even served as a key premise in a widely discussed
argument against epistemological scepticism.

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		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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		<title>	Charity	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-charity-116955.html</link>
		<description>Within at least some branches of Christianity, the term 'charity' has been used to mean the love mandated by
Jesus. In recent theological writings, however, there has been a tendency to replace it with the Greek word agap&amp;#275;.
There has been some disagreement in the twentieth century concerning the precise nature and functioning of
Christian love, a major catalyst for debate having been Anders Nygren's book Agap&amp;#275; and Eros (1930-6).
Numerous scholars have complained that charity does not have a high profile nowadays and have noted that, in
common parlance, the word usually has the meaning of benevolence or beneficence. Some attempts have been
made to place greater emphasis on Christian love and relationships within Christian ethics. Of some interest in
this regard is the notion of an ethic of care, which is not confined to Christian circles but has been the subject of
some debate in recent times.

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		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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		<title>	Chaos theory	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-chaos-theory-116954.html</link>
		<description>Chaos theory is the name given to the scientific investigation of mathematically simple systems that exhibit
complex and unpredictable behaviour. Since the 1970s these systems have been used to model experimental
situations ranging from the early stages of fluid turbulence to the fluctuations of brain wave activity. This complex
behaviour does not arise as a result of the interaction of numerous sub-systems or from intrinsically probabilistic
equations. Instead, chaotic behaviour involves the rapid growth of any inaccuracy. The slightest vagueness in
specifying the initial state of such a system makes long-term predictions impossible, yielding behaviour that is
effectively random. The existence of such behaviour raises questions about the extent to which predictability and
determinism apply in the physical world. Chaos theory addresses the questions of how such behaviour arises and
how it changes as the system is modified. Its new analytical techniques invite a reconsideration of scientific
methodology.

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		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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		<title>	Change	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-change-116953.html</link>
		<description>Change in general may be defined as the variation of properties (whether of things or of regions of space) over
time. But this definition is incomplete in a number of respects. The reference to properties and time raises two
important questions. The first concerns whether we need to specify further the kinds of properties which are
involved in change. If we define change in an object as temporal variation of its properties we are faced with the
problem that some properties of an object may alter without there being a consequent change in the object itself.
The second question concerns the passage of time: does temporal variation constitute change only in virtue of
some feature of time itself, namely the fact (or putative fact) that time passes? Some philosophers have wished to
reject the notion of time's passage. Are they thereby committed to a picture of the world as unchanging?

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		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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		<title>	Chaldaean Oracles	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-chaldaean-oracles-116952.html</link>
		<description>The Chaldaean Oracles were a collection of revelatory verses purportedly compiled in the second century AD.
Along with the Orphic texts, Neoplatonists regarded them as divine words. When the Oracles appear in
philosophical works, they lend support to select cosmological, metaphysical or psychological propositions which
have already been formulated.
According to Neoplatonists, the Chaldaika logia, or Chaldaean Oracles, originated with a certain Julianus, a late
second-century AD ex-soldier in the eastern Roman army, and with his son, also named Julianus, who was their
author. The father, surnamed 'Chaldaean' and a 'philosopher', may have collected handed-down material which he
passed on to his son, a 'theurgist', who was 'divinely inspired' to write new oracles. This origin, some seventy
years before Porphyry, by whom they are first mentioned, is by no means certain. However, it may be corroborated
by similar material in Numenius, an important Neo-Pythagorean. Numenius flourished at that time in Apamea
(Syria), where later Plotinus' theurgic-minded follower Amelius went to teach, as did Iamblichus, who was a
major proponent of theurgy and the Oracles. Both Porphyry and Iamblichus had Syrian parentage. Moreover, in a
unique fragment preserved by Proclus (Commentary on Plato's Parmenides, 594-5), 'the true theologians' used
Syriac terms. Yet the question remains, how much was handed down and how much made up in a culture where
Greek and Oriental had mixed since the third century BC and religions had absorbed Platonic ideas.

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		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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		<title>	Chaadaev, Pëtr Iakovlevich	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-chaadaev-petr-iakovlevich-116951.html</link>
		<description>Pëtr Chaadaev was the first Russian thinker for whom his own country became a philosophical problem. His
works initiated the powerful Russian tradition of reflecting on Russia's whence and whither: that is to say, the
meaning of Russian history, the character of Russian national identity, and the possible, or necessary, paths of
Russian historical development in the future. However, Chaadaev's answer to these questions was mostly
negative: he defined Russia not by what it was, but by what it was not.
A paradoxical feature of Chaadaev's s position was that his general philosophical views did not apply to his native
country. He was a convinced Westernizer, identifying Western development with universal human history, but
Russia was in his view the opposite of the West, an exception to the general rules. His general social philosophy,
deeply influenced by the French theocratic traditionalists, was inherently conservative, stressing the importance of
supra-individual unity and of continuous historical traditions; in contrast with this, his philosophy of Russian
history defined Russia as a country without unity and without history, thus lacking the basic conditions for a
genuine conservatism. This view provoked a strong reaction among Russian Romantic conservatives: they
accepted some aspects of Chaadaev's conservative critique of atomistic individualism but tried to refute his
pessimistic view of Russia, by arguing that, in fact, not Russia but the West represented atomistic disintegration
and incapacity for organic development.

</description>
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		<title>	Certeau, Michel de	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-certeau-michel-116950.html</link>
		<description>Michel de Certeau, a French philosopher trained in history and ethnography, was a peripatetic teacher in Europe,
South America and North America. His thought has inflected four areas of philosophy. He studied how mysticism
informs late-medieval epistemology and social practice. With the advent of the Scientific Revolution, the affinities
the mystic shares with nature and the cosmos become, like religion itself, repressed or concealed. An adjunct
discipline, heterology, thus constitutes an anthropology of alterity, studying the 'other' and the destiny of religion
since the sixteenth century. De Certeau opens the hidden agendas that make representations of the past a function
of social pressures, so that sometime histories are rearticulated in mirrored or subversive forms. This subversion
makes accessible a general philosophy of invention that works within and against the strategic policies of official
institutions. De Certeau's writings also belong to activism, the history of ideological structures, psychoanalysis,
and post-1968 theories of writing (écriture) as defined by Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault and Lyotard.
For de Certeau, mystics are those strange beings who claim to have left the material and sensory world and
encountered an unnameable being, or an unearthly experience, but have returned with visible marks - scars or
mutilations - that attest to the truth of what they say. They eagerly tell of their visions to others. They are creatures
of passage who invent places in which they disappear, and whose words convey to their listeners the
supraterrestrial qualities of the world and language. They liberate those whom they meet, inspiring them to
cognizance of areas that cannot be controlled by rational or symbolic means. Mystics are frequently female, often
rootless, sometimes grimy and occasionally without formal education. The mystic belongs to all religions but
appears on the European horizon at the time major edifices of belief slowly crumble under the pressure of science,
oceanic travel, schematic reason (Ramus, Descartes) and pre-capitalist economy.

</description>
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	<item>
		<title>	Certainty	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-certainty-116949.html</link>
		<description>'Certainty' is not a univocal term. It is predicated of people, and it is predicated of propositions. When certainty is
predicated of a person, as in 'Sally is certain that she parked her car in lot 359', we are ascribing an attitude to
Sally. We can say that a person, S, is psychologically certain of a proposition, p, just in case S believes p without
any doubts. In general, psychological certainty has not been a topic which philosophers have found problematic.
On the other hand, certainty as a property of propositions, as in 'The proposition that Sally parked her car in lot
359 is certain for Sally', has been discussed widely by philosophers. Roughly, we can say that a proposition, p, is
propositionally certain for a person, S, just in case S is fully warranted in believing that p and there are no
legitimate grounds whatsoever to doubt that p. The philosophical issue, of course, is whether there are any such
propositions and, if so, what makes them certain.

</description>
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		<title>	Celsus	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-celsus-116948.html</link>
		<description>The Greek philosopher Celsus of Alexandria was a Middle Platonist, known only for his anti-Christian work The
True Account. The work is lost, but we have Origen's reply to it, Against Celsus. In it Celsus defends a version of
Platonist theology.
Celsus is known only as the author of a polemical work against the Christians entitled Al&amp;#275;th&amp;#275;s logos, which may be
translated The True Account, although other connotations of logos are also present in the title (Logos). We
know of this work only through the reply (Against Celsus) composed to it in AD 248 by the Church Father Origen,
who does not in fact know who Celsus is (Origen §1). We too know nothing about Celsus, but can date his
work fairly closely from references in it to a persecution of Christians under a joint rulership which must be that
Marcus Aurelius and Commodus (AD 177-80).
The title of Celsus' book may also refer to a passage of Plato's Meno (81a), where Socrates speaks of the ancient
doctrine he has heard concerning the immortality of the soul as a 'true account' (Plato §11). One of Celsus'
polemical points certainly is that Platonic philosophy is in accord with the wisdom of the most ancient authorities,
such as Orpheus and Homer - a common enough view among the Neoplatonists. As regards his own philosophical
position, it is hard to pin him to any particular tendency within contemporary Platonism. He shows the expected
contempt for a notion like the resurrection of the body (Origen, Against Celsus V 14), or the idea that god made
man in his own image (VI 63), there being nothing that could resemble god. At VII 42, he gives a basic account of
the Platonist view of the supreme god, which is incompatible with the notion of his involving himself too closely
with matter. He alludes, indeed, to the notion of the supreme god being 'beyond being' (Plato, Republic 509b), and
the title of his work may indicate his adoption of the logos as a secondary god, but we cannot be sure. He mentions
three ways of attaining a conception of god - synthesis, analysis and analogy, which correspond approximately to
the three ways distinguished by Alcinous in his Didaskalikos, chapter 10, although there is no indication that
Celsus knows that work. Contact between man and god is effected, of course, through the agency of daemons,
whom the Christians are criticized for disdaining (VIII 28, 33, 35).

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		<title>	Cavendish, Margaret Lucas	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-cavendish-margaret-lucas-116947.html</link>
		<description>Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of Newcastle, made contact with Hobbes, tutor to the Cavendish family, during the
English Civil War. She became a member of the 'Newcastle Circle', which included Hobbes, Charleton and
Digby, and which was influenced by interaction with Mersenne and Gassendi. While exiled in Paris, Rotterdam
and Antwerp, she met Descartes and Roberval. In 1667, she became the first woman to attend a session of the
Royal Society of London. She corresponded with Christian Huygens about 'Rupert's exploding drops', and with
Glanvill about witchcraft and Neoplatonic notions such as 'plastic faculties' and the 'soul of the world'. She was
one of the first Englishwomen to gain recognition for her publications. In additional to writing treatises such as
Philosophical Fancies (1653) and Philosophical and Physical Opinions (1655, 1663) she experimented with a
wide range of genres to express her views: poetry, orations, plays, autobiobraphy ( Nature's Pictures, 1656),
biography (The Life of  William Cavindishe, 1667), allegories (The World's Olio, 1655), epistolary narrative
(CCXI Sociable Letters, 1664a) and fiction (The Description of a New World, called the Blazing-World, 1668).
Introduced to twentieth-century readers by Henry Ten Eyck Perry (1918) and Virginia Woolf (1925), her
philosophy only came in for serious, sustained evaluation beginning in the 1980s.

</description>
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		<title>	Cavell, Stanley	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-cavell-stanley-116946.html</link>
		<description>Born in Atlanta, Georgia, Stanley Cavell has held the Walter M. Cabot Chair in Aesthetics and the General
Theory of Value at Harvard University since 1963. The range, diversity and distinctiveness of his writings are
unparalleled in twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophy. As well as publishing essays on modernist painting
and music, he has created a substantial body of work in film studies, literary theory and literary criticism; he has
introduced new and fruitful ways of thinking about psychoanalysis and its relationship with philosophy; and his
work on Heidegger and Derrida, taken together with his attempts to revitalize the tradition of Emersonian
Transcendentalism, have defined new possibilities for a distinctively American contribution to philosophical
culture. This complex oeuvre is unified by a set of thematic concerns - relating to scepticism and moral
perfectionism - which are rooted in Cavell's commitment to the tradition of ordinary language philosophy, as
represented in the work of J.L. Austin and Wittgenstein.

</description>
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		<title>	Causality and necessity in Islamic thought	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-causality-and-necessity-islamic-thought-116945.html</link>
		<description>Discussions of causality and necessity in Islamic thought were the result of attempts to incorporate the wisdom of
the Greeks into the legacy of the Qur&amp;#268;amp;lsquo;'an, and specifically to find a philosophical way of expressing
faith in the free creation of the universe by one God. Moreover, that article of faith was itself a result of the
revelation of God's ways in the free bestowal of the Qur&amp;#268;amp;rsquo;'an on a humanity otherwise locked in
ignorance, which a purportedly Aristotelian account of the necessary connection of cause and effect might be
taken to rule out. Thus free creation of the universe and free gift of the Qur'an formed a logical unit. The
challenge, therefore, was to compose an account of metaphysical and ethical matters which permits rational
discourse about them, without obscuring their ultimate source or precluding divine action in the course of world
events and human actions.
The scheme of emanation elaborated by al-Farabi sought to give 'the First' the place of pre-eminence which the
Qur'an demanded for the Creator, but did so by modelling creation on a logical system whereby all things
emanated necessarily from this One. It was this necessity, further articulated by Ibn Sina, which al-Ghazalii took
to jeopardize the freedom of God as Creator and as giver of the Qur'an. al-Ghazali's objections were honed by a
previous debate among Muslim theologians (mutakallimun), who had elaborated diverse views on human freedom
in an effort to reconcile the obvious demand for free acceptance of the Qur'an with its claims regarding God's
utter sovereignty as Creator over all that is. Natural philosophy was also affected by these debates, specifically
with regard to the ultimate constitution of bodies as well as accounts that could be given of their interaction.
However, the primary focus was on human actions in the face of a free Creator.

</description>
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		<title>	Cattaneo, Carlo	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-cattaneo-carlo-116944.html</link>
		<description>The figurehead of the Italian democratic movement prior to the unification of Italy, Carlo Cattaneo developed a
theory of federalism as a practice of self-government, envisaging a United States of Italy. He identified the
bourgeoisie as the most dynamic force in contemporary history and regarded scientific culture as the engine of
progress. Often dubbed the first Italian positivist, he perceived empirical philosophy as a kind of synthesis of all
the sciences, but also stressed its anthropological and psychological dimensions and above all its character as a
methodology of knowledge; his objective was to study human thought. The great themes of Cattaneo's philosophy
are nature, the individual and society; particularly the last.
Cattaneo represents the most progressive trends in Italian thought in the first half of the nineteenth century. He
aimed to encourage the propagation of technical and scientific knowledge in his native Lombardy in order to equip
the entrepreneurial class with the expertise necessary for economic development; and to this end he founded the
journal, Il Politecnico (1839-44; 1851-63). Until 1848, Cattaneo had formed part of the legal opposition to the
regime, but when Milan rose against the Austrians on 18 March of that year, Cattaneo took an active, leading role
in the Five Days' Uprising. He was critical of the provisional government, however, and when the Austrians
returned, left for Paris, where he published L'Insurrection de Milan en 1848 (The Milan Uprising of 1848). Shortly
afterwards, he left Paris for Switzerland, where he settled permanently in Castagnola, near Lugano. From his exile
in Switzerland, Cattaneo voiced his often fierce opposition to the principal political currents in Italy, and forged a
role for himself as the great 'prompter' and moving spirit of the Italian democrats, and the leading proponent of
federalism against unitary solutions.

</description>
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	<item>
		<title>	Categories	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-categories-116943.html</link>
		<description>Categories are hard to describe, and even harder to define. This is in part a consequence of their complicated
history, and in part because category theory must grapple with vexed questions concerning the relation between
linguistic or conceptual categories on the one hand, and objective reality on the other. In the mid-fourth century
BC,Aristotle initiates discussion of categories as a central enterprise of philosophy. In the Categories he presents
an 'ontological' scheme which classifies all being into ten ultimate types, but in the Topics introduces the
categories as different kinds of predication, that is, of items such as 'goodness' or 'length of a tennis court' or
'red', which can be 'predicated of' subjects. He nowhere attempts either to justify what he includes in his list of
categories or to establish its completeness, and relies throughout on the unargued conviction that language
faithfully represents the most basic features of reality. In the twentieth century, a test for category membership was
recommended by Ryle, that of absurdity: concepts or expressions differ in logical type when their combination
produces sentences which are palpable nonsense.Kant, working in the eighteenth century, derives his categories
from a consideration of aspects of judgments, hoping in this manner to ensure that his scheme will consist
exclusively of a priori concepts which might constitute an objective world. The Sinologist Graham argues that the
categories familiar in the West mirror Indo-European linguistic structure, and that an experimental Chinese
scheme exhibits suggestively different properties, but his relativism is highly contentious.

</description>
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		<title>	Casuistry	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-casuistry-116942.html</link>
		<description>Casuistry, from the Latin casus (cases), has been understood in three separate yet related senses. In its first sense
casuistry is defined as a style of ethical reasoning associated closely with the tradition of practical philosophy
influenced by Aristotle and Aquinas. In its second sense it is reasoning about 'cases of conscience' (casus
conscientiae). The third sense, moral laxism, arose out of Pascal's famous critique of casuistry, which did much to
diminish its influence. In recent years, however, a renewed interest in the first and second senses of casuistry has
been witnessed in the areas of practical reasoning and applied philosophy.
In its widest sense, casuistry can be described as a method of ethical reasoning which, drawing on the tradition of
practical philosophy of Aristotle and Aquinas, aims to construct a 'dialectic' between the facts of particular cases
and the antecedent assumptions, evaluations and convictions which individual agents bring to bear in their
consideration of such cases. The purpose of the dialectic is to enable agents to arrive at informed decisions as to
what is morally possible and impossible for them to do in particular cases. In a narrower sense, the term casuistry
has been employed to characterize different systems of moral theology within the Christian, Jewish and Islamic
traditions, in which all-inclusive norms are derived from judgments in particular cases, instead of being laid down
in advance by absolute moral codes. In its narrowest sense, casuistry refers to the use of subtle definitional
distinctions in the handling of the problems of moral theology, with the aim of drawing fine dividing lines between
what is and is not permissible at the level of action. The technique has at times been used to excuse crimes and
sins, thereby exculpating the immoral, and such is the extent of the modern association of casuistry with all
varieties of obfuscation, quibbling and laxism, that a pejorative connotation of the word itself is now established in
most European languages.

</description>
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		<title>	Cassirer, Ernst	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-cassirer-ernst-116941.html</link>
		<description>Ernst Cassirer was born in the German city of Breslau (now Wroc&amp;#322;aw, Poland) on 28 July 1874; he died suddenly,
of a heart attack, on the Columbia University campus in New York on 13 April 1945. His life was a personal and
intellectual 'odyssey' that took him from Europe to the USA, and led him from the Marburg Neo-Kantianism of
his teacher, Hermann Cohen, to his own broad vision of human culture and a critique of the modern state. Cassirer
lectured as Privatdozent at the University of Berlin from 1906 until 1919, when he accepted a professorship at the
newly founded University of Hamburg; he served as its rector in 1929-30.
After Hitler's assumption of the chancellorship of Germany in January 1933, Cassirer left Germany. He taught
from 1933 to 1935 at All Souls College, Oxford and then accepted a professorship at the University of Göteborg,
Sweden. In 1941 he moved to Yale University in the USA, and then went to Columbia University for the academic
year 1944-5. Cassirer published nearly 125 books, essays and reviews and left a number of unpublished papers.

</description>
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		<title>	Carolingian renaissance	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-carolingian-renaissance-116940.html</link>
		<description>The 'Carolingian renaissance' is the name given to the cultural revival in northern Europe during the late eighth
and ninth centuries, instigated by Charlemagne and his court scholars. Carolingian intellectual life centred
around the recovery of classical Latin texts and learning, though in a strictly Christian setting. The only
celebrated philosopher of the time is Johannes Scottus Eriugena, but the daring Neoplatonic speculations of his
masterpiece, the Periphyseon (On the Division of Nature) are not at all characteristic of the time and are based on
Greek sources (Pseudo-Dionysius, Gregory of Nyssa, Maximus the Confessor) generally unknown to his
contemporaries. The mainstream of Carolingian thought is important for the history of philosophy in three
particular ways. First, it was at this time that logic first started to take the fundamental role it would have
throughout the Middle Ages. Second, scholars began to consider how ideas they found in late antique Latin
Neoplatonic texts could be interpreted in a way compatible with Christianity. Third (as would so often again be
the case in the Middle Ages), controversies over Christian doctrine led thinkers to analyse some of the concepts
they involved: for instance, the dispute in the mid-ninth century over predestination led to discussion about free
will and punishment.

</description>
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		<title>	Carneades	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-carneades-116939.html</link>
		<description>The Greek philosopher Carneades was head of the Academy from 167 to 137 BC. Born in North Africa he migrated
to Athens, where he studied logic with the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon; but he was soon seduced by the Academy, to
which his allegiance was thereafter lifelong. He was a celebrated figure; and in 155 BC he was sent by Athens to
Rome as a political ambassador, where he astounded the youth by his rhetorical powers and outraged their elders
by his arguments against justice.
Under Carneades' direction the Academy remained sceptical. But he enlarged the sceptical armoury - in
particular, he deployed sorites arguments against various dogmatic positions. He also broadened the target of
sceptical attack: thus he showed an especial interest in ethics, where his 'division' of possible ethical theories
served later as a standard framework for thought on the subject. But his major innovation concerned the notion of
'the plausible' (to pithanon). Even if we cannot determine which appearances are true and which false, we are
able to distinguish the plausible from the implausible - and further to distinguish among several grades of
plausibility. It is disputed - and it was disputed among his immediate followers - how, if at all, Carneades' remarks
on the plausible are to be reconciled with his scepticism.

</description>
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		<title>	Carnap, Rudolf	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-carnap-rudolf-116938.html</link>
		<description>Carnap was one of the most significant philosophers of the twentieth century, and made important contributions to
logic, philosophy of science, semantics, modal theory and probability. Viewed as an enfant terrible when he
achieved fame in the Vienna Circle in the 1930s, Carnap is more accurately seen as one who held together its
widely varying viewpoints as a coherent movement. In the 1930s he developed a daring pragmatic
conventionalism according to which many traditional philosophical disputes are viewed as the expression of
different linguistic frameworks, not genuine disagreements. This distinction between a language (framework) and
what can be said within it was central to Carnap's philosophy, reconciling the apparently a priori domains such
as logic and mathematics with a thoroughgoing empiricism: basic logical and mathematical commitments
partially constitute the choice of language. There is no uniquely correct choice among alternative logics or
foundations for mathematics; it is a question of practical expedience, not truth. Thereafter, the logic and
mathematics may be taken as true in virtue of that language. The remaining substantive questions, those not
settled by the language alone, should be addressed only by empirical means. There is no other source of news.
Beyond pure logic and mathematics, Carnap's approach recognized within the sciences commitments aptly called
a priori - those not tested straightforwardly by observable evidence, but, rather, presupposed in the gathering and
manipulation of evidence. This a priori, too, is relativized to a framework and thus comports well with empiricism.
The appropriate attitude towards alternative frameworks would be tolerance, and the appropriate mode of
philosophizing the patient task of explicating and working out in detail the consequences of adopting this or that
framework. While Carnap worked at this tirelessly and remained tolerant of alternative frameworks, his tolerance
was not much imitated nor were his principles well understood and adopted. By the time of his death, philosophers
were widely rejecting what they saw as logical empiricism, though often both their arguments and the views
offered as improvements had been pioneered by Carnap and his associates. By his centenary, however, there
emerged a new and fuller understanding of his ideas and of their importance for twentieth-century philosophy.

</description>
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		<title>	Carmichael, Gershom	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-carmichael-gershom-116937.html</link>
		<description>Gershom Carmichael was a teacher and writer of pivotal importance for the Scottish Enlightenment of the
eighteenth century. He was the first Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow, predecessor of
Francis Hutcheson, Adam Smith and Thomas Reid. Carmichael introduced the natural law tradition of Grotius,
Pufendorf and Locke to the moral philosophy courses he taught at the University of Glasgow (1694-1729). His
commentaries on Samuel Pufendorf's work on the duty of man and citizen (1718 and 1724) made his teaching
available to a wider readership in Great Britain and in Europe. He also composed an introduction to logic,
Breviuscula Introductio ad Logicam, (1720 and 1722) and a brief system of natural theology, Synopsis Theologiae
Naturalis (1729).

</description>
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		<title>	Carlyle, Thomas	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-carlyle-thomas-116936.html</link>
		<description>Although widely influential as a historian, moralist and social critic, Carlyle has no real claim to be considered a
philosopher. He does have some importance as one of the transmitters of the ideas of the German Idealists, such
as Kant and Fichte, to Britain, and as one of the chief British spokesmen for the Romantic exaltation of the
imagination above the understanding; but his grasp of philosophical issues is vague. His later writings are
dominated by the idea, derived from his childhood Calvinism, of a divine justice working in history through the
medium of great men ('heroes') who are its conscious or unconscious instruments.
Carlyle was born in Ecclefechan, Scotland, the eldest son of James Carlyle, a farmer and stonemason, and his wife
Margaret. Educated at Annan Academy and Edinburgh University, he eked out a meagre living by private tutoring
and journalism until leaving Scotland and moving to London in 1834. His first major work, Sartor Resartus, was
published in 1833: the most significant of his later writings were The French Revolution (1837), Past and Present
(1843), Letters and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell (1845) and The History of Frederick the Great (1858-65).
Carlyle is important as a literary figure, a moralist, a historian and a social critic, but has little serious claim to be
considered a philosopher, though he was sometimes regarded as such by his contemporaries. His chief interest in
this regard is as one of the transmitters of German Idealism to Britain in the 1820s. The tradition of Scottish
Calvinism in which he had been brought up had been shaken by his encounter with the ideas of the Enlightenment
at Edinburgh University, and he found in the German Idealist tradition a resolution of the problems this caused
him. His enthusiasm for this tradition was expressed in a series of review articles from the 1820s which first
brought his name before the public - notably on the 'State of German Literature' (1827) and 'Novalis' (1829) (see
also 'Voltaire' (1829) and 'Diderot' (1833) for his repudiation of the rationalism of the Enlightenment).

</description>
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	<item>
		<title>	Cardano, Girolamo	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-cardano-girolamo-116935.html</link>
		<description>The Renaissance Italian Girolamo Cardano is famous for his colourful personality, as well as for his work in
medicine and mathematics, and indeed in almost all the arts and sciences. He was an eclectic philosopher, and
one of the founders of the so-called new philosophy of nature developed in the sixteenth century. He used both the
Aristotelian and the Neoplatonic traditions as starting points, and following the medical paradigm of organic
being, he transformed the traditional Aristotelian universe into an animated universe in which, thanks to their
organic functional order, all individual parts strive towards the conservation both of themselves and of the whole
universe. As a result, they can be subjected to a functional analysis. In his more casual writings on moral
philosophy, Cardano showed his orientation to be basically Stoic.

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		<title>	Capreolus, Johannes	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-capreolus-johannes-116934.html</link>
		<description>Thomist philosopher and theologian, Capreolus composed a lengthy commentary on Aquinas' work on Peter
Lombard's Sentences, known as Defensiones theologiae divi Thomae Aquinatis (Defences of the Theology of
Thomas Aquinas) (first printed in 1483-4). He sought to refute the criticisms of Thomism by competing scholastic
traditions during the fourteenth century. The Thomistic school was so impressed with Capreolus' achievement that
it came to refer to him as Princeps Thomistarum (leader of the Thomists). Twentieth-century Thomists have,
generally, considered him more faithful to the teachings of Aquinas than later commentators such as Cajetan. His
philosophical opinions which have received most attention concern analogy, the formal ontological constituent of
the person and the individuation of material substances.
Capreolus was born in Rodez, France, around 1380 and entered the Dominican Order there. In 1407 he was
assigned to the University of Paris as bachelor of the Sentences. He was licensed to graduate as master of theology
in 1411. He subsequently taught in Dominican convents in Toulouse and Rodez. He died in Rodez on 6 April
1444.
Capreolus' reflections on analogy appear in his attack on Duns Scotus' affirmation that the concept of being is
predicated univocally of God and creatures. He does not present a systematic theory of
analogy but solely a tentative clarification of the analogy of being.
He accepts as paradigmatic Aquinas' threefold division of analogy. It is the third part of the
division that deals with the analogy between God and creatures: the analogical concept is predicated of things
which have neither a proper notion nor their manner of being in common. To explain it, he uses the distinction
between the formal and the objective concept thereafter adopted almost unanimously by the Thomistic school. The
formal concept is the subjective, mental representation of a common nature produced by the possible intellect after
it has been actualized by an impressed intelligible species abstracted by the agent intellect from a phantasm. The
objective concept is the extramental common nature considered precisely in so far as it is the object of an act of
understanding.

</description>
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		<title>	Camus, Albert	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-camus-albert-116933.html</link>
		<description>Albert Camus was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1957 for having 'illuminated the problems of the human conscience
in our times'. By mythologizing the experiences of a secular age struggling with an increasingly contested
religious tradition, he dramatized the human effort to 'live and create without the aid of eternal values which,
temporarily perhaps, are absent or distorted in contemporary Europe'(1943). Thus the challenge posed by 'the
absurd' with which he is so universally identified.
Camus' most celebrated work is L'Étranger (The Stranger) (1942). Depicting the 'metaphysical' awakening of an
ordinary Algerian worker, Camus concretizes the Pindarian injunction, provided as life's answer to 'the absurd' in
an epigram to Le Mythe de Sisyphe (The Myth of Sisyphus) (1943): 'Oh my soul do not aspire to immortal heights
but exhaust the field of the possible.'
But if the 'absurd' defines our world, it was never treated by Camus as a conclusion, only 'a point of departure'.
What else have I done except reason about an idea I discovered in the streets of my time? That I have nourished
this idea (and a part of me nourishes it still) along with my whole generation goes without saying. I simply set
it far enough away so that I could deal with it and decide on its logic.
(1954)
How and what morality is still possible, then, in view of the experience of 'the death of God' which has given birth
to the experience of absurdity? While the absurd leaves humans without justification and direction, rebellion bears
witness to the refusal of human beings to accept this incipient despair.
By demanding an end to oppression, rebellion seeks to transform - by revolution if necessary - the conditions that
gave rise to it. Rebellion thus testifies to the human being's incessant demand for dignity. But it is often a vain
yearning without a revolutionary transformation of the institutional structures of exploitation and oppression. Yet
that transformation only promises further and even greater humiliation if it is not continually guided by the spirit
and concerns of rebellion. Appalled by the totalitarian direction of many modern revolutionary movements, Camus
thought he detected a messianic nostalgia lurking at the core of Western rebellions. He saw them driven by an
often unexpressed need to replace the failed vertical transcendence of Judaeo-Christianity with a new horizontal
transcendence.

</description>
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		<title>	Campbell, Norman Robert	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-campbell-norman-robert-116932.html</link>
		<description>Campbell made important contributions to philosophy of science in the 1920s, influenced by Poincaré, Russell and
his own work in physics. He produced pioneering analyses of the nature of physical theories and of measurement,
but is mainly remembered for requiring a theory, for example, the kinetic theory of gases, to have an 'analogy',
that is, an independent interpretation, for example, as laws of motion of a swarm of microscopic particles.
The British philosopher of science Norman Robert Campbell, who became a Fellow of Trinity College Cambridge
in 1904, was also an experimental physicist, and worked on the research staff of the British General Electric
Company from 1919 to 1944. His main contribution to philosophy, published in 1920, is his account of how
physical theories explain laws. It maintains an absolute distinction between laws relating observable properties of
objects, on which agreement can be achieved, and theories used to explain them. It could allow a weaker
distinction, letting accepted theories come to state laws needing further explanation. But only an implausible view
of the significance of the distinction can save its claim that theories need analogies.
Campbell's account of theories credits them with three components, illustrated by a simplified version of the
kinetic theory of gases. First there is a theory's 'hypothesis', its mathematical propositions, empirically
uninterpreted. Then there is a 'dictionary', linking terms of the hypothesis to observable terms used to state the
laws the theory explains. Thus in his example the dictionary identifies the volume V, mass M, pressure P and
absolute temperature T of a gas with combinations of constants and variables postulated by the hypothesis: for
example, V = l 3, where l is a constant, M = nm, where m is a constant and 3n the number of variables dependent
on the independent variable t (time). This hypothesis and dictionary entail the perfect gas law, PV / T .

</description>
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		<title>	Campbell, George	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-campbell-george-116931.html</link>
		<description>George Campbell, Scottish minister, professor and religious thinker, is now remembered primarily for The
Philosophy of Rhetoric (1776). Here he employed the Scottish Enlightenment's developing science of human
nature to explain the effectiveness of the classical rules of rhetoric. He did this by relating the various ends of
persuasive discourse to the natural faculties and propensities of the human mind. In his own time Campbell was
better known as a religious apologist, using an enlightened theory of evidence in A Dissertation on Miracles
(1762) to defend the believability of Christian miracles against the sceptical attack of David Hume.
George Campbell was born in Aberdeen and educated at the town's Marischal College. He was ordained in the
established Church of Scotland in 1748 and was minister of a country parish for nearly a decade. Upon returning to
Aberdeen, he helped found the influential Aberdeen Philosophical Society, whose members included Thomas
Reid, Alexander Gerard and James Beattie (Aberdeen Philosophical Society). He was appointed to the posts of
Principal and Professor of Divinity in Marischal College in 1759 and 1771 respectively, which he held jointly until
the year before his death.

</description>
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		<title>	Campanella, Tommaso	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-campanella-tommaso-116930.html</link>
		<description>Tommaso Campanella was a Counter-Reformation theologian, a Renaissance magus, a prophet, a poet and an
astrologer, as well as a philosopher whose speculations assumed encyclopedic proportions. As a late Renaissance
philosopher of nature, Campanella is notable for his early, and continuous, opposition to Aristotle. He rejected the
fundamental Aristotelian principle of hylomorphism, namely the understanding of all physical substance in terms
of form and matter. In its place he appropriated Telesio's understanding of reality in terms of the dialectical
principles of heat and cold; and he adopted a form of empiricism found in Telesio's work that included
pansensism, the doctrine that all things in nature are endowed with sense. Especially after 1602, Campanella's
exposure to Renaissance Platonism also involved him in panpsychism, the view that all reality has a mental
aspect. Thus his empiricism came to show a distinctly metaphysical and spiritualistic dimension that transformed
his philosophy. At the same time his epistemology embraced a universal doubt and an emphasis on individual
self-consciousness that are suggestive of Descartes' views.
Campanella's career as a religious dissident, radical reformer and leader of an apocalyptic movement presents a
political radicalism that was oddly associated with more traditional notions of universal monarchy and the need
for theocracy. The only one of his numerous writings that receives attention today, La Città del Sole (The City of
the Sun) (composed 1602, but not published until 1623), has come to occupy a prominent place in the literature of
utopias though Campanella himself seems to have expected some form of astronomical/apocalyptic realization.
Campanella's naturalism, especially its pansensism and panpsychism, enjoyed some currency in Germany and
France during the 1620s, but in the last five years of his life it was emphatically rejected by the intellectual
communities headed by Mersenne and Descartes, as well as by Galileo.

</description>
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		<title>	Cambridge Platonism	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-cambridge-platonism-116929.html</link>
		<description>The term 'Cambridge Platonism' has been used to refer to a group of thinkers active in Cambridge from the late
1630s to the 1680s, who were in one form or another inspired by the Platonic tradition of philosophy. Most of
them were either fellows or students of two colleges, Emmanuel and Christ's. Their inner circle consisted of Henry
More (1614-87), Ralph Cudworth (1617-88), John Smith (1618-52) and Benjamin Whichcote (1609-83), who was
its leading figure. Their outer circle of associates within Cambridge comprised John Sherman (d. 1666), John
Worthington (1618-80), Peter Sterry (1613-72), George Rust (1626-70) and Nathaniel Culverwell (1618-51).
There were also thinkers outside Cambridge who were closely connected with, and often shared the views of, the
Cambridge Platonists: John Norris (1657-1711), Joseph Glanvill (1636-80) and Richard Burthogge
(c.1638-c.1704). Among the disciples of the Cambridge school were some important latitudinarian divines: Simon
Patrick (1626-1707), Edward Fowler (1632-1714), John Tillotson (1630-94), John Moore (1646-1714), Gilbert
Burnet (1643-1715), Edward Stillingfleet (1635-99) and Thomas Tenison (1636-1715).

</description>
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		<title>	Calvin, John	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-calvin-john-116928.html</link>
		<description>John Calvin, French Protestant reformer and theologian, was a minister among Reformed Christians in Geneva
and Strasbourg. His Institutes of the Christian Religion (first edition 1536) - which follows the broad outline of the
Apostles' Creed and is shaped by biblical and patristic thought - is the cornerstone of Reformed theology.
Calvin's religious epistemology links self-knowledge and knowledge of God. He identifies in humans an innate
awareness of God, which is supported by the general revelation of God in creation and providence. Because sin
has corrupted this innate awareness, Scripture - confirmed by the Holy Spirit - is needed for genuine knowledge of
God. Scripture teaches that God created the world out of nothing and sustains every part of it. Humanity, which
was created good and with free will, has defaced itself and lost significant freedom due to its fall into sin. Calvin
sees Christ the mediator as the fulfilment of the Old Testament offices of prophet, priest and king.
Calvin insists that God justifies sinners on the basis of grace and not works, forgiving their sins and imputing
Christ's righteousness to them. Such justification, received by faith, glorifies God and relieves believers' anxiety
about their status before God. On the basis of his will alone, God predestines some individuals to eternal life and
others to eternal damnation.
Calvin dignifies even ordinary occupations by seeing them as service to God. He recognizes the distinction
between civil government and the Church, although he says that government should protect true worship of God
and Christians should obey and support their government. Calvin's thought was dominant in non-Lutheran
Protestant churches until the eighteenth century and has enjoyed a resurgence since the mid nineteenth century.

</description>
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		<title>	Callicles	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-callicles-116927.html</link>
		<description>Callicles, although known only as a character in Plato's Gorgias (the dramatic date of which is somewhere
between 430 and 405 BC), was probably an actual historical person. Employing a distinction between nature
(physis) and convention (nomos), he argues eloquently that the naturally superior should seize both political
power and a greater share of material goods: it is only a convention of the weak majority which labels such
behaviour unjust. In private life the superior should indulge their desires freely: excess and licence are true virtue
and happiness.
Callicles is a wealthy and aristocratic young Athenian with ambitions to be a democratic leader, and the detail that
Plato bestows on his portrait strongly suggests that he did in fact exist. Plato may have deliberately selected
someone whose youthful promise was known to have come to nothing, as a warning against moral and intellectual
indiscipline (there is a hint that Callicles was later arrested). Despite his proclaimed contempt for Sophists, his
views appear indebted to those of Gorgias and may consequently be distorted by Plato's anti-Sophistic bias.

</description>
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		<title>	Calcidius	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-calcidius-116926.html</link>
		<description>The Platonist Calcidius (sometimes less correctly spelt Chalcidius) was the author of a Latin work containing a
partial translation of, and partial commentary on, Plato's Timaeus. Although of uncertain date, the doctrinal
content of his commentary reflects the thought of the Middle Platonist era (c.50 BC-AD 200).
Calcidius' date and place of operation are uncertain, the only clue residing in his dedication of his work to one
Osius, who has been taken, following identifications in a number of manuscripts, to be the Bishop of Corduba (AD
256-357) and spiritual advisor of Constantine. This identification has been challenged, mainly on the grounds that
Isidore of Seville makes no mention of Calcidius in his enumeration of all the Spanish writers that he knows, but
this is not conclusive. It is also true that his language is more consistent with a fifth-century than a fourth-century
date, but even this is not conclusive when weighed against considerations of content. The main issue is whether
Calcidius is to be regarded as exclusively dependent on Middle Platonist sources or as influenced also by the
Timaeus commentary of Porphyry. In fact, there are sufficient indications that, unless Calcidius was being very
selective (which does not seem to be his method), he knows nothing of Porphyry. His work seems primarily to be a
translation of a number of Middle Platonist or Peripatetic Greek sources (or even of a single such source).
Identifiable sources include the second century Peripatetic Adrastus of Aphrodisias, who wrote a commentary on
the Timaeus concentrating on the mathematical and 'scientific' aspects, and the Neo-Pythagorean Numenius.

</description>
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		<title>	Cajetan (Thomas de Vio)	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-cajetan-thomas-vio-116925.html</link>
		<description>Thomas de Vio, better known as Cajetan, has long been considered to be the outstanding commentator on the
philosophical thought of Thomas Aquinas. He has had a great influence not only on discussions about Aquinas'
theory of analogical predication regarding God and creatures but also on discussions about Aquinas' fundamental
notions of essence and existence. On both counts his interpretations are at variance with Aquinas himself. He also
set himself in opposition to Aquinas when he denied in his later writings that the immortality of the human soul
could be demonstrated, arguing that it is a doctrine that must be accepted simply on faith, like the doctrines of the
Trinity and the Incarnation. His explication of Aquinas' cognitive psychology is an interesting development that
goes beyond Aquinas.

</description>
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		<title>	Cabral, Amílcar	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-cabral-amilcar-116924.html</link>
		<description>Amílcar Cabral was founder and leader of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde
(PAIGC), which led a war of liberation in the Portuguese colonies of Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde that ended
with the recognition of their joint independence by the Portuguese government in October 1974. Cabral was
assassinated in 1973, the victim of an attempted coup aimed at taking over the PAIGC leadership. Thus he did not
live to see the independence for which he had struggled. Cabral's importance for African political philosophy lies
in his having developed an undogmatic left-wing analysis of the situation of the Guinean peasantry. While familiar
with Marxist analysis, Cabral was always willing to adapt it to the empirical realities of the Guinean situation. His
writings on the role of culture in the nationalist struggle, which have important affinities with Gramsci, combine
theoretical ingenuity with detailed local knowledge.

</description>
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		<title>	Cabanis, Pierre-Jean	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-cabanis-pierre-jean-116923.html</link>
		<description>Cabanis was born in Cosnac in the Limousin. He was registered as a medical doctor in Reims in 1784, after seven
years' study in Paris (during which he had already become a protégé of Mme d'Helvétius, encountering Condillac,
Condorcet, Benjamin Franklin, Mirabeau and Theodore Roosevelt in her circle). His radical ideas about the reform
of medical practice and education would perhaps have made it difficult for him to be accepted by the medical
establishment in Paris at the time. However, he did not make his profession as a doctor (though he treated
Mirabeau, and published an account of Mirabeau's illness and death in 1791). Instead, he put his medical
knowledge to political and philosophical use. In 1790, he wrote his Observations sur les hôpitaux (Observations
on Hospitals) and this led to public office, including membership of the Commission on Hospitals, under the
revolutionary régime. He also took an active interest in educational reform.

</description>
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		<title>	Báñez, Domingo	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-banez-domingo-116922.html</link>
		<description>Domingo Báñez, once spiritual advisor to St Teresa of Avila, was a prominent Spanish theologian. In his
commentaries on the Summa theologiae of Thomas Aquinas, he challenged an essentialist reading of Aquinas, and
insisted that esse (being) was an act. He is best known for his opposition to Molina's attempt to reconcile human
free choice with divine foreknowledge, providence and grace. He also wrote on logic, and commented on
Aristotle's On Generation and Corruption.
Báñez studied at Salamanca, where he entered the Dominican Order in 1546. He held a series of teaching and
administrative posts in Avila, Alcalá, Valladolid and Toro. In 1577 he returned to the University of Salamanca
where he taught theology until he retired in 1600.

</description>
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		<title>	Byzantine philosophy	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-byzantine-philosophy-116921.html</link>
		<description>Although early Christian writers on the ascetic theory of life had adopted the term philosophia, the earliest
manifestations of autonomous philosophical thought in Byzantium appeared in the ninth and tenth centuries with
the Christian humanists' such as Photios, Patriarch of Constantinople, Arethas of Patras, Bishop of Caesarea, and
Leo the Mathematician (or Philosopher). Photios elaborated the doctrine of the Trinity in the dispute over the
procession of the Holy Spirit (the filioque dispute) using the armoury of Aristotle's theory of substances (the
distinction between first substance' and second substance'). He was keenly interested in Aristotelian logic,
rejecting Plato's self-existent ideas', and he collected works by many ancient writers. Arethas copied and
commented on works by Plato and Aristotle and wrote critical notes on logic, ontology and psychology.
In the late eleventh and twelfth centuries, the growing study of philosophy reflects the great boost given to higher
education and learning by the foundation in 1045 of the University' of Constantinople. Among the teachers
known as hypatoi t&amp;#333;n philosoph&amp;#333;n (first among philosophers) were Michael Psellos, undoubtedly the most
important and most prolific of the Byzantine polymaths, Ioannes Italos, Theodoros of Smyrna, Eustratios of Nicaea
and Michael of Ephesos. The last two are better known as commentators on Aristotle.

</description>
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		<title>	Butler, Joseph	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-butler-joseph-116920.html</link>
		<description>For more than a century following the death of Thomas Hobbes in 1679, philosophers, theologians, and thinking
men generally felt obliged to address his alleged reduction of morality to self-interest and his alleged banishment
of God from the universe. Both views represent misreadings of Hobbes, but both quickly settled into received
interpretations of him. The first view provoked an outpouring of moral philosophy that today, still, we associate
with the work of the Cambridge Platonists, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, Bernard Mandeville, Francis Hutcheson
and, eventually, David Hume and Adam Smith. The second became allied with the claims of the British deists and
so with the writings of men such as Herbert of Cherbury, John Toland, Anthony Collins, Matthew Tindal, Thomas
Chubb, and, later, Hume, Edward Gibbon and Thomas Paine. The two views were connected, since religious
scepticism was widely thought to be destructive of morality.

</description>
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	<item>
		<title>	L'enseignement de la civilisation</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-enseignement-civilisation-116919.html</link>
		<description>xxx	?||L'enseignement de la civilisation, ou plut&amp;ocirc;t la  d&amp;eacute;couverte d'une culture &amp;eacute;trang&amp;egrave;re par les apprenants, occupe une place  particuli&amp;egrave;rement importante dans l'enseignement d'une langue &amp;eacute;trang&amp;egrave;re puisque  l'on ne peut pas traiter une langue uniquement comme corps de structures et de  r&amp;egrave;gles grammaticales. C'est un organisme vivant qui bouge, qui se d&amp;eacute;veloppe et  qui change au fur et &amp;agrave; mesure du temps, en pr&amp;eacute;sentant l'int&amp;eacute;r&amp;ecirc;t non n&amp;eacute;gligeable  d'une approche culturelle en classe de langues.  &amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;D'une mani&amp;egrave;re g&amp;eacute;n&amp;eacute;rale, on remarque actuellement un grand engouement pour  l'enseignement de la civilisation en didactique des langues alors que, dans les  m&amp;eacute;thodes structurales, elle &amp;eacute;tait consid&amp;eacute;r&amp;eacute;e comme secondaire par rapport &amp;agrave; la  langue fran&amp;ccedil;aise qu'il fallait enseigner avant tout. Cette p&amp;eacute;riode d'ignorance  ou d'isolation &amp;eacute;tant pass&amp;eacute;e, on l'associe aujourd'hui int&amp;eacute;gralement aux cours de  langues vivantes. Les trois raisons suivantes nous convainquent : &amp;nbsp;- la culture est &amp;agrave; la fois le principe, la finalit&amp;eacute; et le moteur de  l'apprentissage puisqu'on apprend pour communiquer avec les locuteurs et, sans  culture, la langue resterait lettre morte, &amp;nbsp;- la linguistique prouve que la communication d&amp;eacute;passe largement le cadre  des mots ou la structure des phrases, et la civilisation nous permet d'acc&amp;eacute;der &amp;agrave;  ces sous-entendus, connotations, etc. &amp;nbsp;- les relations internationales exigent non seulement des comp&amp;eacute;tences  linguistiques mais aussi culturelles pour rapprocher les personnes, les peuples,  afin de favoriser la paix dans le monde. ||</description>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-enseignement-civilisation-116919.html</guid>
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	<item>
		<title>	Le désir chez ROUSSEAU (Nouvelle Héloïse)	?</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-desir-chez-rousseau-nouvelle-heloise-116918.html</link>
		<description>Rousseau affirme que l'attente d'un bonheur procure plus de bonheur que la réalisation de cette attente. Cela grâce à l'imagination de l'Homme qui est très développée et qui nous permet de jouir de ce que l'on crée virtuellement. 

Nous verrons que différentes idées de Rousseau sont ici réfutables. Tout d'abord le désir n'apporte selon lui que le bonheur, puis le bonheur est dans le désir et non dans l'acquisition, ensuite il envisage le bonheur d'un point de vu uniquement psychique et enfin il considère que le monde des illusions est le seul digne d'être habité.


Selon Rousseau le désir n'apporte que du bonheur. 
Or le désir est la conséquence d'un manque, d'un désir d'échapper à une souffrance, cela naît donc d'une chose négative. L'homme qui désire est insatisfait, il manque de quelque chose qui lui apporterait un bonheur. Il ne sait pas s'il l'obtiendra, il doute, a peur, comment ces sentiments pourraient apporter un état de bonheur ?
En outre c'est une envie tournée vers le futur, on désire quelque chose qu'on obtiendra peut être. Or penser uniquement à un plaisir futur et incertain nous fait oublier les plaisirs présents, nous ne vivons pas notre vie pleinement. Par exemple comme l'affirme D'Holbach les hommes désirent que leur âme soit immortelle car ils ne veulent pas cesser d'exister, ils croient donc en l'au delà et l'attendent avec enthousiasme. Or ce désir les empêchent de profiter de leur vie présente car ils ne désirent que la vie après la mort. 
C'est un plaisir incertain, cela signifie que certains hommes oublient des plaisirs qui sont devant aux et dont ils pourraient jouir pour se consacrer à des plaisirs qui peut être ne s'accompliront jamais.

</description>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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	<item>
		<title>	 Comment les choses estimés bonnes peuvent nous tromper	?</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-comment-choses-estimes-bonnes-peuvent-nous-tromper-116917.html</link>
		<description>	xxx	?</description>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-comment-choses-estimes-bonnes-peuvent-nous-tromper-116917.html</guid>
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	<item>
		<title>	 Faut-il craindre que le développement de la raison affaiblisse les liens sociaux	?</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-faut-craindre-developpement-raison-affaiblisse-liens-sociaux-116916.html</link>
		<description>	xxx	?</description>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-faut-craindre-developpement-raison-affaiblisse-liens-sociaux-116916.html</guid>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>	 L'art exprime-t-il une époque	?</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-art-exprime-epoque-116915.html</link>
		<description>Dans l'esprit des premiers hommes, nous semble-t-il, deux ordres de possibilités s'opposèrent. D'un côté une série d'activités efficaces, en quelque sorte raisonnées, s'offrait à celui qui chassait à l'aide d'armes fabriquées, pourvoyant de cette manière à sa subsistance. Il disposait de haches de pierre, d'épieux à la pointe de pierre. Il façonnait en outre en forme de boules des pierres destinées au jet. Ses outils lui permettaient de dépecer méthodiquement les animaux, d'en prélever la fourrure. [...]
Mais comme tous ceux qui l'ont suivi, le Moustérien se heurta à la seule puissance qui décidément l'humiliait : il lui fallut comme nous s'incliner devant la mort; devant la mort échouait décidément son effort industrieux. Le domaine de l'activité efficace s'était ouvert à son intelligence naissante.
Le domaine de la mort en était la limite, c'est comme tel qu'il se révéla à l'esprit de ces premiers hommes: tout à coup la mort introduisait ce qui dément la valeur de l'activité humaine, ce qui bouscule le sentiment de capacité lié aux premières lueurs de l'intelligence. L'animal n'attend rien et la mort ne le surprend pas, la mort échappe en quelque sorte à l'animal. Mais l'homme, qui travaille, attend le résultat de son travail, et la mort détruit la tranquille attente qui est le fondement de toute pensée. La pensée est d'abord une attente : la mort répond à cette attente en l'anéantissant,  la mort se révèle à nous par l'anéantissement de cette attente qui est la base de notre vie. C'est de cette manière que l'activité intelligente de l'homme le mit en présence de la mort, en présence de la négation radicale, terrifiante, de ce qu'il est essentiellement.

</description>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-art-exprime-epoque-116915.html</guid>
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	<item>
		<title>	 D'ou vient l'incompréhension entre les cultures	?</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-vient-incomprehension-entre-cultures-116914.html</link>
		<description>	xxx	?</description>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-vient-incomprehension-entre-cultures-116914.html</guid>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>	 Est-ce de la satisfaction de nos désirs qu'il faut attendre le bonheur	?</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-satisfaction-nos-desirs-faut-attendre-bonheur-116913.html</link>
		<description>Toutefois, le plaisir et le bonheur ne peuvent être absolument séparés. L'homme, en tant que vivant, est fortement incliné à poursuivre des buts premiers, ceux qui sont induits par son corps : manger, boire, jouir de son corps sexué. Tout le pousse à  chercher son bien-être, à désirer ce qui le favorise, à fuir ce qui lui apporte désagrément et douleur. C'est ce que l'hédonisme antique, qui affirmait que l'accès au bonheur passait nécessairement par le plaisir, avait compris. Ainsi pour Epicure, le plaisir ou la satisfaction du désir est  un bien. Mais s'il affirme que l'homme doit s'employer à rechercher le plaisir pour être heureux, il ne doit pas en faire la visée ultime ou le but de toutes ses actions. Le plaisir ne doit pas être recherché pour lui-même, mais seulement pour éviter la souffrance et avoir la paix de l'âme. Le bonheur n'est pas le fruit de la luxure : « Ce ne sont pas les beuveries et les orgies continuelles, les jouissances des jeunes garçons et des femmes, les poissons et autres mets qu'offrent une table de luxueuse qui engendrent une vie heureuse, mais la raison vigilante qui recherche minutieusement les motifs de ce qu'il faut choisir et de ce qu'il faut éviter et qui rejette les vaines opinions, grâce auxquelles le plus grande trouble s'empare des âmes » (« Lettre à Ménécée »).</description>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-satisfaction-nos-desirs-faut-attendre-bonheur-116913.html</guid>
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	<item>
		<title>	 L'Arraisonnement de l'Homme par la technique	?</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-arraisonnement-homme-par-technique-116912.html</link>
		<description>Pour Heidegger, l'ère moderne réalise le projet cartésien de maîtrise et de domination de la nature. Elle est l'ère où se manifeste dans toute son ampleur la technique, la mobilisation de toutes les forces en vue d'une exploitation. Toute la nature est devenue, non plus objet de contemplation ou de pensée, mais un fonds exploitable et calculable, y compris l'homme lui-même qui n'en est que le gérant. Ainsi, le Rhin, dont le poète savait dire le mystère, n'est plus qu'une énergie électrique potentielle, qu'une source d'énergie sommée de se livrer (La Question de la technique).

</description>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-arraisonnement-homme-par-technique-116912.html</guid>
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	<item>
		<title>	 La religion est-elle un obstacle à ma liberté	?</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-religion-obstacle-liberte-116911.html</link>
		<description>« Le dernier acte est sanglant quelque belle que soit la comédie en tout le reste. On jette enfin de la terre sur la tête et en voilà pour jamais » (Pensée §165). Cette image pascalienne doit nous renvoyer à deux choses. Premièrement, à ce que nous n'avons de cesse de fuir, notre condition marquée entre autre par ce destin auquel nous sommes tous conviés: la mort. Deuxièmement, à ce manque en nous d'un discours qui ne s'adresse pas seulement à la raison (philosophie) mais aussi et surtout au coeur (religion). Comment être libre lorsque notre vie est entièrement basée sur une fuite, celle de cette condition qui est la notre et qui nous effraie à chaque fois que notre pensée s'y attarde? Comment être libre quand quelque chose se joue en nous, des mécanisme affectifs devant lesquels la philosophie est peu bavarde? Ce que nous sommes, ce que nous ressentons, ne trouve son sens qu'en dehors d'une philosophie pétrie d'orgueil et qui ne jure que par la raison: à savoir, dans la sphère religieuse qui traite de ce qui nous préoccupe </description>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-religion-obstacle-liberte-116911.html</guid>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>	 La philosophie nous détache-t-elle de la réalité	?</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-philosophie-nous-detache-realite-116910.html</link>
		<description>- Le monde, dans le quotidien, nous apparaît à travers des manifestations sensibles caractérisées par leur variété, mais aussi par leur fugacité. Il concerne en priorité la perception.
 Or il est incontestable que la philosophie, depuis Platon, se méfie de la perception, n'y trouvant que source d'erreurs et défilé d'apparences inconsistantes (on peut faire une référence  mais rapide  à l'allégorie de la caverne). Elle privilégie le concept qui, en tant qu'universel et séparé des apparences, est bien abstrait: détaché de tout «accident», de toute «qualité», du monde immédiat.
 Toute la bibliothèque philosophique et la pensée qu'elle transmet va dans ce sens: la réflexion, au moins dans un premier temps, met le monde à distance  te qui suppose qu'elle s'en détache  et substitue à l'immédiateté du sensible un ensemble d'idées, de concepts qui, en se prétendant universellement applicables, commencent par négliger chaque cas particulier.</description>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-philosophie-nous-detache-realite-116910.html</guid>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>	 Peut-on parler d'un modèle de civilisation	?</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-peut-parler-modele-civilisation-116909.html</link>
		<description>Ce principe, si on l'appliquait rétrospectivement, disqualifierait presque toutes les civilisations passées, qui ont recouru à l'esclavage et qui ont généralement sacrifié l'individu au profit de la collectivité. Or ce dernier point justement mérite réflexion. Deux grandes options s'opposent ici : l'une, la nôtre, privilégie l'individu, la personne, l'autre, plus ancienne mais encore présente, vise avant tout un bien supérieur, dépassant absolument le bien propre de chacun : ce peut être la prospérité de la cité ou le service d'un dieu ou de l'incarnation d'un dieu. On peut penser que ces options différentes ont chacune leur logique et leur cohérence, sans quoi les civilisations qui les ont adoptées ne dureraient pas ou n'auraient pas duré longtemps.</description>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-peut-parler-modele-civilisation-116909.html</guid>
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	<item>
		<title>	 La contradiction constitue elle un handicap a la philosophie	?</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-contradiction-constitue-handicap-philosophie-116908.html</link>
		<description>L'entendement distingue sa réflexion subjective de la vérité même, il ne se voit pas lui-même dans le phénomène, dans l'objectalité qui pour lui a sa dynamique propre. C'est grâce à l'erreur que la conscience naturelle, ou naïve, en arrive à réfléchir sur ses observations. Cette conscience établit des déterminations universelles au regard de la vie multiforme et infiniment variée qu'elle observe dans ces particularités. La conscience empirique s'attribue l'erreur, puisque son but, sa satisfaction, est de conserver la positivité abstraite des êtres, leur égalité à soi. L'objet étant toujours déjà là dans le monde, c'est au sujet qu'il revient d'abolir la contradiction qui menace la positivité. Le sujet tient ainsi déjà une réflexion sur lui-même, puisqu'en tant qu'engagé dans un monde, il se tient pour seul responsable des illusions qui peuvent l'affecter. Dès lors, il constatera rapidement, en observant un bâton dans l'eau, que celui-ci est brisé ; mais il déterminera qu'il n'est brisé que pour lui-même, et non en soi. Il faut abolir la contradiction, et cette expérience est à l'origine de ce principe formel qui est le principe de non-contradiction.</description>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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	<item>
		<title>	 La religion  est-elle un asile pour les pauvres	?</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-religion-asile-pour-pauvres-116907.html</link>
		<description>	xxx	?</description>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-religion-asile-pour-pauvres-116907.html</guid>
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	<item>
		<title>	 L'ignorance est elle source de la connaissance	?</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-ignorance-source-connaissance-116906.html</link>
		<description>	xxx	?</description>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-ignorance-source-connaissance-116906.html</guid>
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	<item>
		<title>	 Le cru et le su s'excluent-ils	?</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-cru-excluent-ils-116905.html</link>
		<description>Une croyance plus radicale est au fondement de la possibilité du savoir, et peut-être dans les deux acceptions de ce dernier (intellectuel et pratique). Il s'agit simplement de la croyance en la réalité du monde extérieur. Pour connaître les choses, il faut d'abord croire à leur existence, serait-elle abstraite et uniquement rationnelle. En douter conduit d'abord au scepticisme pyrrhonien (qui doute de tout, et même du fait de douter), puis au solipsisme absolu, fruit de l'hypothèse cartésienne du rêve généralisé. La réalité de l'existence des choses à connaître est peut-être impossible à prouver, mais uniquement susceptible d'adhésion par un acte de croyance. Moore, pourtant, proposa une preuve logique de l'existence du monde extérieur monde au sujet qui le pense, mais celle-ci apparaît d'une trivialité sans grande conséquence philosophique, pour ne pas dire affligeante.</description>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-cru-excluent-ils-116905.html</guid>
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	<item>
		<title>	 La science répond-elle à UN besoin de vérité	?</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-science-repond-besoin-verite-116904.html</link>
		<description>La science n'apportera qu'un type de réponse.
 Les sciences ne satisfont pas notre désir de vérité unitaire : non seulement les sciences n'apportent pas une authentique, stable et totale satisfaction à l'homme souffrant et désirant, s'interrogeant sur sa mort et sur sa destinée, sur le sens de sa vie, mais elles nous laissent devant un champ théorique éparpillé, fragmenté, décevant, malgré un effort de communication que nul ne peut nier. Que faire de cette science en morceaux, de cette fragmentation du champ des savoirs ?</description>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-science-repond-besoin-verite-116904.html</guid>
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	<item>
		<title>	 L'Etat garantit-il l'intérêt général	?</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-etat-garantit-interet-general-116903.html</link>
		<description>	Effectivement, par bien des aspects, il semble que l'on puisse suivre Marx &amp; Engels dans L'Idéologie allemande lorsqu'ils parlent de l'Etat comme d'une communauté illusoire dont l'intérêt général ne serait que le reflet de la classe dominante. Or à l'aune d'une lutte des classes, il apparaît alors évident pour eux qu'un intérêt commun à l'ensemble d'une société est impossible en l'état : [] La division du travail implique du même coup la contradiction entre l'intérêt de l'individu singulier ou de la famille singulière [la société civile] et l'intérêt collectif de tous les individus qui sont en relation entre eux ; qui plus est, cet intérêt collectif n'existe pas seulement, mettons dans la représentation, en tant qu'« intérêt universel », mais d'abord dans la réalité comme dépendance réciproque des individus entre lesquels se partage le travail. C'est justement cette contradiction entre l'intérêt particulier et l'intérêt collectif qui amène l'intérêt collectif à prendre, en qualité d'État, une forme indépendante, séparée des intérêts réels de l'individu et de l'ensemble et à faire en même temps figure de communauté illusoire, mais toujours sur la base concrète des liens existant dans chaque conglomérat de famille et de tribu, tels que les liens du sang, langage, division du travail à une vaste échelle et autres intérêts ; et parmi ces intérêts nous trouvons en particulier, comme nous le développerons plus loin, les intérêts des classes déjà conditionnées par la division du travail, qui se différencient dans tout groupement de ce genre et dont l'un domine les autres. Il s'ensuit que toutes les luttes à l'intérieur de l'État, la lutte entre la démocratie, l'aristocratie et la monarchie, la lutte pour le droit de vote, etc., etc., ne sont que les formes illusoires sous lesquelles dont menées ces luttes effectives des différentes classes entre elles [] et il s'ensuit également que toute classe qui aspire à la domination [] doit conquérir d'abord le pouvoir politique pour représenter à son tour son intérêt propre comme étant l'intérêt universel [] ».?</description>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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	<item>
		<title>	 En quoi les lois de la nature ne peuvent-elles pas s'appliquer à la société humaine	?</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-quoi-lois-nature-peuvent-elles-pas-appliquer-societe-humaine-116902.html</link>
		<description>	xxx	?</description>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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	<item>
		<title>	Le langage parvient-il à tout exprimer	?</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-langage-parvient-tout-exprimer-116901.html</link>
		<description>	L'inexprimable for intérieur.

C'est donc l'ensemble de nos émotions, de nos sentiments qui échapperaient à l'expression. Certes, les passions se manifestent par des symptômes extérieurs, elles s'expriment donc d'une certaine façon. Mais ces signes révèlent la présence des sentiments et non réellement leur essence ou leur contenu exact, qui demeureraient le secret de l'âme.

Inexprimable ou confus ?

Mais Hegel nous met en garde contre cette représentation : ce qui ne peut s'exprimer, dit-il, n'est pas une réalité trop singulière ou subtile pour être manifestée au dehors, mais un ensemble confus, évanescent. Doué de conscience, l'homme doit pouvoir tout exprimer - du moins tout ce qu'il a pris la peine d'humaniser, de hisser des méandres de son psychisme jusqu'à la conscience.
Il n'est donc guère étonnant que ce soit à l'occasion d'une critique de l'ineffable que Hegel ait écrit : « C'est dans les mots que nous pensons ». Dire que nous pensons en mots, comme on paye en francs ou en dollars, c'est définir le mot comme l'unité de la pensée. Loin d'être deux mondes radicalement extérieurs, « incommensurables » comme le disait Bergson, le langage et la pensée apparaissent ici comme absolument consubstantiels.
?</description>
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	<item>
		<title>	Business ethics</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-business-ethics-116900.html</link>
		<description>Business ethics is the application of theories of right and wrong to activity within and between commercial
enterprises, and between commercial enterprises and their broader environment. It is a wide range of activity, and
no brief list can be made of the issues it raises. The safety of working practices; the fairness of recruitment; the
transparency of financial accounting; the promptness of payments to suppliers; the degree of permissible
aggression between competitors: all come within the range of the subject. So do relations between businesses and
consumers, local communities, national governments and ecosystems. Many, but not all, of these issues can be
understood to bear on distinct, recognized groups with their own stakes in a business: employees, shareholders,
consumers, and so on. The literature of business ethics tends to concentrate on 'stakeholders' - anyone who
occupies a role within the business or who belongs to a recognized group outside the business that is affected by
its activity - but not in every sort of business. Corporations are often discussed to the exclusion of medium-sized
and small enterprises.
Theories of right and wrong in business ethics come from a number of sources. Academic moral philosophy has
contributed utilitarianism, Kantianism and Aristotelianism, as well as egoism and social contract theory. There
are also theories that originate in organized religion, in the manifestos of political activists, in the thoughts of
certain tycoons with an interest in social engineering, and in the writings of management 'gurus'. Recently,
business ethics has been affected by the ending of the Cold War, and the breakdown of what were once command
economies. These developments have encouraged enthusiasts for the market economy to advocate moral and
political ideas consistent with capitalism, and the handing over to private companies of activity in certain
countries that has long been reserved for the state.

</description>
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	<item>
		<title>	Bushi philosophy</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-bushi-philosophy-116899.html</link>
		<description>Bushi is one of several terms for the warrior of premodern Japan; samurai is another. The 'way of the warrior' -
that is, the beliefs, attitudes and patterns of behaviour of the premodern Japanese warrior - is commonly called
bushid&amp;#333; (literally, the 'way of the bushi'). However, bushid&amp;#333; is actually a phrase of rather late derivation, and in
premodern times was never exclusively used to describe the warrior way.
Two of the earliest and most enduring phrases for the way of the warriors who rose in the provinces of Japan in
the late ninth and tenth centuries were the 'way of the bow and arrow' and the 'way of the bow and horse'. These
phrases, however, referred to little more than prowess in the military arts, the most important of which, as the
second phrase clearly specifies, were horse riding and archery. For many centuries no one in Japan undertook to
define systematically what the way of the warrior in a larger sense was or should be. Warrior beliefs, ideals and
aspirations - including loyalty, courage, the yearning for battlefield fame, fear of shame and an acute sense of
honour and 'face' - were widely recognized, but neither warriors nor others apparently felt the need to codify
them in writing.
Not until the establishment of the Tokugawa military government (shogunate) in 1600, which brought two and a
half centuries of nearly uninterrupted peace to Japan, did philosophers begin to study and write about the warrior
way (bushid&amp;#333;). Concerned about the meaning and proper role of a ruling warrior class during an age of peace,
philosophers posited that warriors should not only maintain military preparedness to deal with fighting that might
occur, but should also develop themselves, through education based primarily on Confucianism, to serve as
models and moral exemplars for all classes of Japanese society.

</description>
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	<item>
		<title>	Burthogge, Richard</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-burthogge-richard-116898.html</link>
		<description>Richard Burthogge, perhaps the first but certainly not the least interesting modern idealist, was a minor
philosopher who responded to a variety of English and Dutch influences. His epistemology, constructed as an
undogmatic framework within which to debate theological and metaphysical issues, contains remarkable
resemblances to later, even recent idealism. He argued that, since our faculties help to shape their objects, we
never know things as they are in themselves: all the immediate objects of thought are appearances.
'Metaphysical truth' is therefore beyond us, but we approach 'logical truth' in so far as our notions harmonize or
cohere with one another and with experience. In this spirit, Burthogge advocated a tolerant reasonableness in
religion, while in metaphysics he postulated a universal mind, united with matter, of which individual minds are
local manifestations.

</description>
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	<item>
		<title>	Burley, Walter</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-burley-walter-116897.html</link>
		<description>Active in the first half of the fourteenth century, Burley received his arts degree from Oxford before 1301 and his
doctorate in theology from Paris before 1324. At one time a fellow of Merton College, he - along with Thomas
Bradwardine, Richard Kilvington and others - became a member of the household of Richard de Bury, Bishop of
Durham and served several times as envoy of the King of England to the papal court. Despite his extra-university
activities, Burley continued to compose Aristotelian commentaries and to engage in disputations to the end of his
life. A clear and prolific writer, Burley has been labelled an 'Averroist' and a 'realist' because of his arguments
against Ockham, but it would perhaps be more accurate to see him as a middle-of-the-road Aristotelian whose
intellectual activity coincided with the transition between the approaches of Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus on
the one hand and those of William of Ockham and the Oxford Calculators on the other.

</description>
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	<item>
		<title>	Burke, Edmund</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-burke-edmund-116896.html</link>
		<description>Edmund Burke's philosophical importance lies in two fields, aesthetics and political theory. His early work on
aesthetics, the Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757), explored
the experiential sources of these two, as he claimed, fundamental responses, relating them respectively to terror at
the fear of death and to the love of society.
Active in politics from 1759, and Member of Parliament from 1765, he wrote and delivered a number of famous
political pamphlets and speeches, on party in politics - Thoughts on the Causes of the Present Discontents (1770),
on the crisis with the American colonies - On Conciliation with America (1775), on financial reform and on the
reform of British India - Speech on Mr Fox's East India Bill (1783). While clearly informed by a reflective
political mind, these are, however, pièces d'occasion, not political philosophy, and their party political
provenance has rendered them suspect to many commentators.
His most powerful and philosophically influential works were written in opposition to the ideas of the French
Revolution, in particular Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790), which has come to be seen as a definitive
articulation of anglophone political conservatism. Here Burke considered the sources and desirability of social
continuity, locating these in a suspicion of abstract reason, a disposition to follow custom, and certain institutions
- hereditary monarchy, inheritance of property, and social corporations such as an established Church. His
Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs (1791) insisted on the distinction between the French and Britain's
revolution of 1688; while his final works, Letters on a Regicide Peace (1795), urged an uncompromising crusade
on behalf of European Christian civilization against its atheist, Jacobin antithesis.

</description>
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		<title>	Buridan, John</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-buridan-john-116895.html</link>
		<description>Unlike most other important philosophers of the scholastic period, John Buridan never entered the theology
faculty but spent his entire career as an arts master at the University of Paris. There he distinguished himself
primarily as a logician who made numerous additions and refinements to the Parisian tradition of propositional
logic. These included the development of a genuinely nominalist semantics, as well as techniques for analyzing
propositions containing intentional verbs and paradoxes of self-reference. Even in his writings on metaphysics and
natural philosophy, logic is Buridan's preferred vehicle for his nominalistic and naturalistic vision.
Buridan's nominalism is concerned not merely with denying the existence of real universals, but with a
commitment to economize on entities, of which real universals are but one superfluous type. Likewise, his
representationalist epistemology accounts for the difference between universal and singular cognition by focusing
on how the intellect cognizes its object, rather than by looking for some difference in the objects themselves. He
differs from other nominalists of the period, however, in his willingness to embrace realism about modes of things
to explain certain kinds of physical change.
Underlying Buridan's natural philosophy is his confidence that the world is knowable by us (although not with
absolute certainty). His approach to natural science is empirical in the sense that it emphasizes the evidentness of
appearances, the reliability of a posteriori modes of reasoning and the application of certain naturalistic models
of explanation to a wide range of phenomena. In similar fashion, he locates the will's freedom in our evident
ability to defer choice in the face of alternatives whose goodness appears dubious or uncertain.

</description>
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		<title>	Bultmann, Rudolf	?</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-bultmann-rudolf-116894.html</link>
		<description>Rudolf Bultmann was one of the most influential Protestant theologians of the period that immediately followed the
Second World War. A founding member of the school of dialectical theology in the 1920s, he was a major New
Testament scholar, who refined the method of form criticism. He argued that the Synoptic Gospels reveal not the
historical Jesus, but the Christ of faith, the Christ-myth developed by the early church. The existentialist
philosophy of Martin Heidegger was a major influence, and he adapted it to the needs of Christian theology,
devising an existential access to faith. He contrasted Historie - objective, factual accounts of historical events -
with Geschichte - the meaning that people choose to give to those events. One must demythologize the New
Testament - strip it of its prescientific imagery - before one can interpret its significance for oneself. Bultmann
defined biblical hermeneutics as an inquiry into the reality of human existence and proposed a new understanding
of the person and teaching of Christ. Central to this is the concept of the kerygma, the proclamation of the
salvation-event focused on Christ. It is in response to the kerygma that a human being can actively opt for faith.
Bultmann reinterpreted the Lutheran doctrine of justification and the theology of the cross in the light of this.
</description>
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		<title>	Bulgakov, Sergei Nikolaevich	?</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-bulgakov-sergei-nikolaevich-116893.html</link>
		<description>A luminary of the Russian Religious-Philosophical Renaissance, Bulgakov moved from Marxism, to idealism, to
Christianity in the early twentieth century. He rejected historical determinism, class struggle and all theories of
progress that accept the suffering of one generation as a bridge to the happiness of another. He regarded the
abolition of poverty as a moral imperative, insisted that Christianity mandates political and social reform, and
wanted to create a new culture in which Orthodox Christianity would permeate every area of Russian life. His
most important philosophical works, Filosofiia khoziaistva, chast' pervaia (The Philosophy of the Economy, Part
I) (1912) and Svet nevechernyi (Unfading Light) (1917), reflect his turn to a Solov'ëvian mysticism which
apotheosized transfiguration, Sophia and Godmanhood (Bogochelovechestvo). Bulgakov saw the cosmos as an
organic whole, animated and structured by a World Soul, an entelechy that he called Sophia, Divine Wisdom.
Sophia mediates between God and his creation, working mysteriously through human beings. In emigration,
Bulgakov developed new interpretations of Orthodox dogmatics and participated in the ecumenical movement. His
lifelong concerns were the Church in the world and the interconnection of religion and life. His writings on
contemporary political, social and cultural issues helped inspire the Russian Religious-Philosophical
Renaissance.

</description>
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		<title>	Buffon, Georges Louis Leclerc, Comte de</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-buffon-georges-louis-leclerc-comte-116892.html</link>
		<description>Both as a scientist and as a writer, Buffon was one of the most highly esteemed figures of the European
Enlightenment. In depicting the perpetual flux of the dynamic forces of Nature, he portrayed the varieties of
animal and vegetable species as subject to continual change, in contrast with Linnaeus, whose system of
classification based on physical descriptions alone appeared timeless. But Buffon's definition of a species in terms
of procreative power excluded the evolutionary hypothesis that any species could become transformed into
another. Hybrids, as imperfect copies of their prototypes, were in his scheme ultimately destined to become sterile
rather than to generate fresh species. By virtue of the same definition, he judged that the different races of
mankind formed family members of a single species, since the mating of humans of all varieties was equally
fertile.

</description>
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		<title>	Buffier, Claude</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-buffier-claude-116891.html</link>
		<description>A French Jesuit who flourished in the early eighteenth century, Buffier developed an outlook that he referred to as
common-sense philosophy. While deeply influenced by the philosophies of Descartes and Locke, he saw their
reliance on the testimony of inner experience to be conducive to scepticism concerning the external world. In
reaction to this, he sought to establish the irrevocable claims of various 'first truths', which pointed towards
external reality and qualified it in various respects. His work anticipates certain themes that surfaced later in the
common-sense philosophy of Thomas Reid.
Buffier was born in Poland to French parents. He pursued his studies in the Jesuit college at Rouen, and entered
there as a novitiate at the age of 18. His career was spent almost entirely at the college of Louis-le-Grand in Paris,
first as a teacher then, after 1699, as 'scriptor', a position that enabled him to devote all his energies to writing. He
wrote extensively on philosophy, geography, history, and grammar (often in verse, to facilitate memorization) and
made important contributions to the Dictionnaire de Trévoux and the Mémoires de Trévoux.

</description>
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		<title>	Büchner, Friedrich Karl Christian Ludwig (Louis)	?</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-buchner-friedrich-karl-christian-ludwig-louis-116890.html</link>
		<description>Ludwig Büchner wrote one of the most popular and polemical books of the strong materialist movement in later
nineteenth century Germany, his Kraft und Stoff (Force and Matter) (1855). He tried to develop a comprehensive
worldview, which was based solely on the findings of empirical science and did not take refuge in religion or any
other transcendent categories in explaining nature and its development, including human beings. When Büchner
tried to expose the backwardness of traditional philosophical and religious views in scientific matters, his
arguments had some force, but the positive part of his programme was not free of superficiality and naivety.
Büchner's writings helped to strengthen progressive and rational traditions inside and outside philosophy, but
they can also serve as the prime example of the uncritical nineteenth-century belief in science's capacity to redeem
humankind from all evil.

</description>
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	<item>
		<title>	Buddha</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-buddha-116889.html</link>
		<description>The title of Buddha is usually given to the historical founder of the Buddhist religion, Siddh&amp;#257;rtha Gautama,
although it has been applied to other historical figures, Buddhist and non-Buddhist, and to many who may be
mythological. The religion which he founded was enormously successful and for a long period was probably the
most widespread world religion. It is sometimes argued that it is not so much a religion as a kind of philosophy.
Indeed, Buddhism bears close comparison with some of the philosophical schools of the Hellenistic world in this
respect. The Buddha himself does not seem to have known the concept of a transcendent God and most schools of
Buddhism have repudiated it on the grounds, among others, that it undermines personal responsibility for action.
Buddhism could be considered as a kind of 'metareligion', open to many religious practices and tolerating others,
but not identifiable with religious activity as such - more a kind of philosophical structuring of religion together
with a methodology for self-development. Associated with this latter is an elaborate and sophisticated account of
mental states and the functioning of consciousness. Characteristic of earlier Buddhist thought is a positive
emphasis upon balanced states and a strong rejection of any form of underlying substance and most types of
changelessness.

</description>
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		<title>	Buber, Martin</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-buber-martin-116888.html</link>
		<description>Martin Buber covered a range of fields in his writings, from Jewish folklore and fiction, to biblical scholarship
and translation, to philosophical anthropology and theology. Above all, however, Buber was a philosopher, in the
lay-person's sense of the term sense: someone who devoted his intellectual energies to contemplating the meaning
of life.
Buber's passionate interest in mysticism was reflected in his early philosophical work. However, he later rejected
the view that mystical union is the ultimate goal of relation, and developed a philosophy of relation. In the short
but enormously influential work, Ich und Du (I and Thou). Buber argued that the I emerges only through
encountering others, and that the very nature of the I depends on the quality of the relationship with the Other. He
described two fundamentally different ways of relating to others: the common mode of 'I-It', in which people and
things are experienced as objects, or, in Kantian terms, as 'means to an end'; and the 'I-Thou' mode, in which I
do not 'experience' the Other, rather, the Other and I enter into a mutually affirming relation, which is
simultaneously a relation with another and a relation with God, the 'eternal Thou'.

</description>
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		<title>	Bryce, James</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-bryce-james-116887.html</link>
		<description>James Bryce, British statesman and writer, combined a distinguished public life with scholarship in history,
politics and law. As a jurist his interest lay in historical jurisprudence, but he is best remembered for his
comparative politics. He contributed significantly to democratic political theory and to a liberal-historicist
approach in philosophy of law.
Bryce was born in Belfast in 1838, of Ulster Scottish descent. He was educated at Glasgow University and Oxford
University. Although called to the Bar in 1867, he preferred scholarship, travel and public service. As Regius
Professor of Civil Law at Oxford (1870-93), he reinvigorated the study of Roman law in Britain and helped to
reform legal education. He entered Parliament as a Liberal MP in 1880 and held several ministerial offices
between 1886 and 1906. He was Ambassador to the USA (1907-13), was elevated to the peerage as Viscount
Bryce of Dechmont in 1914, and remained active in public life until his death.

</description>
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		<title>	Brunschvicg, Léon</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-brunschvicg-leon-116886.html</link>
		<description>Brunschvicg occupied a central place in French philosophy during the first part of the twentieth century. In 1909
he became a professor at the Sorbonne, teaching there and at the École Normale Supérieure for the next thirty
years. His indefatigable activity, wide curiosity and erudition made him a leading figure of French philosophy. His
influence is manifest in the work of Bachelard, Piaget, Guéroult, Nabert, Koyré and Sartre. His most important
work lay in the field of the philosophy of mathematics, where (among other things) he introduced French
philosophers to the work of Frege and Russell.

</description>
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	<item>
		<title>	Bruno, Giordano</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-bruno-giordano-116885.html</link>
		<description>Giordano Bruno was an Italian philosopher of nature and proponent of artificial memory systems who abandoned
the Dominican Order and, after a turbulent career in many parts of Europe, was burned to death as a heretic in
1600. Because of his unhappy end, his support for the Copernican heliocentric hypothesis, and his pronounced
anti-Aristotelianism, Bruno has often been hailed as the proponent of a scientific worldview against supposed
medieval obscurantism. In fact, he is better interpreted in terms of Neoplatonism and, to a lesser extent,
Hermeticism (also called Hermetism). Several of Bruno's later works were devoted to magic; and magic may play
some role in his many books on the art of memory. His best-known works are the Italian dialogues he wrote while
in England. In these Bruno describes the universe as an animate and infinitely extended unity containing
innumerable worlds, each like a great animal with a life of its own. His support of Copernicus in La Cena de le
ceneri (The Ash Wednesday Supper) was related to his belief that a living earth must move, and he specifically
rejected any appeal to mere mathematics to prove cosmological hypotheses. His view that the physical world was
a union of two substances, Matter and Form, had the consequence that apparent individuals were merely
collections of accidents. 

</description>
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		<title>	Brunner, Emil</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-brunner-emil-116884.html</link>
		<description>Emil Brunner was one of the most influential Protestant theologians of the twentieth century. He was a minister of
the Swiss Reformed Church, a professor at the University of Zurich, and held distinguished lectureships in
England, the USA and Japan. He joined the 'dialectical school' early in his career, but tried to rehabilitate
natural theology, which led to a rift with Barth. His works were widely read and often served as basic texts in
Reformed and Presbyterian seminaries. He rejected the historicist reduction of Christ to a wise teacher figure that
was characteristic of neo-Protestantism. He was also critical of modern philosophical anthropologies - as
propounded by Marx or Nietzsche, for example - because he felt that they reduced human essence to a single
dimension. Only theological anthropology can fully interpret human essence; and of central importance here is the
'I-Thou encounter', whereby the fulfilment of the human 'I' is achieved through a relationship with the divine
'Thou'. Brunner also unfolded an original view on the relation of theology to philosophy. Reason, he argued, is
essential for the elucidation and communication of faith. Philosophy, in so far as it indicates the limitations of
reason, can serve to prepare us for the revelation of the Absolute.

</description>
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		<title>	Browne, Peter</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-browne-peter-116883.html</link>
		<description>Peter Browne, an Irish bishop, was a critic of Locke's theory of ideas. His chief philosophical concern was to
explain how human beings can conceive of God. He proposed that God's existence and attributes can be
understood analogically, by their real - though inevitably partial - resemblance to human things. He distinguished
between analogy, which turns on a 'real resemblance', and metaphor, which turns on a merely imagined one.
Browne entered Trinity College Dublin in 1682 and became a fellow in 1692. He served as provost of Trinity from
1699 until 1710, when he became Bishop of Cork and Ross in the south of Ireland. George Berkeley was a student
and fellow at the college during Browne's tenure as provost. Years later, in the Fourth Dialogue of Alciphron,
Berkeley, without naming Browne, attacked his analogical theology (Berkeley, G. §11). He took Browne to be
denying that we have any notion at all of God's attributes. Browne's angry reply occupies the long final chapter of
his Things Divine and Supernatural (1733).

</description>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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		<title>	Brown, Thomas</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-brown-thomas-116882.html</link>
		<description>Thomas Brown was the last prominent figure in the Scottish philosophical tradition deriving from David Hume
and Thomas Reid. Like Reid, he took the mind's knowledge about itself to be a datum it is pointless to challenge or
try to justify, since no other grounds can be more certain for us. But he defended Hume's account of causation as
nothing more than invariable succession. The mind, therefore, is a simple substance, whose successive states are
affected by and affect the states of physical objects: the laws according to which these changes take place are no
harder to grasp than the effects of gravitation. Brown's lectures, published as delivered daily to Edinburgh
students, seek to classify the laws of the mind so that we can conveniently understand ourselves, and direct our
lives accordingly; the last quarter of his course draws conclusions for ethics and natural religion.

</description>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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		<title>	Broad, Charlie Dunbar	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-broad-charlie-dunbar-116881.html</link>
		<description>A Cambridge contemporary of Russell, Moore and Wittgenstein, C.D. Broad wrote on an exceptional range of
topics, including causation, perception, the philosophy of space and time, probability and induction, mind and
body, ethics and the history of philosophy. He typically set out a number of received positions on a topic, explored
their consequences with great clarity, and then came to a cautious estimate of where the truth probably lay.
However, Broad made some notable contributions of his own, especially on perception (he defended a
representative theory), induction (he argued that our inductive practices require the existence of natural kinds),
and time (he argued that tensed facts cannot be analysed away). Although his talents lay in very careful analysis,
Broad insisted that there was a proper place in philosophy for metaphysical speculation; he particularly admired
McTaggart, and his monumental Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy (1933, 1938) contains some of Broad's
best work.

</description>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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		<title>	Brito, Radulphus</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-brito-radulphus-116880.html</link>
		<description>Radulphus Brito was a prominent master of arts at the University of Paris around 1300. In order to secure the
foundation of concepts in extramental reality, he devised a system of four types of 'intentions', first and second,
abstract and concrete. As a philosopher of language, similar concerns made him claim a formal identity between
the modes of signifying (of words) and the modes of being signified (of things).
Probably a native of Brittany, Radulphus Brito (Ralph the Breton) must have been born about 1270, as he became
a master of arts in Paris no later than 1296 and doctor of theology, also in Paris, about 1311-2. He died in 1320 or
later.
The extant body of Radulphus' work is mainly unedited. Most of it relates to his activity as a master of arts, and
comprises questions on the Aristotelian Organon, including Porphyry's Isag&amp;#333;g&amp;#275;, the anonymous Six Principles and
Boethius' De differentiis topicis (On Topical Differences), and on Aristotle's De anima, Physics, Meteorology and
Metaphysics, as well as on some mathematical and astronomical textbooks. There are also sophismata
(investigations of particular logical problems), and a work on grammatical theory, Quaestiones super Priscianum
Minorem (Questions on Priscian Minor), also called Modi significandi (Modes of Signifying). From Radulphus'
career in theology we have questions on Peter Lombard's Sentences, a Quodlibet and Quaestiones in Vesperis
(Evening Questions).

</description>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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	<item>
		<title>	Brinkley, Richard</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-brinkley-richard-116879.html</link>
		<description>Richard Brinkley was a Franciscan theologian at the University of Oxford in the latter half of the fourteenth
century. Probably at the request of his superiors, he undertook an attack on nominalism and conceptualism,
resulting in his best-known work, Summa logicae (Synopsis of Logic). Other works include a commentary on Peter
Lombard's Sentences, which survives only fragmentarily and in a student's shortened version. Brinkley had a
significant influence on several generations of Oxford logicians and Parisian theologians.
Brinkley was active at Oxford University sometime between 1350 and 1373. His successors called him Doctor
Bonus or Doctor Valens (the 'Good Doctor' or 'Capable Doctor'). His principal surviving philosophical work is
the lengthy Summa logicae (Synopsis of Logic) comprising over one hundred manuscript folia (roughly equivalent
to 500 ordinary printed pages). Brinkley's extant theological works include fragments of his Commentum super
Sententias, a commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, which also survives in a shortened version
(abbreviatio) by Stephen Gaudet, who delivered his own commentary on the Sentences in 1361-2 (Kaluza
1989: 181-88). The same manuscript in which Gaudet's abbreviatio is found also contains Quaestiones magnae
and Quaestiones breves (Long Questions and Short Questions) on various philosophical issues in theological
contexts, probably also by Brinkley. Lost works by Brinkley include a Distinctiones scholasticae (Scholastic
Distinctions) listed by John Bale in the sixteenth century, and a Quaestiones theologicales Biligam et Brinkel
(Theological Questions of Brinkley and [Richard] Billingham) (probably a student's compilation), mentioned in an
old Prague University library catalogue. The Lectura super Sententias (Lecture on the Sentences) mentioned by
Bale is very likely identical with the Commentum. Bale also mentions a Determinationes (Determinations), but this
work is probably by William of Foville, a Franciscan of Cambridge University.

</description>
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		<title>	Bridgman, Percy William</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-bridgman-percy-william-116878.html</link>
		<description>Bridgman founded high-pressure experimental physics and was committed to a classical empiricist view of science
- a view challenged by twentieth-century developments in relativistic and quantum mechanics. He argued that
developments in special relativity showed the experimental operations scientists performed were suitable
substitutes for basic constituents of matter, thus founding operationalism, a methodological position which
influenced logical positivism and, transformed beyond his recognition, was expropriated by the behaviourist
school in the social sciences. As Bridgman grappled with the challenges of general relativity and quantum
mechanics, he increasingly parted company with his positivistic and behaviourist followers by moving more
towards subjectivist views of science and knowledge. These later views led him to see and explore intimate
connections between foundations of scientific knowledge and human freedom.

</description>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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		<title>	Brentano, Franz Clemens</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-brentano-franz-clemens-116877.html</link>
		<description>Brentano was a philosopher and psychologist who taught at the Universities of Würzburg and Vienna. He made
significant contributions to almost every branch of philosophy, notably psychology and philosophy of mind,
ontology, ethics and the philosophy of language. He also published several books on the history of philosophy,
especially Aristotle, and contended that philosophy proceeds in cycles of advance and decline. He is best known
for reintroducing the scholastic concept of intentionality into philosophy and proclaiming it as the characteristic
mark of the mental. His teachings, especially those on what he called descriptive psychology, influenced the
phenomenological movement in the twentieth century, but because of his concern for precise statement and his
sensitivity to the dangers of the undisciplined use of philosophical language, his work also bears affinities to
analytic philosophy. His anti-speculative conception of philosophy as a rigorous discipline was furthered by his
many brilliant students. Late in life Brentano's philosophy radically changed: he advocated a sparse ontology of
physical and mental things (reism), coupled with a linguistic fictionalism stating that all language purportedly
referring to non-things can be replaced by language referring only to things.

</description>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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		<title>	Philosophy in Brazil	?</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-philosophy-brazil-116876.html</link>
		<description>It is possible to distinguish between European philosophy in Brazil and Brazilian philosophy. The former refers to
Brazilians who participate in discussions of issues occurring in the European philosophic tradition without any
reference to Brazilian reality and its problems; the latter to those Brazilian intellectuals who respond to the
problems growing out of situations which have confronted the nation historically whether their philosophical
orientations have originated in Europe or elsewhere. This entry focuses on the latter and generally follows a
historical progression. This progression spans from the precabralian Tupi-Guarani speaking societies of eastern
South America to the healthy development of Brazilian philosophy since 1950 after the founding of the Institute of
Brazilian Philosophy.

</description>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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	<item>
		<title>	La sévérité vous semble-t-elle nécessaire à une bonne éducation	?</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-severite-vous-semble-necessaire-bonne-education-116875.html</link>
		<description>.../...
&amp;nbsp;
[Les sanctions n'ont jamais emp&amp;ecirc;ch&amp;eacute; de  				commettre &amp;nbsp;des fautes. Elles ne sont pas n&amp;eacute;cessaires. Les sanctions n'ont  				jamais emp&amp;ecirc;ch&amp;eacute; les criminels d'accomplir leurs forfaits. Elles  				ne sont pas dissuasives. Au contraire, elles renforcent le  				sentiment d'injustice. L'&amp;eacute;ducation ne doit pas &amp;nbsp;reposer sur l'id&amp;eacute;e de contrainte et la peur du ch&amp;acirc;timent.]||Ce document reprend les analyses du sujet:&amp;nbsp;Les sanctions sont-elles n&amp;eacute;cessaires ?||</description>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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	<item>
		<title>	Que faut-il entendre par vains désirs	?</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-faut-entendre-par-vains-desirs-116874.html</link>
		<description>	xxx	?</description>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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	<item>
		<title>	Pouvons nous dire que seul aujourd'hui compte	?</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-pouvons-nous-dire-seul-aujourd-hui-compte-116873.html</link>
		<description>.../...
&amp;nbsp;
 &amp;nbsp;a. Le principal caract&amp;egrave;re du temps  est son ordre qui s&amp;rsquo;impose &amp;agrave; l&amp;rsquo;attention, et plus pr&amp;eacute;cis&amp;eacute;ment, l&amp;rsquo;irr&amp;eacute;versibilit&amp;eacute;  de cet ordre. On peut ainsi tout inverser, sauf le temps. On peut mettre les  choses la t&amp;ecirc;te en bas, mettre &amp;laquo;&amp;nbsp;la charrue avant les b&amp;oelig;ufs&amp;nbsp;&amp;raquo; m&amp;ecirc;me si c&amp;rsquo;est  difficile, dangereux, ce n&amp;rsquo;est pas impossible. Mais on aura beau retourner sur  ses pas, rien ne d&amp;eacute;fera l&amp;rsquo;aller. Lavelle dira que &amp;laquo;&amp;nbsp;L&amp;rsquo;irr&amp;eacute;versibilit&amp;eacute;  constitue pourtant le caract&amp;egrave;re le plus essentiel du temps, le plus &amp;eacute;mouvant, et  celui qui donne &amp;agrave; notre vie tant de gravit&amp;eacute;&amp;nbsp;&amp;raquo; (Du temps et de l&amp;rsquo;&amp;eacute;ternit&amp;eacute;). Jank&amp;eacute;l&amp;eacute;vitch affirmera&amp;nbsp;: &amp;laquo;&amp;nbsp;Le voyageur revient &amp;agrave; son point de d&amp;eacute;part,  mais il a vieilli entre-temps&amp;nbsp;!&amp;nbsp;&amp;raquo; (L&amp;rsquo;irr&amp;eacute;versible et la nostalgie). Ainsi  l&amp;rsquo;irr&amp;eacute;m&amp;eacute;diable r&amp;eacute;side en ceci qu&amp;rsquo;une fois qu&amp;rsquo;on est parti d&amp;rsquo;un point du temps,  celui-ci ne peut plus jamais &amp;ecirc;tre retrouv&amp;eacute;, puisqu&amp;rsquo;il est toujours d&amp;eacute;j&amp;agrave; pass&amp;eacute;.&amp;nbsp;
.../...||Ce document reprend les analyses de la probl&amp;eacute;matique:&amp;nbsp;N'y a-t-il que le pr&amp;eacute;sent qui soit digne d'estime ?||</description>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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	<item>
		<title>	Comment passe-t-on du mythe (mythos) à la raison (logos)	?</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-comment-passe-mythe-mythos-raison-logos-116872.html</link>
		<description>	Le mythe est une représentation culturelle qui a généralement pour objet un acte fondateur d'une civilisation ou permettant de l'expliquer. Plus exactement, le problème du mythe et du logos doit se saisir dans ce mouvement entre la connaissance scientifique et véritable c'est-à-dire l'avènement de la raison et de la science et la pré-connaissance de l'homme dans cette représentation imagée du vraisemblable. Mais comme le dit Lévi-Strauss dans Anthropologie structurale : « Pour comprendre ce qu'est un mythe, n'avons-nous donc le choix qu'entre la platitude et le sophisme ? Certains prétendent que chaque société exprime, dans ses mythes, des sentiments fondamentaux tels que l'amour, la haine ou la vengeance, qui sont communs à l'humanité tout entière. Pour d'autres, les mythes constituent des tentatives d'explication de phénomènes difficilement compréhensibles; astronomiques, météorologiques, etc. Quelle que soit la situation réelle, une dialectique qui gagne à tous coups trouvera le moyen d'atteindre à la signification ». 
	Si le mythe représentation une connaissance préscientifique devant amener vers le logos (1ère partie), il n'en reste pas moins que le logos ne peut se faire d'après épuration du mythe (2nd partie), bien qu'il soit constitutif des sociétés humaines nous permettant alors de nous interroger sur la notion même de vérité (3ème partie).

</description>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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	<item>
		<title>	La preuve est-elle plus forte que le préjugé	?</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-preuve-plus-forte-prejuge-116871.html</link>
		<description>Le terme préjugé est souvent employé dans un sens péjoratif, pour dénoncer l'erreur ou au moins l'absence de réflexion qui conduit un individu à adhérer à une idée fausse (dont il n'a pas pris la peine de contrôler le bien-fondé) voire à la défendre contre des idées justes, ou à condamner des individus au nom de cette idée. Une preuve peut se définir comme étant une démarche , une procédure qui amène l'esprit à admettre la vérité d'une affirmation tandis qu'un préjugé est considéré comme un fait admis sans pour autant être fondé . Face à ces définitions, il semble qu'on ne peut que s'incliner devant une preuve. Elle est le fruit d'un raisonnement, d'une instruction et de recherches, tandis que le préjugé ne s'appuie sur rien, si ce n'est de vagues impressions qui n'ont pas la solidité des fondements de la preuve. Or, bien souvent, une preuve présentée reste impuissante devant un préjugé malgré sa force démonstrative , alors même qu'elle semblerait la plus apte à le combattre, elle qui se définit comme un jugement réfléchi appuyé sur un raisonnement cohérent ou sur une vérification expérimentale. La preuve ne semble donc pas avoir toujours une efficacité réelle contre le préjugé car on s'accroche à nos préjugés, ils sont tenaces. Doit-on en conclure qu'une preuve est inefficace face à un préjugé ? Le problème n'est pas ici de savoir si la preuve est supérieure au préjugé, mais si elle peut détruire les préjugés en comprenant leurs mécanismes ou bien si elle reste impuissante face à eux. Est-ce qu'une preuve ne peut-elle pas éliminer un préjugé ? Peut-elle pourtant rester inefficace face à un préjugé ? A quel niveau une preuve aura-t-elle alors un pouvoir contre un préjugé ?</description>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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		<title>	Brahmo Samaj	</title>
		<link>http://www.devoir-de-philosophie.com/dissertation-brahmo-samaj-116870.html</link>
		<description>The Brahmo (or Brahma) Samaj (Society of Brahma') is the name of a theistic society founded by Raja
Rammohun Roy in Calcutta in 1828. It advocated reform, and eventually abolition, of the traditional caste system,
as well as legislation aimed at improving the social status of women and greater protection of children. Also
dedicated to Hindu religious reform, the Brahmo Samaj stressed a monotheistic doctrine with a policy of tolerance
and respect for all major religions of the world. The society split into two factions in 1866, largely over the issue
of the speed of reform. Another split occurred in 1878 over whether the society's constitution was to be fully
democratic. The democratic wing, called the Sadh&amp;#257;ra&amp;#1049236; Brahmo Samaj (Universal Brahma Society'), is still active
in India.
</description>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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