Devoir de Philosophie

Mexican Revolution.

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Mexican Revolution. I INTRODUCTION Mexican Revolution, violent political and social upheaval that occurred in Mexico in the early 20th century. The revolution began in November 1910 as an effort to overthrow the 30-year dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz. It grew into a widespread rebellion that would eventually change the structure of Mexico's economy, government, and society. Various revolutionary leaders and factions pursued different goals during and immediately after the revolution. Moderate and conservative leaders sought primarily political reform, including free and fair elections. More radical leaders sought far-reaching social reforms, including the redistribution of land to poor farmers, limits on the influence of the Roman Catholic Church, and labor reforms that would give workers the right to organize and to strike. The fundamental goals of the revolution were incorporated in the 1917 constitution, although widespread factional fighting continued until 1920. It took almost another two decades for many of the reforms contained in the constitution to be implemented. And at the end of the 20th century, the goals of the revolution--particularly the need for an accountable, democratic government and the right of all Mexicans to enjoy a basic standard of living--continue to influence the nation. During the revolution, different leaders pursued different objectives. Francisco Indalécio Madero and Venustiano Carranza--both of whom were later presidents of Mexico--sought primarily political reform. The two most famous rebel leaders--Francisco "Pancho" Villa and Emiliano Zapata--supported the growing demands from the lower classes for major social and economic reforms. Zapata, in particular, championed the demands of poor farmers for land to cultivate. Others sought curbs on the social control and political influence exercised by the Catholic Church. Almost all of the revolutionaries felt a growing sense of nationalism and called for a reduction in the prominent role played by foreigners in Mexico's economy. Many swept up by the revolution gave little thought to the long-term goals being pursued; for them the revolution was an opportunity for adventure and personal economic gain. II BACKGROUND: THE DÍAZ YEARS General Porfirio Díaz was the president of Mexico at the outbreak of the revolution in 1910. He had become important in Mexican politics in the 1860s and was elected president in 1877. Díaz pledged that he would serve only one term as president and stepped down in 1880. However, he returned to the presidency in 1884 and was reelected through 1910. Díaz justified his subsequent reelections on the grounds that he had brought political stability and economic development to Mexico. Mexico had seen little political stability: In the 55 years between Mexican independence in 1821 and Díaz's rise to power, the presidency changed hands on 75 different occasions. Díaz used a blend of coercion and compromise to bring his political opponents in line. He and his political allies rigged elections at all levels of government and met press criticism with force or bribery. The Díaz regime worked to develop Mexico's economy, especially its industry. In 1883 Díaz visited the United States and came away convinced that Mexico had to pursue industrialization more aggressively. He believed that Mexico lacked the capital and technology to industrialize; consequently, it would be necessary to make the nation more attractive to foreign investors by providing political stability, government subsidies, and a friendly court system. This strategy led to extensive foreign investment, particularly after 1900. Foreign investors, especially from the United States and Britain, soon came to play dominant roles in Mexico's transportation, mining, and oil industries. The Díaz administration supported policies so favorable to foreigners that some Mexicans complained that their country had become "the mother of foreigners and the stepmother of Mexicans." Díaz's land policy was especially controversial. Even before Díaz came to power, much of Mexico's land was being concentrated in the hands of a small minority of the population; under Díaz concentration increased. A law passed in 1883 permitted private land companies to survey public lands; they were paid for these services, not in cash, but with a land grant equal to one-third of the land surveyed plus an option to buy the remaining two-thirds at a low price. This approach soon transferred extensive public lands to a limited number of private owners. By the mid-1890s these survey companies had gained control of 20 percent of Mexico's total land area. The Díaz regime also continued to allow nonnatives to take property from the communal land holdings of Mexico's indigenous populations, a process that had been accelerating since the 1850s. As more land passed into the control of a small minority, the vast majority of the rural people--primarily indigenous people--saw their real wages and standard of living decline. The one bright spot in the agricultural picture was the growth of commercial agriculture geared to the export market in the United States and Europe. But even this improvement had a darker side: As production shifted to export crops such as sugar and coffee, Mexico actually became less able to feed itself. Mexico frequently had to import food, even basic commodities such as corn. Like the peasant farmers in the countryside, urban laborers also had a lower-class existence. Working conditions in urban areas were harsh, with people typically working 12 hours a day, six days a week. Efforts to unionize met with opposition from police and politicians. The courts typically viewed unions as "illegal associations," and political authorities used the police and sometimes even the army to suppress union activities. Although the Díaz administration tried to hasten industrialization, it was not prepared to accept workers' organizations. While Mexico had many social, economic, and political problems with deep roots in its history, it also had more immediate problems that led to the outbreak of revolution in 1910. Although Díaz's development policies had produced some impressive results, the new prosperity benefited only a small elite, perhaps 10 percent of Mexico's total population. Even these people suffered when the international economy took a downturn in 1907. Mexico also experienced a major crisis in food production and distribution in 1909 and 1910. Antiforeign sentiment grew as foreign investment increased rapidly during the first decade of the 20th century. Although 80 years old, Díaz was planning on yet another reelection in 1910. III THE REVOLT BEGINS The spark that ignited the revolution came from an unlikely source: the presidential election of 1910, which had been considered a mere formality by most Mexicans. There was little indication that the presidential candidacy of a member of the political elite, Francisco Madero, would lead to revolution. Madero came from a wealthy family in the northern Mexican state of Coahuila. He achieved national recognition with the publication in early 1909 of his book, La successíon presidencial en 1910 (The Presidential Succession in 1910). In the work Madero called for free elections and a ban on reelection to high public offices. He also argued that Díaz should permit a free selection of the vice president who would presumably succeed the aging president. When it became evident that Díaz would not permit any choice, Madero chose to run for the presidency himself. Díaz initially welcomed Madero's candidacy as a harmless threat that would give the election a democratic appearance. When Madero became the focal point of anti-Díaz forces, Díaz jailed Madero until after the presidential elections. After Díaz won the election in an overwhelming victory in the summer of 1910, he released Madero, who promptly fled to San Antonio, Texas, to plot revolution. Madero presented his program for revolution in the Plan of San Luis Potosí, named for the Mexican city in which he had been jailed. The plan declared the 1910 elections to be null and announced that Madero would be installed as provisional president until new elections could be held. The plan even provided a specific starting time for a national uprising: 6 PM on November 20, 1910. It also highlighted the fact that Madero was concerned primarily with Mexico's political problems, not its growing economic and social difficulties. Although Madero called for free and democratic elections, and a ban on reelection at all levels of government, he offered little to urban workers seeking higher wages and better working conditions, or to indigenous people seeking the restoration of their traditional lands. Madero's intention was to lead a political rebellion, not a social revolution. Despite the political nature of the plan, it became a rallying point for poor and working-class Mexicans, many of whom expected that broader economic and social reforms would be instituted by a Madero government. On the night before the revolt was to start, Madero crossed into Mexico expecting to be met by a revolutionary army organized by his uncle. Instead he found only a handful of poorly armed rebels; Madero promptly went back to San Antonio, but he returned to Mexico to resume nominal leadership of the rebel movement in February 1911, after numerous rebellions occurred throughout Mexico under his banner. The most important of these rebellions were those led by Emiliano Zapata in southern Mexico and Pascual Orozco and Francisco "Pancho" Villa in the north. Zapata called for land reform and the break up of large estates and ranches in order to give land to indigenous people and other peasant farmers. Rallying under the cry "Land and Liberty," he recruited an army made up largely of indigenous people from villages and farms in the state of Morelos. Villa recruited a following consisting primarily of armed cowboys and ranch foremen, who began attacking federal forces and railroad connections in the northern state of Chihuahua. The northern rebels under Villa focused on capturing the border town of Ciudad Juárez, across the Río Grande (called the Río Bravo in Mexico) from El Paso, Texas. The capture of Ciudad Juárez would be a psychological blow to the Díaz regime, but more importantly, it would give the rebels control of the customs house and an entry point for importing war materials into northern Mexico. On May 10, 1911, rebel forces captured Ciudad Juárez. Díaz recognized that the end of an era was at hand and agreed to resign before the end of May; in return Madero promised to keep Díaz's federal army and bureaucracy intact. Díaz resigned on May 25 and went into exile in Europe. His minister of foreign relations, Francisco Leon de la Barra, was appointed to serve as interim president until new elections could be held. In the presidential elections scheduled for October, Madero was the obvious choice for the victorious rebel groups, although others had actually played more important roles in the military action. The only significant opposition came from General Bernardo Reyes, who represented the old regime. Reyes quit the race and went into exile in San Antonio, Texas, claiming unfair treatment in the campaign. Madero won an overwhelming victory over a group of minor candidates and took office on November 6, 1911. IV THE MADERO PRESIDENCY As a moderate who was primarily interested in political reform, Madero soon found himself caught between revolutionaries demanding more radical change and conservatives seeking to preserve as much of the old regime as possible. Madero angered almost all of the revolutionary leaders by trying to disband the revolutionary forces while maintaining the old Díaz federal army. When Madero adopted a cautious policy on land reform, Zapata revolted and issued his own plan, the Plan of Ayala, which called for the immediate transfer of land to peasant farmers. The most serious revolt was launched by Pascual Orozco in March 1912. Orozco had played a key role in putting Madero in power in the first place and felt that Madero had not adequately rewarded him for his revolutionary services. Members of the old regime--Reyes and General Felix Díaz, the former dictator's nephew--also revolted against Madero. While all of these revolts were put down, they hindered political consolidation, ate away at limited government revenues, and created the impression that Madero could not govern effectively. They also highlighted Madero's limited ability to initiate new policies in the areas of land, labor, and education. Madero was eventually overthrown by a more traditional military revolt in Mexico City led by Reyes and Felix Díaz. This revolt got off to an unpromising start when Reyes was killed on the first day of the uprising, February 9, 1913. Leadership of the rebels then fell to Felix Díaz. The forces defending the Madero government were led by General Victoriano Huerta, an oldline Díaz general. For the next ten days, rebel and loyalist forces struggled for control of the national capital, and artillery fire was exchanged in the heart of the city. With property destruction and civilian casualties mounting, Huerta and Felix Díaz reached an agreement. Under the terms of the agreement, Huerta became provisional president while Díaz would run for the presidency in new elections. Huerta had Madero and his vice president, José María Pino Suárez, arrested, and on February 22, 1913, they were executed. The official explanation was that they had been shot accidentally when their supporters tried to free them. V THE HUERTA REGIME Huerta's seizure of power in the capital soon provoked new revolts in the provinces. Zapata once again revolted in the south, motivated mainly by his belief that Huerta would not act on the issue of land reform. The chief opposition to Huerta came from the "Men of the North": Álvaro Obregón of Sonora, Pancho Villa of Chihuahua, and Venustiano Carranza of Coahuila. The three leaders joined together in an uneasy, mutually suspicious coalition that aimed to overthrow Huerta. Carranza assumed command of the alliance, whose supporters were known as "Constitutionalists" for their desire for a legal, constitutional approach to solving Mexico's problems. Huerta also had another important foe: the U.S. government. The administration of President Woodrow Wilson objected to the way Huerta had come to power and refused to recognize Huerta's government. This made it difficult for Huerta to purchase arms from U.S. companies or to get loans from U.S. banks. The United States offered financial assistance to Mexico if Huerta would hold free and fair elections, in which he could not run as a candidate. When Huerta refused the offer, Wilson blocked the export of arms to the Huerta administration and began an active campaign to force Huerta from office. Wilson dispatched U.S. troops to occupy the key Mexican port of Veracruz in April 1914, cutting off Huerta from an important source of revenue and a location for importing arms. The U.S. president later partially lifted the arms embargo, so that the anti-Huerta forces--but not the Huerta government--could import arms from the United States. With the additional weapons and ammunition, the Constitutionalist forces were able to force Huerta to resign in July 1914. Carranza was then installed as provisional head of the new government. VI CIVIL WAR Rather than bringing peace, the ouster of Huerta led to the bloodiest phase of the Mexican Revolution. Disagreement within the revolutionary ranks had existed from the earliest days, when Orozco and Villa defied Madero to launch the successful attack on Ciudad Juárez in May 1911. After the overthrow of Huerta, the various revolutionary factions held a convention at Aguascalientes in October 1914 to try to unite behind a president. Instead of promoting revolutionary unity, the convention divided the Constitutionalist coalition and provided an opportunity to choose up sides for the bitter civil war that was to follow. Villa and Zapata continued to demand that large estates be broken up and the land redistributed to indigenous people and other poor farmers. They were opposed by Carranza and Obregón, who did not favor widespread land reform. Fighting erupted soon after the convention. An estimated 200,000 Mexicans died as a result of fighting in the year following Huerta's resignation. Zapata's forces occupied Mexico City in November 1914 and in December Villa and Zapata triumphantly entered the capital. Together they seemed to be on the verge of defeating Carranza and taking control of the country. Zapata returned to his home state of Morelos in late December and began to institute the land reforms he had promised. The tide turned in the spring and summer of 1915, when Obregón inflicted a series of major defeats on Villa, who was eventually forced to leave central Mexico and retreat north to his original stronghold in the state of Chihuahua. In August Zapata's army was driven from Mexico City by Constitutionalist forces. The United States acknowledged the weakened position of Villa and Zapata by officially recognizing Carranza as the president of Mexico in October 1915. This angered Villa, who attempted to retaliate against the United States--and prove that Carranza and Obregón did not control northern Mexico--by attacking U.S. citizens in Mexico. In 1916 he crossed the border and raided Columbus, New Mexico, burning the town and killing 18 people. The United States responded by sending a punitive expedition into northern Mexico. United States troops, commanded by General John Pershing, chased Villa for nearly a year but were unable to capture him. Pershing withdrew his troops back to the United States in February 1917, and for the next two years Villa operated as a regional boss in northern Mexico. His troops periodically occupied major cities in the state of Chihuahua, including Ciudad Juárez and Hidalgo del Parral. Carranza's troops invaded Morelos in the spring of 1916 and soon eliminated any remaining hope that Zapata could control southern Mexico. In 1919 while still resisting in Morelos, Zapata was killed by one of Carranza's agents. VII CONSTITUTION OF 1917 Although Obregón had been the principal military figure in determining the outcome of the factional fighting, Carranza continued as the dominant political figure. Carranza--like Madero--came from a politically established, landholding family in northern Mexico and was primarily concerned with political reform. To provide some institutional basis for the revolution, as well as to legitimize his own position, Carranza called a constitutional convention for late 1916. Those attending the convention were carefully screened to exclude supporters of Villa and Zapata. Despite this precaution, more radical members gained the leadership of the convention and produced a constitution that was very different from the one envisioned by Carranza. General Obregón, Carranza's military ally in the fighting against Villa and Zapata, was one of the principal forces behind the social and economic reforms of the new constitution. The 1917 constitution asserted the concept of the "social function" of property, which required that even private property be used in a manner which benefited society as a whole. The constitution claimed national ownership of subsoil resources such as petroleum and committed the government to a program of land redistribution. The constitution also placed a number of restrictions on the Catholic Church. The church could not own property or operate primary schools, and members of the clergy were prohibited from holding public office or even voting. For workers, the constitution recognized the principles of unionization, minimum wages, and maximum hours; it also established a social security system. The antiforeign theme of the revolution showed itself in restrictions on foreigners' ability to own property and conduct business in Mexico. One aspect of the new constitution that did appeal to Carranza was the provisions which strengthened the presidency. Carranza had to accept the 1917 constitution in order to avoid further splits in the revolutionary ranks, but he did not have to enforce it. Elected as the first president under the new constitution, Carranza largely ignored its more radical provisions. He distributed little land to peasants belonging to the indigenous population and ignored the prolabor aspects of the constitution. Carranza also showed little interest in implementing the constitutional restrictions on the church. Although he engaged in lengthy feuds with the U.S. government and foreign investors, these disagreements reflected Carranza's nationalism rather than any commitment to the constitution. Carranza's political demise came not from problems with the new constitution but from a traditional source of political crisis: presidential succession. Carranza attempted to block Obregón from the presidency in 1920 by imposing his own candidate. Obregón and his supporters revolted against Carranza in April 1920. While traveling from Mexico City to Veracruz, Carranza was killed by supporters of Obregón on May 21, 1920. After new elections, Obregón assumed the presidency in December 1920. VIII THE OBREGÓN PRESIDENCY Although Obregón had supported many of the more radical reforms of the new constitution, he proceed cautiously to avoid further political conflict and economic dislocation. The rate of land distribution increased and workers made modest gains under Obregón's administration. Obregón tightened restrictions on the Catholic Church but was not prepared to provoke an open conflict. One of the most notable achievements of the Obregón administration was the education program undertaken by his minister of education, José Vasconcelos, who reformed the curriculum, initiated a nationwide campaign to promote literacy, and substantially increased spending on education in rural areas. The Obregón government also improved relations with the United States, which had refused to recognize its legitimacy. This refusal was due in large part to pressure from U.S. mining and oil companies, who feared that the Mexican government was going to confiscate land and property they owned in Mexico. After a series of diplomatic meetings in 1923, Mexico agreed to give foreign owners of large estates immediate compensation, at market value, for any land confiscated for the purpose of redistribution. Mexico also conceded that constitutional provisions asserting Mexican control of the nation's petroleum resources would not be retroactive; if a U.S. company had acquired lands and taken measures to develop the petroleum resources before 1917, then they would be exempt from confiscation. The United States, in return, reopened its embassy in Mexico and officially recognized the Obregón government. In 1923 presidential succession again caused a split in the revolutionary ranks. Obregón selected as his successor Plutarco Elías Calles, provoking a revolt by the other principal contender for the presidency, Adolfo de la Huerta. Both he and Calles had played key roles in the revolt of 1920, which had placed Obregón in the presidency. De la Huerta was defeated, and Obregón was able to preside over a peaceful presidential election in 1924, the first peaceful transfer of power since 1884. IX THE CALLES ADMINISTRATION Calles made it clear that he intended to implement the constitution more vigorously, which soon provoked major domestic and international disputes. He angered the U.S. government by approving laws that limited foreign ownership of land and regulated the actions of foreign-owned oil companies operating in Mexico. Calles also provoked a major confrontation with the Catholic Church by enforcing constitutional provisions that limited the power of the church, including a ban on religious schools. This led church authorities to end public religious functions for three years, beginning in 1926, and incited the worst civil upheaval the country had seen since 1917. The lack of religious services sparked a panic among the faithful in the central Mexican states of Colima, Jalisco, and Michoacán. The result was a religiously motivated civil war, which became known as the Cristero Rebellion. The rebellion was supported not only by those opposed to the government's anticlerical laws, but also by anti-Calles forces angered by the president's attempts to enforce other reforms mandated by the constitution. Although the Cristero rebels gathered a fighting force of approximately 50,000 recruits, they were unable to overcome the federal army's superior numbers and firepower; fighting came to a standstill in 1929. United States Ambassador Dwight Morrow helped the Mexican government and the Catholic Church to reach an agreement, and the government relaxed its anticlerical legislation in the summer of 1929. In 1928 in the midst of the Cristero Rebellion, Obregón won reelection to the presidency and was slated to return as head of the Mexican government. In July of that year, president-elect Obregón was assassinated by a religious fanatic. Emilio Portes Gil was selected by the Mexican congress to serve as interim president. Although Calles had supposedly retired to private life after 1928, he effectively took over the government and ran the country through a series of weak puppet presidents from 1928 to 1934. Calles dominated Mexican politics during the brief presidencies of Portes (1928-1930), Pascual Ortiz Rubio (1930-1932), and Abelardo L. Rodríguez (1932-1934). During this period, the process of political and social reform slowed, as Calles focused on removing the military from Mexican politics and on improving the nation's infrastructure--especially its roads, postal service, and telephone network. Despite the moderation of the revolution's most radical reforms, three times as much land was distributed to poor farmers during the decade in which Calles controlled the government, 1924 to 1934, as had been distributed under President Obregón between 1920 and 1924. Calles also presided over the creation of an official political party in 1929, an action which would have enormous implications for future governments in Mexico. This was the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (National Revolutionary Party), or PNR. The party was a mechanism for the peaceful transfer of power in Mexico and a means for concentrating political power in the presidency. After numerous name changes and reorganizations, the party came to be known as the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party), or PRI. The party has ruled Mexico continuously from its creation until the present. X THE FINAL YEARS OF REFORM Lázaro Cárdenas served as president from 1934 to 1940. He was supposed to be Calles's fourth puppet, but he soon asserted his independence from Calles and pressed for maximum development of the constitutional themes of the revolution. In the area of land reform, Cárdenas distributed almost twice as much land as all of the previous revolutionary presidents combined. He also reorganized the official government party to give greater voice to peasant farmers and labor demands. In March 1938, after bitter labor and legal disputes, Cárdenas nationalized foreign-owned oil companies. This was, however, one of the last reforms, as Cárdenas was forced to curtail his reform program due to an economic crisis that began in 1937. In the years after 1940, the revolutionary goals set down in the constitution of 1917 were de-emphasized. Land reform and redistribution were cut back in favor of promoting industrialization. The government showed more interest in helping businesses and less interest in responding to the demands of labor. Government hostility toward the Catholic Church gave way to a working relationship, and antiforeign sentiment declined as foreign investment and tourism boomed. By 1946 the Mexican Revolution had essentially ceased being a political reality and had become a historical legacy. XI LEGACY OF THE REVOLUTION The revolution produced major changes in Mexico. The old political elite had been largely swept away, to be replaced by a new revolutionary elite. The revolution set in motion a trend toward political centralization, concentrating power in the national government and particularly in the president. The role of the military in politics was substantially reduced by a series of revolutionary presidents, even though all the presidents who served between 1920 and 1946 had been revolutionary generals. The creation and evolution of an official party solved the recurring crisis over presidential succession that had marked the years from 1910 to 1928; this helped to promote the long-term political stability that Mexico later enjoyed. The revolution also launched labor and social reforms that have had a lasting effect on Mexican society. Workers and peasant farmers were given a greater voice in public affairs, although they were forced to operate within the limits set by the official party and the government. A new constitution gave workers the right to organize and to strike, and established a minimum wage, an eight-hour workday, and limitations on child labor. Enforcement of these provisions was delayed for years, and once they were put into effect, the provisions only applied to the minority of workers formally organized in trade unions. Still they proved to be important to poor and working-class Mexicans throughout the country. The revolution also prompted the Mexican government to take on a more active role in maintaining basic minimum living standards for all Mexicans, a role that has continued throughout the 20th century. The constitution of 1917 paved the way for the development of a substantial social security system, which came to include government hospitals, state-subsidized health care, and public housing. The land reforms begun during the revolution set into motion the largest land redistribution effort ever attempted in Latin America. The new constitution restricted land ownership by the Catholic Church and foreigners and launched a process that dismantled large estates and distributed thousands of hectares of land to indigenous people and other poor farmers. These reforms returned land to many who had lost it during the Díaz dictatorship, and gave land to many farmers who had never owned property. The revolution also helped to define and to promote pride in Mexico's national identity, especially its indigenous roots. It inspired artists such as Diego Rivera and José Clemente Orozco, who celebrated the revolution's political and social themes through their murals and other paintings. Unlike later social revolutions in the 20th century, such as the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the Cuban Revolution of 1959, the Mexican Revolution was not portrayed by its leaders as a model for other countries. Mexicans thought of their revolution as a unique experience that could not necessarily be duplicated. Later opponents of the Mexican government and the PRI--such as the Zapatista movement in the southern state of Chiapas in the 1990s--have called upon the folk heroes and the slogans of the Mexican Revolution to justify their own armed opposition to the existing regime. Contributed By: Don M. Coerver Microsoft ® Encarta ® 2009. © 1993-2008 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

« growing economic and social difficulties.

Although Madero called for free and democratic elections, and a ban on reelection at all levels of government, he offered little tourban workers seeking higher wages and better working conditions, or to indigenous people seeking the restoration of their traditional lands.

Madero’s intention was tolead a political rebellion, not a social revolution.

Despite the political nature of the plan, it became a rallying point for poor and working-class Mexicans, many of whomexpected that broader economic and social reforms would be instituted by a Madero government. On the night before the revolt was to start, Madero crossed into Mexico expecting to be met by a revolutionary army organized by his uncle.

Instead he found only ahandful of poorly armed rebels; Madero promptly went back to San Antonio, but he returned to Mexico to resume nominal leadership of the rebel movement in February1911, after numerous rebellions occurred throughout Mexico under his banner. The most important of these rebellions were those led by Emiliano Zapata in southern Mexico and Pascual Orozco and Francisco “Pancho” Villa in the north.

Zapata calledfor land reform and the break up of large estates and ranches in order to give land to indigenous people and other peasant farmers.

Rallying under the cry “Land andLiberty,” he recruited an army made up largely of indigenous people from villages and farms in the state of Morelos.

Villa recruited a following consisting primarily ofarmed cowboys and ranch foremen, who began attacking federal forces and railroad connections in the northern state of Chihuahua. The northern rebels under Villa focused on capturing the border town of Ciudad Juárez, across the Río Grande (called the Río Bravo in Mexico) from El Paso, Texas.

Thecapture of Ciudad Juárez would be a psychological blow to the Díaz regime, but more importantly, it would give the rebels control of the customs house and an entrypoint for importing war materials into northern Mexico.

On May 10, 1911, rebel forces captured Ciudad Juárez.

Díaz recognized that the end of an era was at hand andagreed to resign before the end of May; in return Madero promised to keep Díaz’s federal army and bureaucracy intact.

Díaz resigned on May 25 and went into exile inEurope.

His minister of foreign relations, Francisco Leon de la Barra, was appointed to serve as interim president until new elections could be held. In the presidential elections scheduled for October, Madero was the obvious choice for the victorious rebel groups, although others had actually played more importantroles in the military action.

The only significant opposition came from General Bernardo Reyes, who represented the old regime.

Reyes quit the race and went into exilein San Antonio, Texas, claiming unfair treatment in the campaign.

Madero won an overwhelming victory over a group of minor candidates and took office on November6, 1911. IV THE MADERO PRESIDENCY As a moderate who was primarily interested in political reform, Madero soon found himself caught between revolutionaries demanding more radical change andconservatives seeking to preserve as much of the old regime as possible.

Madero angered almost all of the revolutionary leaders by trying to disband the revolutionaryforces while maintaining the old Díaz federal army.

When Madero adopted a cautious policy on land reform, Zapata revolted and issued his own plan, the Plan of Ayala,which called for the immediate transfer of land to peasant farmers. The most serious revolt was launched by Pascual Orozco in March 1912.

Orozco had played a key role in putting Madero in power in the first place and felt that Maderohad not adequately rewarded him for his revolutionary services.

Members of the old regime—Reyes and General Felix Díaz, the former dictator’s nephew—also revoltedagainst Madero. While all of these revolts were put down, they hindered political consolidation, ate away at limited government revenues, and created the impression that Madero couldnot govern effectively.

They also highlighted Madero’s limited ability to initiate new policies in the areas of land, labor, and education.

Madero was eventually overthrownby a more traditional military revolt in Mexico City led by Reyes and Felix Díaz.

This revolt got off to an unpromising start when Reyes was killed on the first day of theuprising, February 9, 1913.

Leadership of the rebels then fell to Felix Díaz.

The forces defending the Madero government were led by General Victoriano Huerta, an old-line Díaz general. For the next ten days, rebel and loyalist forces struggled for control of the national capital, and artillery fire was exchanged in the heart of the city.

With propertydestruction and civilian casualties mounting, Huerta and Felix Díaz reached an agreement.

Under the terms of the agreement, Huerta became provisional presidentwhile Díaz would run for the presidency in new elections.

Huerta had Madero and his vice president, José María Pino Suárez, arrested, and on February 22, 1913, theywere executed.

The official explanation was that they had been shot accidentally when their supporters tried to free them. V THE HUERTA REGIME Huerta’s seizure of power in the capital soon provoked new revolts in the provinces.

Zapata once again revolted in the south, motivated mainly by his belief that Huertawould not act on the issue of land reform.

The chief opposition to Huerta came from the “Men of the North”: Álvaro Obregón of Sonora, Pancho Villa of Chihuahua, andVenustiano Carranza of Coahuila.

The three leaders joined together in an uneasy, mutually suspicious coalition that aimed to overthrow Huerta.

Carranza assumedcommand of the alliance, whose supporters were known as “Constitutionalists” for their desire for a legal, constitutional approach to solving Mexico’s problems. Huerta also had another important foe: the U.S.

government.

The administration of President Woodrow Wilson objected to the way Huerta had come to power andrefused to recognize Huerta’s government.

This made it difficult for Huerta to purchase arms from U.S.

companies or to get loans from U.S.

banks.

The United Statesoffered financial assistance to Mexico if Huerta would hold free and fair elections, in which he could not run as a candidate.

When Huerta refused the offer, Wilsonblocked the export of arms to the Huerta administration and began an active campaign to force Huerta from office.

Wilson dispatched U.S.

troops to occupy the keyMexican port of Veracruz in April 1914, cutting off Huerta from an important source of revenue and a location for importing arms.

The U.S.

president later partially liftedthe arms embargo, so that the anti-Huerta forces—but not the Huerta government—could import arms from the United States.

With the additional weapons andammunition, the Constitutionalist forces were able to force Huerta to resign in July 1914.

Carranza was then installed as provisional head of the new government. VI CIVIL WAR Rather than bringing peace, the ouster of Huerta led to the bloodiest phase of the Mexican Revolution.

Disagreement within the revolutionary ranks had existed fromthe earliest days, when Orozco and Villa defied Madero to launch the successful attack on Ciudad Juárez in May 1911.

After the overthrow of Huerta, the variousrevolutionary factions held a convention at Aguascalientes in October 1914 to try to unite behind a president.

Instead of promoting revolutionary unity, the conventiondivided the Constitutionalist coalition and provided an opportunity to choose up sides for the bitter civil war that was to follow.

Villa and Zapata continued to demandthat large estates be broken up and the land redistributed to indigenous people and other poor farmers.

They were opposed by Carranza and Obregón, who did notfavor widespread land reform.

Fighting erupted soon after the convention.

An estimated 200,000 Mexicans died as a result of fighting in the year following Huerta’sresignation. Zapata’s forces occupied Mexico City in November 1914 and in December Villa and Zapata triumphantly entered the capital.

Together they seemed to be on the vergeof defeating Carranza and taking control of the country.

Zapata returned to his home state of Morelos in late December and began to institute the land reforms he hadpromised. The tide turned in the spring and summer of 1915, when Obregón inflicted a series of major defeats on Villa, who was eventually forced to leave central Mexico and. »

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