Devoir de Philosophie

Artistic taste

Publié le 22/02/2012

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Taste has been variously understood as (1) the capacity to take pleasure in certain artistic and natural objects, (2) the capacity to identify the constituent elements in such objects, and (3) the capacity to discern certain special properties. Taste in sense (1) has been a topic since the early eighteenth century, culminating in the work of Hume and Kant. This conception of taste is annexed to the idea that 'beauty' or 'artistic excellence' is not itself an objective property of things, but that it is recorded in judgments of beauty as a report of a certain kind of pleasure felt by the judge in the presence of these things. Taste in sense (2), which is an analogue of the notion of taste as the ability to discriminate with the tongue and taste buds, has also been a topic since the eighteenth century, articulated perhaps most clearly by Hume. A connection between sense (1) and sense (2) is intended by eighteenth-century authors, but the connection has not been formulated clearly. Taste in sense (3) is a conception originating in the mid-twentieth century, notably in the work of Frank Sibley. It is primarily the idea that beauty, elegance, gracefulness and other properties - collectively called 'aesthetic properties' - require a special capacity for their discernment, although these are truly objective properties located in the objects being judged.

« objects of nature.

Later he turns to the consideration of the exercise of taste in judgments of works of art,developing an elaborate theory of such judgments, but declaring that judgments of beauty made about works of artare inevitably 'impure', because the judge is implicitly aware that the the object was made .

Kant's argument for the impurity of such judgments is elliptical.

It turns on his conviction that a pure judgment of taste does not involve theapplication of a predicate concept, while the recognition that an object was made involves a recognition that someconcept was instrumental in the making of the object, this concept then inevitably figuring in one's taste-judgmentof the object (see Kant, I.

§12 ). 3 Sibley In the mid-twentieth century the idea of taste was reconceived, notably in the work of Frank Sibley and the manycommentators on his work.

Whereas eighteenth-century theorists conceived taste either as the capacity to feelpleasure in the presence of certain objects or as the capacity to discern the properties of objects,Sibley conceivesit as the ability to detect various special properties he calls 'aesthetic properties'.

Although it is not clear whetherthese properties are distinguished by requiring taste for their perception, or whether taste itself is understood asthe ability to perceive them,Sibley gives them an uncircular, working characterization by enumerating some of them:they are the properties named by 'graceful', 'elegant' and 'delicate', for instance, and he calls these words'aesthetic terms'.

He is content to identify aesthetic terms, in general, as terms similar to those that heenumerates.

Taste thus becomes the ability to apply aesthetic terms, presumably by virtue of one's possession ofthe associated 'aesthetic concepts'.

He also characterizes the exercise of taste independently of anyconsiderations of feeling.

Sibley's conception of taste is thus similar to the eighteenth-century idea of taste as anability to detect properties, but unlike eighteenth-century authors, he regards the relevant properties as membersof a special class, and again, unlike those authors, he does not treat the capacity for feeling as an essential aspectof the exercise of taste, while not denying that feelings might be attendant upon the exercise of taste.

Thesuccess of Sibley's conception is a matter of current debate.

Two questions deserve particular attention: (1) Canthe ideas of taste and aesthetic properties be characterized independently of each other, or at least characterizedin a manner that is not viciously circular? (2) Is there an adequate criterion for distinguishing aesthetic propertiesfrom non-aesthetic properties? 4 Further issues It may be thought that the only point of interest in the topic of taste arises from an epistemological conviction thatjudgments in aesthetics must be grounded in feelings, and, therefore, that the status of these feelings is implicatedin any possibility of the objectivity of aesthetic judgments.

This is not so.

The question of one's personal tasteretains philosophical interest even if there is an objective, independent standard of beauty, or if there can be nostandard even in terms of taste.

In the first case, we imagine that there is some impersonal, objective measure ofbeauty.

We will then think of a person of good taste as someone who has positive feelings about objects of merit(and, perhaps, negative feelings about meritless things).

The question arises, should one like the objects of meritand dislike the inferior ones? What kind of obligation is this? Contemporary moral theorists have tended to separatequestions of normative assessments of actions from questions of motivation.

That is, the question of which actionshould be carried out is kept independent of the question of whether an agent is moved to do that action.

Onemight think of a morally perfect person - a saint, for example - as someone who is always moved to do, and feelslike doing the right thing.

Analogously, one might think of an aesthetically perfect person as someone who alwayslikes beautiful things, and only likes beautiful things.

The relation of moral judgment to moral motivation is far fromclear, but there is no doubt that a remark like this is sensible: 'I knew that it was the right thing to do, but I couldnot bring myself to do it.' Is there a parallel in the aesthetic case? In other words, is it sensible to say, 'I know thatit is a beautiful thing, but I cannot bring myself to care for it'? If a person making judgments about beautydistinguishes between judging something to be beautiful and merely having a positive feeling for the object, then inwhat way, if any, are such judgments and feelings related? Could one have positive feelings without being inclinedto judge the object beautiful? Could one judge the object beautiful in the absence of any positive feelings of one'sown? An explanation of the relation between feeling and judgment - in a single person - seems to be required, evenif individual feeling were not a factor in the formulation of a standard of beauty.

In the second case, we imaginethat there is no objective measure of beauty, that people making such judgments are only expressing their ownfeelings and preferences.

It may still be wondered whether individual people, exercising their taste in expressions ofliking, disliking and preferences, display self-consistency.

If these people like something, say, a work of art, andbelieve that they like it on account of some property the work possesses, then what if they fail to like some otherwork that possesses the same property? Besides this question of an individual's aesthetic consistency, there is alsoa question of how to understand the totality of one's taste.

It is, after all, the same person that likes one thing,dislikes another, prefers one thing to another, and so on.

Since these exercises of taste exhibit and define aperson's aesthetical self, it is necessary to ask how one would characterize the 'logic' of that self.

However taste isconceived, and however we are to understand its constitution and expression in a single person, there remains thisquestion: is it better to have good taste? Why? Because it leads one to a life of greater pleasure? Surely that is buta hope, contingent on the objects one might encounter, and threatened by the fact that pleasures of taste areonly some of the pleasures available to a person - they might be outweighed by other pleasures, the pursuit ofwhich is blocked by the development and exercise of one's taste.

Perhaps the possession of good or delicate tastemakes for an improvement in one's well-being, and is necessary for enjoying a better life; it remains to explain why.. »

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