Devoir de Philosophie

Casuistry

Publié le 22/02/2012

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Casuistry, from the Latin casus (cases), has been understood in three separate yet related senses. In its first sense casuistry is defined as a style of ethical reasoning associated closely with the tradition of practical philosophy influenced by Aristotle and Aquinas. In its second sense it is reasoning about 'cases of conscience' (casus conscientiae). The third sense, moral laxism, arose out of Pascal's famous critique of casuistry, which did much to diminish its influence. In recent years, however, a renewed interest in the first and second senses of casuistry has been witnessed in the areas of practical reasoning and applied philosophy. In its widest sense, casuistry can be described as a method of ethical reasoning which, drawing on the tradition of practical philosophy of Aristotle and Aquinas, aims to construct a 'dialectic' between the facts of particular cases and the antecedent assumptions, evaluations and convictions which individual agents bring to bear in their consideration of such cases. The purpose of the dialectic is to enable agents to arrive at informed decisions as to what is morally possible and impossible for them to do in particular cases. In a narrower sense, the term casuistry has been employed to characterize different systems of moral theology within the Christian, Jewish and Islamic traditions, in which all-inclusive norms are derived from judgments in particular cases, instead of being laid down in advance by absolute moral codes. In its narrowest sense, casuistry refers to the use of subtle definitional distinctions in the handling of the problems of moral theology, with the aim of drawing fine dividing lines between what is and is not permissible at the level of action. The technique has at times been used to excuse crimes and sins, thereby exculpating the immoral, and such is the extent of the modern association of casuistry with all varieties of obfuscation, quibbling and laxism, that a pejorative connotation of the word itself is now established in most European languages.

« handbooks of the Middle Ages and reached its fullest expression in Roman Catholic textbooks of moral theology of the Counter-Reformation.

The method was also embraced by a number of Anglican divines and members of the Reformed tradition.

The impetus behind the case-method lay in the desire among theologians and philosophers to discover the moral norms embodied in divine law in the circumstances of human life, rather than finding them in antecedent absolute norms which one could then apply to a set of cases.

Thus, the case-reasoning of the theologians was able to respond to new situations and novel problems with a commendable degree of good sense, originality and doctrinal flexibility. In recent times the case-method of the theologians has been revived in the field of bioethics ( Bioethics ).

For bioethicists the value of casuistry resides in its emphasis of practical problem-solving by means of a nuanced interpretation of individual cases.

This is thought to have greater consonance with the actual conditions of medical practice and decision-making.

Problems arise, however, when one attempts to achieve the transposition of the case-method of the theologians to the modern secular context of bioethics.

The confessors of Roman Catholic casuistry, in particular, possessed both juridical authority and the authority of being experts within an institutional setting.

Yet the new casuists of bioethics must rely on professional knowledge alone to determine morally adequate judgments in particular cases.

The problem here is one of analogy.

The older casuistical method relied upon interpretative authorities such as confessors and canonists which helped to bolster the idea that the judgments made in particular cases would reflect the assumptions of a common morality.

Given the context of moral pluralism in which bioethical judgments are made, it is difficult to see how bioethics can draw upon the same type of paradigmatic examples of 'right' and 'wrong' moral judgment on which the earlier model of casuistry was based (Moral pluralism ; Moral expertise ). It is in its widest sense, in the context of moral philosophy, that casuistry holds its greatest promise.

As a dialectical method of moral reasoning inspired by Aristotle and Aquinas, casuistry may well prove relevant here in virtue of its opposition to inflexible and literal interpretations of moral principles, and its resistance to any ethical attitude which first absolutizes a universal moral norm and then insists on its all-round and unyielding application, while denying any abatement or adjustment to changing contingencies.. »

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