From Roe v.

« A.

The appellee and certain amici argue that the fetus is a 'person' within the language and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.

In support of this, they outline atlength and in detail the well known facts of fetal development.

If this suggestion of personhood is established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses, for the fetus'right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment.

The appellant conceded as much on reargument.

On the other hand, the appellee conceded onreargument that no case could be cited that holds that a fetus is a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.… All this, together with our observation, supra, that, throughout the major portion of the 19th century, prevailing legal abortion practices were far freer than they aretoday, persuades us that the word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.… B.

The pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy.

She carries an embryo and, later, a fetus, if one accepts the medical definitions of the developing young inthe human uterus.

See Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary.

The situation therefore is inherently different from marital intimacy, or bedroom possession ofobscene material, or marriage, or procreation, or education.… As we have intimated above, it is reasonable and appropriate for a State to decide that, at some point intime another interest, that of health of the mother or that of potential human life, becomes significantly involved.

The woman's privacy is no longer sole and any rightof privacy she possesses must be measured accordingly. Texas urges that, apart from the Fourteenth Amendment, life begins at conception and is present throughout pregnancy, and that, therefore, the State has a compellinginterest in protecting that life from and after conception.

We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins.

When those trained in the respectivedisciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in aposition to speculate as to the answer. It should be sufficient to note briefly the wide divergence of thinking on this most sensitive and difficult question.

There has always been strong support for the viewthat life does not begin until live birth.

This was the belief of the Stoics.

It appears to be the predominant, though not the unanimous, attitude of the Jewish faith.

Itmay be taken to represent also the position of a large segment of the Protestant community, insofar as that can be ascertained; organized groups that have taken aformal position on the abortion issue have generally regarded abortion as a matter for the conscience of the individual and her family.

As we have noted, the commonlaw found greater significance in quickening.

Physicians and their scientific colleagues have regarded that event with less interest and have tended to focus eitherupon conception, upon live birth, or upon the interim point at which the fetus becomes 'viable,' that is, potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit withartificial aid.

Viability is usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks.

The Aristotelian theory of 'mediate animation,'that held sway throughout the Middle Ages and the Renaissance in Europe, continued to be official Roman Catholic dogma until the 19th century, despite oppositionto this 'ensoulment' theory from those in the Church who would recognize the existence of life from the moment of conception.

The latter is now, of course, theofficial belief of the Catholic Church.

As one brief amicus discloses, this is a view strongly held by many non-Catholics as well, and by many physicians.

Substantialproblems for precise definition of this view are posed, however, by new embryological data that purport to indicate that conception is a 'process' over time, ratherthan an event, and by new medical techniques such as menstrual extraction, the 'morning-after' pill, implantation of embryos, artificial insemination, and evenartificial wombs. In areas other than criminal abortion, the law has been reluctant to endorse any theory that life, as we recognize it, begins before live birth, or to accord legal rights tothe unborn except in narrowly defined situations and except when the rights are contingent upon live birth.

For example, the traditional rule of tort law deniedrecovery for prenatal injuries even though the child was born alive.

That rule has been changed in almost every jurisdiction.

In most States, recovery is said to bepermitted only if the fetus was viable, or at least quick, when the injuries were sustained, though few courts have squarely so held.

In a recent development, generallyopposed by the commentators, some States permit the parents of a stillborn child to maintain an action for wrongful death because of prenatal injuries.

Such anaction, however, would appear to be one to vindicate the parents' interest and is thus consistent with the view that the fetus, at most, represents only the potentiality oflife.

Similarly, unborn children have been recognized as acquiring rights or interests by way of inheritance or other devolution of property, and have been representedby guardians ad litem.

Perfection of the interests involved, again, has generally been contingent upon live birth.

In short, the unborn have never been recognized inthe law as persons in the whole sense. In view of all this, we do not agree that, by adopting one theory of life, Texas may override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake.

We repeat, however,that the State does have an important and legitimate interest in preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman, whether she be a resident of the State or anonresident who seeks medical consultation and treatment there, and that it has still another important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of humanlife.

These interests are separate and distinct.

Each grows in substantiality as the woman approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy, each becomes'compelling.' With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in the health of the mother, the 'compelling' point, in the light of present medical knowledge, is atapproximately the end of the first trimester.

This is so because of the now-established medical fact, … that, until the end of the first trimester mortality in abortionmay be less than mortality in normal childbirth.

It follows that, from and after this point, a State may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regulationreasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health.

Examples of permissible state regulation in this area are requirements as to the qualificationsof the person who is to perform the abortion; as to the licensure of that person; as to the facility in which the procedure is to be performed, that is, whether it must bea hospital or may be a clinic or some other place of less-than-hospital status; as to the licensing of the facility; and the like. This means, on the other hand, that, for the period of pregnancy prior to this 'compelling' point, the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free todetermine, without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be terminated.

If that decision is reached, the judgment maybe effectuated by an abortion free of interference by the State. With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in potential life, the 'compelling' point is at viability.

This is so because the fetus then presumably has thecapability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb.

State regulation protective of fetal life after viability thus has both logical and biological justifications.

If theState is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life orhealth of the mother. Measured against these standards, Art.

1196 of the Texas Penal Code, in restricting legal abortions to those 'procured or attempted by medical advice for the purposeof saving the life of the mother,' sweeps too broadly.

The statute makes no distinction between abortions performed early in pregnancy and those performed later, andit limits to a single reason, 'saving' the mother's life, the legal justification for the procedure.

The statute, therefore, cannot survive the constitutional attack made uponit here. To summarize and to repeat: 1.

A state criminal abortion statute of the current Texas type, that excepts from criminality only a lifesaving procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard topregnancy stage and without recognition of the other interests involved, is violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnantwoman's attending physician.. »