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Gazala, Battle of

Publié le 22/02/2012

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The Battle of Gazala (May 26–June 17, 1942) was a prelude to the disastrous British defeat at the Battles of Tobruk. Gazala did much to enhance and render virtually legendary the reputation of the German commander Erwin Rommel, and the battle foiled British hopes of driving Rommel out of Libya before the commencement of the Allies' North African Campaigns. Rommel's victory also demonstrated, yet again, the inadequacy of static tactics versus the tactics of mobility in World War II. The Eighth British Army, at the time commanded by Lieutenant General Neil Ritchie, was deployed in an elaborately conceived defensive line, the Gazala Line, west of Tobruk. Ritchie had grouped his assets in "boxes," tactical strong points, along the line, parceling out his armor accordingly. This manner of deployment meant that armor was treated as a static asset instead of a highly mobile one, an error that made it difficult to mass the tanks as needed and that therefore contributed greatly to the British defeat. Thanks to Ultra decrypts, Ritchie was well apprised of Rommel's intention to attack, but he had no idea of where the attack would come. With his customary genius for rapid mobility, Rommel threw his Italian troops against the Gazala Line in a frontal assault while his main panzers swung rapidly around Bir Hakeim, the southern end of the Gazala Line. This put Rommel into position to flank and roll up the British line. The problem with mobile warfare, however, is always one of supply, and Rommel moved so far so fast that his supply lines were stretched very thin. Worse, his own intelligence had failed him, having grossly underestimated British strength. British armor was also more formidable than in the past, thanks to the addition of the new American Grant tank. Thus, on May 29, 1942, after a pitched armor duel, Rommel's flanking attack was checked. He withdrew to an area soon dubbed "the Cauldron," a move Ritiche misinterpreted as a mere disengagement. This prompted Ritchie to hold off making a counterattack. It was a fatal excess of caution, for Rommel used the lull in the battle to regroup and to reestablish his lines of supply. This quickly accomplished, he launched a new assault at Bir Hakeim and, on June 10, forced a breach in the Gazala Line there. Now, belatedly, Ritchie did counterattack, forcing Rommel back to the Cauldron, which Ritchie started to encircle. Instead of assuming a defensive posture, however, the always aggressive Rommel counterattacked in turn, creating a bulge, or salient, in the Gazala Line at the defensive "box" code-named Knightsbridge. This brought about the dissolution of the Gazala Line and forced an opening to Tobruk. The theater commander Claude John Ayre Auchinleck ordered Ritchie to set up a new defensive line, but it was to no avail, and Rommel pushed through to Tobruk, which fell on June 21. As a result of Gazala and Tobruk, both Ritchie and Auchinleck were subsequently relieved by British high command.

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