Devoir de Philosophie

EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD

Publié le 27/04/2011

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   - The search for security was the motor of Soviet policy after the war, not world expansion. How far did events in the post-war period vindicate or contradict this statement?    The emergence of two superpowers in the post-war period was inevitable. The USSR and USA were in fact the only two nations with a considerable amount of influence on the global scale. Indeed, during the war which had no major impact on the USA (bitterly named “Fortress America”), the Americans invested themselves on social as well as industrial levels. Across the Pacific Ocean, the USSR effectively controlled the Baltic states, Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania: this was known as the “Soviet sphere of influence”. However, the bond between both countries was only held by one frail string: the promise of international peace. Thus, East-West relations were extremely tense after the war; this led to a deep mistrust but never resulted in “hot” war. Behind the scenes, all countries were pursuing their own interests and tried to envelope the entire world with their personal lifestyle by putting a pejorative connotation when discussing another countries’ issues. This was known as the war by proxy. The Soviets saw American threats as dangerous provocations and the US’ commitment to strengthen and expand its own growing global empire as a threat to global peace and it’s own security. Likewise, the Americans and British saw the annexed East as Communist propagation. This engendered a major polemic debate. Stalin himself faced the world with this problematic question: “Are pacific intentions of the USSR to be considered as expansionist tendencies of our state?” 

« strategy rather than offensive tactics).

In fact, the USSR never intended to take over the West.

Greece, Franceand Italy observed an internal Communist growth which had little to do with the Soviet Union itself.

The USSR didn'ttake a particular interest in foregrounding their political ideas over Eastern boundaries (the USSR was in factreticent to get involved in the Greek crisis: he respected the fact that Greece belonged to the West).

Furthermore,during the war, the safety of the USSR was primordial: Maurice Thorez (French rebel) stated: “Proletarian revolutioncan wait; the safety of the USSR could not.” They even put aside Communist extension to fight off the Germans.This shows to what extent the safety of their country mattered. Soon after the Soviet take-over of Eastern Europe, China became Communist in 1949.

Russians continued torecognize the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek instead of the Communists.

Stalin's decisions were ratherpragmatic than ideologic; this meant Soviet expansionism focused mainly on Eastern Europe, and not the rest of theworld as the Americans stubbornly believe.When at Potsdam, it was agreed of the Soviet Union's hegemony, Truman already thought they had “given toomuch” to the USSR.

His policy of containment under the Truman Doctrine (providing financial, military andeconomical help to any country threatened by a Communist take-over) was aimed to refrain Soviet expansion.Similarly, the Marshall Plan was proof of Truman's involvement in foreign affairs.

Americans wanted to rebuildEuropean economy which had been ruined.

Chruchill even described Europe as “a rubble heap, a breeding ground ofhate.” The American leader thought that people would turn to Communism as a promise against harsh livingconditions (poverty, debt, desperation and chaos).

They therefore invested 17 billion Dollars for Europeanprosperity.

Nonetheless, in 1952, possibly eighty per cent of American aid to Western Europe war for militarypurposes.

How was the Soviet Union supposed to react to this multiplication of arms? The Soviets felt threatenedand incontestably tightened control over Eastern Europe.

Stalin also thought reciprocally that by proliferationgDollars all over the world, the USA was trying to dominate it by making people dependant on their currency (andtherefore isolate the USSR). Spread of Communism was imminent in the post-war period.

The Brezhnev doctrine declared that the Soviet Unionhad a "right" to come to the assistance of an endangered fellow socialist country.

The United States of America andthe United Kingdom fail to fathom the fact that Communism wasn't necessarily stimulated by the USSR.

We canname for instance Latin America and Mexico during the 1960's: internal Communism was brought to life byCommunist rebels who were later supported by the Soviet Union.

But the USSR wasn't originally intending to spreadit's wings.

Americans, on the other hand, supported anti-communist regimes (i.e: General Pinochet, Chile's harshdictator) even if it meant human rights' violations...

the same event occured in Afghanistan from 1979 onwards: theAfghan government supported by Soviet forces fought versus the US-backed guerrilla fighters.

Also, during the ColdWar, both parties were taking sides in worldly conflicts: in 1967, Israel was supported by the US government in theMiddle-East conflict with Arabs.

The USSR supported the Palestinians and Arab states.In conclusion, we can say that expansion wasn't the USSR's first preoccupation but whilst searching for security, itwas rather inevitable that their empire increased. Certain past events make us doubt of the USSR: what exactly were they looking for after the war? Churchill repliesto this, sure of himself: “Stalin wants illimited expansion of power and doctrine”.

The call for Cominform and the RedArmy to repress Eastern European countries to observe a lifestyle similar to that of Russia's implied a certaindominion on the buffer zone (which covered an area of 750 000 km squared), an oppression that can be put intoparallel with the colonialist tendencies of the eighteenth century.

Truman argued that “Stalin is building an empireand has projects for Western Europe too.” We have seen that Russia in fact didn't take a particular interest in expanding it's right arm (West) but did look toinvading Japan.

There is inevitable proof of this: On April 13, 1941, the USSR and Japan signed a neutrality pact.Nonetheless, true to his promise to the Allies, “his new-found friends” (and interested in expanding their Soviet inthe East) Stalin broke his non-aggression pact with Japan.

Soviet troops invaded Japanese-held Manchuria inAugust and helped win the war in the Pacific. Eastern Europe was amazed by the Soviet Union's industrial growth before the Second World War.

They werehoping, under a Russian-controlled government, to achieve a similar economic boost.

Nonetheless, the reality ofSoviet proselytism (control) was different than what was expected: freedom of speech which had been reigning inthe society for many decades was suddenly forbidden, democracy was lost, newspapers censored, non-Communistsjailed, wages fell behind, international travelling banned...

Eastern European countries did recover but trade wasestablished with the USSR only.

All the benefits of economic prosperity were directed to the Soviet Union.Additionally, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) was setup in 1949 to co-ordinate theindustries and trade of Eastern European countries.

The idea was that members of comecon traded mostly with oneanother rather than trading with the West.

Comecon favoured the USSR far more than any of its other members: itprovided the Soviet Union with a market to sell its goods, it also guaranteed it a cheap supply of raw materials (ie:Poland was forced to sell its coal to the USSR at one-tenth of the price that it could have got selling it on the openmarket.

Comecon also began nationalizing banks & farms for socialist countries in 1964.

Thus, in the buffer zone,consumer goods were uncommon, coal used for heating was scarce, food was expensive due to inflation...

Protestattempts and demonstrations against Communist policies (notably in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary andRomania) gave way to reprisals.

Furthermore, the USSR stated that countries located behind the virtual “IronCurtain” were not entitled to recieve Marshall Aid.

These harsh conditions are witnesses as to Russia's aggregatesovereignty over the entire region of Eastern Europe.. »

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