A pragmatic approach to metaphorical irony

« 1.0 Introduction: Our research paper is concerned with metaphorical irony, which falls within the domain of Pragmatics.

Pragmatics is concerned with the appropriate use of sentences as utterances in the process of linguistic communication (lecture notes).

Therefore, we need to draw a distinction between the terms "sentence" and "utterance" before we provide a working definition of Pragmatics, which is our domain of study.

This constitutes one part of our review of the relevant literature.

The other part involves a brief discussion of the speech-act theory.

It focuses on such works as Austin (1962, 1975), Searle (1969, 1979), and Grice (1975).

In the third part, we review a number of works concerned with the figurative use of language.

Specifically, we focus on Searle (1977, 1979), Bergmann (1991), Davidson (1991), and Martinich (1991), and Sperber and Wilson (1981) .The aim behind this review is manifold: a) to familiarize ourselves and the reader with the work of those scholars who initiated and developed speech-act theory, thereby contributing to the development of Pragmatics as a new field of study , b) provide the relevant theoretical background for our study of metaphorical irony, and c) select the approach we believe to be most appropriate for our analysis of the phenomenon of metaphorical irony as illustrated by the relevant data. 1.1.

Sentence versus Utterance: According to Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary(1961), a “sentence” is "a unit of speech consisting of a meaningful arrangement of words, or merely a word, that expresses an assertion, a question , a command , a wish, or an exclamation, and typically containing a subject and a predicate( He played ball; It.parto.

I depart) or only a predicate (Go home).

Such sentences are sometimes called full sentences, as distinguished from minor sentences, which generally consist of a completive word or phrase (Where is john?-At home), an interjection (Ouch!), or an exclamation (Heavens above!)”.

The same source defines the term “utterance” as (a)"vocal expression, style or power of speaking" and (b)"that which is uttered, or spoken or published." Therefore, the terms "sentence" and "utterance" refer to two different entities.

Being a unit of 7 grammatical analysis, a sentence means only what its combined words mean .In fact, sentence meaning is independent of context and does not involve any intentions of the speaker.

However, an utterance is the actual use of a given sentence in a given context with certain intentions on the part of the speaker.

For instance, a sentence like (1): (1) “It is cold in here”. means what its words mean literally, namely that “It is cold” in the place being referred to by “here".

This sentence counts as a statement of a fact, or state of affairs.

It can be either true or false.

However, when it is uttered in the process of communication, this utterance may, depending on the context in which it is used, on the relationship between the speaker and the hearer, their shared background knowledge, and the speaker’s intentions, have a variety of functions.

For example, it can be used to request, order, etc the hearer to close the window, turn the central heating on, etc (lecture notes).

We can conclude that the meaning of an utterance depends on the context in which it is used with the intentions to perform a given speech act.

Therefore, it must be analysed pragmatically, rather than grammatically or semantically. 1.2.

A Working Definition of "Pragmatics": “Pragmatics” is a branch of linguistics which studies the ability of language users to pair sentences with the contexts in which they would be appropriate (lecture notes). According to Levinson (1983:1), "The modern usage of the term Pragmatics is attributable to the philosopher Charles Morris (1938), who was concerned to outline (after Locke and Pierce) the general shape of a science of signs, or semiotics (or semiotic as Morris preferred).

Within Semiotics, Morris distinguished three distinct branches of inquiry: Syntactics (or syntax), being the study of 'the formal relation of signs to one another'; Semantics, the study of 'the relations of signs to the objects to which the signs are applicable'(their designata); and Pragmatics, the study of 'the relation of signs to interpreters'." Levinson (ibid: 5) admits that the term “Pragmatics” is very difficult to define.

Crystal (1990: 243) suggests that "Pragmatics studies the factors which govern 8 someone's choice of language, when they speak or write.

If we choose to say something, there are all kinds of factors which constrain what we will say, and how we will say it.

In theory we can say anything we like.

In practice, we follow a large number of social rules (most of them unconsciously) which govern the way we speak".

Crystal (1992:310) defines “Pragmatics” as "the study of language from the point of view of the users - especially of the choices they make, the constraints they encounter in using language in social interaction, and the effects their use of language has on the other participants in an act of communication." From the preceding definitions, we can deduce the following facts about "Pragmatics": First, Pragmatics must be distinguished from Semantics.

Semantics deals with the meaning of sentences with no reference to their users, the context of their use, or their communicative functions.

Pragmatics, by contrast, focuses on the context in which language is used for special communicative purposes.

It studies the meaning of utterances and the way they are interpreted in special contexts, using extra- linguistic factors that include the context, the speaker, and the hearer.

The objective of Pragmatics is the identification of the relationship between the linguistic utterance and the extralinguistic factors, as the understanding of the meaning of an utterance depends on the context in which it is used.

In short, pragmatics deals with those extra-linguistic elements that determine the meaning of utterances as used in the process of communication. 1.3.

Speech- Act Theory: Speech-act theory is at the heart of Pragmatics.

This theory was initiated by Austin (1962) and further developed by Searle (1965).

Searle (Ibid: 221-222) stresses the importance of the study of speech acts by stating that it is not " the symbol or word or sentence, or even the token of the symbol or word or sentence, which is the unit of linguistic communication, but rather it is the production of the token in the performance of the speech act that constitutes the basic unit in linguistic communication." It is noteworthy that all the studies on speech-acts use the same terminologies initially introduced by Austin in his (1962, 1975) pioneering work, How to Do Things with 9 Words.

These terminologies are, namely, “speaker”, “hearer”, “context”, “force”, “performance”, “sentence”, “utterance”, etc.

So, let us begin by reviewing his work. 1.3.1.

Austin's Speech-Act Theory: 1.3.1.0.

Introduction : J .l.Austin is the father of modern pragmatics in general, and speech-act theory in particular.

In his (1962) work How to Do Things with Words, Austin begins by questioning the assumption that “the business of a statement can only be to describe some state of affairs, or to state some fact, which it must do either truly or falsely"(Austin, 1962:1) .Prior to Austin’s (1962) work, it was widely assumed that to say something is simply and always to state something.

This led both philosophers and grammarians to conclude that a statement of fact ought to be “verifiable”.

Therefore, many “statements” were considered only “pseudo-statements” and were shown to be strict nonsense.

Austin (ibid: 3) calls this assumption the “descriptive fallacy”, and he undertakes to challenge it.

Austin (ibid) argues that "not all true or false statements are descriptions" .He proposes to use the term “constative” instead of “descriptive”.

So, the first thing he does is to draw a distinction between performative utterances and constative utterances. 1.3.1.1.

Performatives versus Constatives Austin uses the term “performative” utterance to refer to those utterances which were considered by the “logical positivists” a type of nonsense because, in their view, they are not statements of fact.

Austin (1975:5) points out that such utterances are not (or not merely) cases of saying something, but of doing something .And they are not a true or false report of something.

Performatives resemble statements, at least in their grammatical form, but they can not be true or false.

To illustrate, let us consider Austin's example: (2) "I do (take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife)". 10 Utterance (2), which is pronounced in the course of a marriage ceremony, is not a description of the doing of the action or a statement that the action is done; it is doing the action.

Here, the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action (not just saying something).This is different, for example, from the statement: (3) "The weather is hot". This statement is verifiable in terms of truth and falsity. Since Performatives, unlike constatives, cannot be assessed in terms of truth conditions, Austin (ibid: 14-15) proposes to assess them in terms of what he calls “felicity conditions”.

These conditions consist of the things which are, besides the uttering of the words, necessary for the "happy" functioning of a performative.

For example, (4)"I promise that (the money will be yours)". The preceding utterance requires appropriate circumstances of the uttering of the words in addition to the performance of certain other actions, or even the performance of acts of uttering further words.

If one (or more) of these conditions is not realised, we do not say that the utterance is false but void.

Austin calls it an "unhappy" utterance. These are the Felicity conditions for the happy performance of a speech-act, as proposed by Austin (Ibid: 14-15): A.1 There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances. A.2 The particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked. B.

1.

The procedure must be excuted by all participants correctly. B.2.

The procedure must be excuted by all participants completely. 11 T.1.

Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a person participating in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have those thoughts or feelings, and the participants must intend so to conduct themselves, and further T.2.

must actually so conduct themselves subsequently. If conditions A and B are not realized, the infelicity is called a “Misfire”.

Here, the act purported to be done is null or void, so that it does not take effect.

If the two last conditions are not realized, the infelicity is an “Abuse”.

Here, the act is not void, and the circumstances are in order.

However, it is an abuse of the procedure because it is insincere.

Austin (ibid: 23) states that all the possible cases of infelicity are not mutually exclusive. 1.3.1.2.

Explicit Performatives Versus Implicit Performatives : According to Austin (ibid: 32), all explicit performatives begin with or include some highly significant and unambiguous expression, such as "I bet"," I promise","I bequeath", etc.

These expressions make it plain how the utterance is to be taken or understood.

Therefore, the explicit performative rules out equivocation and keeps the illocutionary force, relatively, fixed.

Implicit (or primary) peformatives, on the other hand, do not make explicit the precise force of the utterance or “how it is to be taken” (Austin, 1975:73) .They are characterized by the vagueness of meaning and uncertainty of sure reception (ibid: 76), as the following example illustrates: (5) “I shall help you”. If somebody utters statement (5) above, he might be asked the question “Is that a promise?”, and his answer might be either ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. 12 Having made the previous distinction, Austin (ibid: 50) notices that statements, which refer to something which does not exist, are not so much false as void.

The following utterance is a case in point. (6) “The present king of France is bald”. Moreover, Austin (1962:20) maintains that the more we consider a statement as an utterance (not as a sentence), the more the whole thing can be considered as an act.

Therefore, the unhappiness affecting a performative utterance can be the same as the unhappiness affecting a statement.

To illustrate, let us assume that the one who utters (7) does not believe that the cat is on the mat. (7) “The cat is on the mat”. The insincerity of this assertion is the same as the insincerity of a promise. Upon a closer study of performatives, Austin (1975:61) finds that the verbs which seem to be specially performative verbs serve the purpose of making explicit (not the same as stating or describing) what precise action it is that is being performed by the issuing of the utterance.

He (ibid: 90) comes to the conclusion that, in pure explicit performatives (such as “state” or “maintain”), the whole thing is surely true or false even though the uttering of it is the performing of the action of stating or maintaining.

So, a distinction must be made between the performative opening part (I state that) which makes clear how the utterance is to be taken (here a statement not a prediction) from the that–clause which is required to be true or false.

Therefore, the performative is not so obviously different from the constative. Finally, Austin(1975:62) finds out that for an utterance to be performative, it must be used performatively.In fact, the same sentence can be used on different occasions of utterance in both ways, performative and constative.

Consider example (8) for illustration: (8) “It is yours”. 13 This utterance can be a constative, meaning “It (already) belongs to you”, or a performative, meaning "I give it to you”.

Therefore, the initial distinction between performatives and constatives, which was justified as a distinction between doing and saying, collapses, because “considerations of the happiness and happiness type may infect statements (or some statements) and considerations of the type of truth and falsity may infect performatives (or some performatives)” (Austin, 1975:55). 1.3.1.3.

Locutionary, Illocutionary, and Perlocutionary Acts: After finding it very difficult to distinguish performatives from constatives, Austin (1975:94) resorts to the fundamentals of language use, and decides to consider “ how many senses there may be in which to say something we do something, or in saying something we do something, or even by saying something we do something”.

This consideration leads him (ibid: 94-103) to find out that there are three different senses of the use of language in the performance of the speech act.

These acts (or senses) are as follows: Locutionary Act: The act of saying something.

This act has a meaning because it consists of the uttering of a certain sentence with certain sense and reference, which is equivalent to meaning. Illocutionary Act: The performance of an act in saying something as opposed to the performance of an act of saying something.

This act has a certain conventional force.

For example, ordering, informing... Perlocutionary Act: The consequential effects that the saying of something often produces upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons.

For example, convincing, persuading, deterring... 14 Austin (1975:96-102) explains the difference between locutionary, illocutionary, and perloctionary acts by illustrating the difference between “direct speech” and “reported speech”.

For example, (9a) He said to me “Do your homework”. This direct locutionary act can be reported, but we cannot report it using the expression “said that”.

Thus, we will have the illocutionary act (9b). (9b) “He advised me to do my homework”. If there are consequential effects produced on the hearer, we can talk about (9c): (9c) “He convinced me to do my homework”. The preceding example clearly demonstrates the difference between the locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts. On the basis of the above, Austin (1975:114) has discovered that when we utter a sentence, we necessarily perform both locutionary and illocutionary acts.

This suggests that there is no distinction between constatives and performatives, as both belong to a general class of performatives.

In fact, Austin (ibid: 147) concludes that “stating is only one among very numerous speech-acts of the illocutionary class” because when we state something, we perform the act of stating, and our utterance is liable to be happy or unhappy (as well as true or false). Austin (1975:151-163) suggests a classification of utterances on the basis of their illocutionary force.

He distinguishes five general categories: 1-Verdictives: They are typified by the giving of a verdict by a jury, arbitrator, or umpire.

For example, convicting, assessing, grading, describing… 2- Exercitives: They are the exercising of powers, rights, or influence.

For example, appointing, voting, ordering, urging, advising, warning... 15 3- Commissives: They are typified by promising or otherwise undertaking. They commit the speaker to doing something.

For example, promising, undertaking, vowing, swearing… 4- Behabitives: They have to do with attitudes and social behaviour.

For example, apologizing, congratulating, commending, condoling, cursing, challenging... 5- Expositives: They make plain how our utterances fit into the course of an argument or conversation, how we are using words, or, in general, are expository. Examples are “I reply”, “I agree”, “I concede”... It is important to note that even Austin (ibid: 151) was not satisfied with this classification, and he thought it is incomplete. 1.3.2.Searle’s Contribution to Speech- Act Theory: 1.3.2.1.

Searle’s Assessment of Austin’s Classification: According to Searle (1979: 11), Austin’s taxonomy involves (at least) six weaknesses.

For Searle, this is due to the fact that Austin’s was not a classification of illocutionary acts but of English illocutionary verbs.

The weaknesses identified by Searle are as follows: 1-There is no consistent principle of classification. 2- Many of the verbs listed in the categories do not satisfy the definition given for the category. 3- There is too much heterogeneity within the categories. 4-There is too much overlap of the categories. 5- Not all the verbs are illocutionary verbs. 16 6- There is a persistent confusion between verbs and acts. 1.3.2.2.

The Basis of Searle's Alternative Classification : As an alternative to Austin’s (1962, 1975) classification, Searle (1979:2-5) proposes a taxonomy of illocutionary acts based on three dimensions.

These dimensions concern the ways in which illocutionary acts differ from one another, and involve the “illocutionary point”, “direction of fit”, and the “expressed sincerity conditions”. A-Differences in the Point (or Purpose) of the (Type of) Act: Searle (ibid: 2-3) calls "illocutionary point", the point or purpose of an illocution. For him, the illocutionary point of an illocutionary act is part of but not the same as its illocutionary force.

The illocutionary force results from several elements, one of which is the illocutionary point.

For example, requests and commands have the same illocutionary point: they are both attempts to get the heaver to do something.

However, their illocutionary forces are different. B-Differences in the Direction of Fit Between Words and the World: Searle (ibid: 3-4) states that some illocutions have as part of their illocutionary point to get the words (more strictly, their propositional content) to match the world. Statements, descriptions, assertions, and explanations are examples of this type.

Others, on the other hand, get the world to match the words.

Cases in point are requests, commands, vows, and promises.

Searle calls this difference, a difference in the "direction of fit".

He represents the world -to- word direction of fit with an upward arrow (↑), and the word -to- world direction of fit with a downward arrow (↓). C- Differences in Expressed Psychological States: According to Searle (ibid: 4-5), in the performance of any illocutionary act with a given propositional content, the speaker expresses some attitude to that propositional content.

For example, to state that (p) is to express the belief that (p), to promise to do (a) is to express an intention to do (a).

Searle argues that the expressed psychological state 17 holds even if the speaker is insincere.

This psychological state constitutes the sincerity condition of the act.

Searle symbolizes the expressed psychological state with the capitalized initial letter of the corresponding verb.

For example, B,W, and I respectively symbolize the expressed psychological states of “belief” , “want”, and “intention”. 1.3.2.3.

Searle’s Alternative Taxonomy: According to Searle (ibid: 12-20), there are five basic categories of illocutionary acts: A-Assertives: Their point or purpose is to commit the speaker (in varying degrees) to something being the case, to the truth of the expressed proposition.

Assertives are assessable in terms of truth and falsity and may be symbolized as follows: B (p).

is the assertion sign for the illocutionary point common to all the members of this class.

The direction of fit is word-to –world, and the psychological state expressed is Belief (that p).

For example, suggest, insist, conclude, state, deduce… B-Directives: Their illocutionary point is that they are attempts (of varying degrees) by the speaker to get the hearer to do something.

Directives may be symbolized as follows:! / W (H does A).

! Indicates the illocutionary point of the members of this class.

The direction of fit is world-to -word and the sincerity condition is want (or wish or desire).

Their propositional content is always that the hearer H does some future action A.

For example, ask , order, command, request, beg, permit…. C- Commissives Searle (ibid: 14) admits that Austin’s definition of commissives “seems unexceptionable”.

Commissives are those illocutionary acts whose point is to commit the 18 speaker (in varying degrees) to some future course of action.

We have the following symbolism: C / I (S does A).

C symbolizes the members of this class, the direction of fit is world-to-word, the sincerity condition is intention, and the propositional content is always that the speaker S does some future action A.

For example, promise, vow…. D- Expressives: Their illocutionary point is to express the psychological state specified in the sincerity condition about the state of affairs specified in the propositional content.

This class may be symbolized as follows: E O (P) (S/H + property).

“E” is the illocutionary point common to all Exprissives.

O indicates that there is no direction of fit.

P is a variable ranging over the different possible psychological states expressed in performance of the illocutionary acts in this class.

The propositional content ascribes some property to either S or H.

For example, thank, congratulate, apologize, condole… D- Declarations: In the case of Declarations, the state of affairs represented in the proposition expressed is brought into existence by declaring it to exist.

The successful performance of one of its members brings about the correspondence between the propositional content and reality (the world).

Declarations are symbolized as follows: D O (P).

D is the declarational illocutionary point.

The direction of fit is both word -to-world and worldto-word.

There is no sincerity condition.

P is the usual propositional variable.

For example, “You are fired”, “I resign”, “You are guilty (as uttered by a judge in a court)”… 1.3.2.4.

Indirect speech Acts : Searle (1979: 30-31) states that direct speech acts are cases where the speaker utters a sentence and means exactly and literally what he says.

However; in indirect speech acts, the speaker’s utterance meaning and the sentence meaning differ.

In fact, the 19 speaker utters a sentence, means what he says, but also means something more or something different.

Searle (ibid: 36) suggests that, in the field of indirect illocutionary acts, Directives are the most useful to study because ordinary conversational requirements of politeness normally make it awkward to issue flat imperative sentences. Thus, for Searle (ibid: 48), politeness is the chief motivation for indirectness. Searle (ibid: 34) makes a distinction between the secondary illocutionary act, which is literal, and the primary illocutionary act, which is not literal.

He (ibid: 42) asserts that the former is related to sentence meaning, while the latter is related to speaker meaning. For example, (10) “Can you pass me the salt?” The primary illocutionary force of utterance (10) is a request .Its secondary illocutionary force is that it is a question about the ability of the speaker to pass the salt. Searle (1979: 32-35) proposes an inferential strategy that the hearer has to follow in order to move from the secondary illocutionary act to the primary illocutionary act.

This inferential strategy is based on facts about the conversation, principles of conversational cooperation, factual background information, and inferences.

This strategy aims at, first of all, establishing that the primary illocutionary force departs from the literal illocutionary force, and second, what the primary illocutionary force is.

Searle (ibid: 47) points out that the first part of this strategy is established by the principles of conversation operating on the information shared by the hearer and the speaker.

The second, on the other hand, is derived from the theory of speech-acts together with background information. Searle (ibid: 46-47) identifies ten steps that constitute the inferential strategy that a hearer follows in order to grasp the primary illocution of an indirect speech-act.

We can apply these steps to the secondary illocution (11a), as uttered by a speaker X to a hearer Y who is making too much noise: (11a) “Can you keep quiet?” 20 The hearer goes through the following steps in order to get the primary illocution (11b): (11b) “I want you to keep quiet” Step one: (fact about the conversation) X has asked me a question about my ability to keep quiet. Step two: (principles of conversational cooperation) I assume that he is cooperating in the conversation and that therefore his utterance has some aim or point. Step three: (factual background information) The conversational setting is not such as to indicate a theoretical interest in my ability to keep quiet. Step four: (factual background information) X probably already knows that the answer to that question is yes. Step five: (inference from steps 1-4) Therefore his utterance is probably not just a question.

It probably has some ulterior illocutionary point. Step six: (theory of speech act) A preparatory condition for any directive illocutionary act is the ability of the hearer to perform the act predicated in the prepositional content condition. Step seven: (inference from steps one and six) Therefore, X has asked me a question the affirmative answer to which would entail that the preparatory condition for requesting me to keep quiet is satisfied. Step eight: (background information) I am making too much noise, my friend is studying, studying needs concentration, etc. Step nine: (inference from steps seven and eight) He has therefore alluded to the satisfaction of a preparatory condition for a request whose obedience conditions it is quite likely he wants me to bring about.. »