Anomalous monism

« in the following section.

(Hereafter, ‘mental event' will be used in a restricted sense to mean acquiring or losing apropositional attitude.) 3 Psychophysical anomalism One way that psychophysical anomalism could fail is if there is a basic vocabulary for a closed, comprehensive theory that includes both mental and physical terms.

A Cartesianinteractionist (see Dualism ) might argue that any basic vocabulary for a closed, comprehensive theory true of our world would have to contain both mental and physical terms; for the mental properties expressed by at least somemental terms are fundamental force-generating properties.

However, this position is empirically implausible:mechanics seems to have no need of the hypothesis that there are mental events.

There is another way thatpsychophysical anomalism could fail, namely if mental terms can be defined by terms constructible from the basicvocabulary of a closed, comprehensive theory or be reducible to such terms by reductive bridge laws.

Davidsonoffers reasons that appeal to the nature of mental concepts for holding that no mental predicate (more specifically,no propositional attitude predicate) could be reduced to any physical predicate, no matter how complex, in either ofthese two ways.

If definitional psychophysical reduction were possible, then a physical predicate could express anunhedged sufficient condition of application for a mental predicate - one unqualified by any escape clauses.

That,Davidson argues, is impossible: no physical predicate could express such an unhedged sufficient condition ofapplication.

Hence, definitional reduction is impossible.

The same consideration arguably shows that reduction viabridge laws is impossible.

For if a psychophysical bridge law were a reductive law, rather than an emergent law, thelaw would have to be a derivative law, rather than a fundamental law.

The law would have to be implied by laws ofthe reducing theory, physical theory, together with physical conditions, and only analytical principles, and perhapsother necessary truths.

Otherwise, the truths of physical theory itself would not imply the psychophysical truths inquestion.

It is arguable that if the truths of physical theory itself imply such psychophysical truths, then unhedgedanalytical generalizations with physical (and logical) predicates in their antecedents and mental predicates in theirconsequents would be possible.

But such generalizations are impossible if mental predicates could not haveunhedged physical conditions of application.

Davidson does not consider the possibility, however, that there aremetaphysically necessary truths that are not analytical truths, and that enable psychophysical reduction; of thatconsideration, more in §4.

There are, in Davidson's work, several lines of argument for the claim that mentalpredicates cannot have unhedged physical sufficient conditions of application; and other proponents ofpsychophysical anomalism have contributed to the development of some of these lines of argument.

Much of theinterest in anomalous monism has centred on whether a sound argument for the claim can be found.

Every line ofargument appeals to what Davidson calls ‘the holism of the mental' - (roughly) the view that propositional attitudetypes, identified by their intentional mode (for example belief) and their content (for example that the earth isround), are individuated holistically by their place in a network of other propositional attitude types.

The place of apropositional attitude state type in such a network is partly determined by logical and semantical relationshipsbetween its content and the contents of a vast range of other state types in the network.

For networks ofpropositional attitude types must, Davidson argues, exhibit a large degree of rational coherence.

Irrationality ispossible, obviously, but only against a background of largely rational coherence.

To make coherent propositionalattitude attributions, our attributions must conform to standards of rational coherence, standards concerning whatit would make sense to believe given certain other beliefs, what it would make sense to value given certain beliefsand desires, and what courses of action would make best sense given a certain pattern of beliefs, desires, values,and so on.

One line of argument is that if unhedged physical conditions of application were possible, propositionalattitude attributions could be made solely on the basis of such conditions, and thus without reliance on rationalassessment.

But that, it is claimed, would amount to changing the subject, since principles of rational assessmentare constitutive of the very meaning of such mental predicates.

This line of argument is, however, inconclusive.

Ifthere are constitutive principles of rational assessment that implicitly define mental predicates, then, indeed,unhedged sufficient physical conditions of application cannot permit attributions that contravene the principleswithout changing the subject.

Nevertheless, so long as those principles would not be contravened by attributionsmade solely on the basis of unhedged physical conditions, there would be no change of subject.

It thus remains tobe seen why such attributions would have to contravene principles of rational coherence.

It has also been argued,however, that there is no complete set of impersonal, objective principles of rational coherence.

This idea has beenput by saying that there is no complete set of codifiable principles of rationality that can supply a common,objective standard in attributing mental states to others.

We must rely on our own standards of assessment inunderstanding others; there is no single objective standard to which we can appeal.

The claim that there are nocodifiable objective standards of rationality is contentious.

Decision theory and confirmation theory, for instance,attempt to formulate such standards (see Confirmation theory ; Decision and game theory ).

Perhaps they cannot succeed, but if they cannot, it remains to be seen why they cannot.

Suppose, however, that there is indeed nosingle set of codifiable objective standards of rationality, that there are at best rules of thumb, and that we mustinvariably rely to some extent on our subjective sense of what makes rational sense - what it makes sense tobelieve given other beliefs, and so on - in making mental attributions.

The question arises, then: would this implythat unhedged physical conditions of application for propositional attitudes would invariably contravene ourassessments of rational coherence? If there is a set of codifiable principles of rational assessment for eachattributor at a time, then such contravention might be avoidable.

When two individuals' propositional attitudeattributions are governed by somewhat different sets of principles, there would arguably be some difference in themeanings of the propositional attitude predicates they employ.

Similarly, the meanings of propositional attitudepredicates a given individual employs would arguably change somewhat over time as somewhat different setsgovern the individual's attributions at different times.

Propositional attitude predicates could be, in principle,rendered unambiguous by relativizing them to such sets of principles.

Unhedged physical sufficient conditions ofattribution for mental predicates understood as governed by a particular set of principles of rationality would, then,have to be such that they do not contravene the principles.

However, if they did not, there would be no change ofsubject.

It might be responded that there will be no set of codifiable principles of rational assessment even for anattributor at a time.

But a case for that remains to be made.

In any event, for present purposes, suffice it to note. »