Areté

 A pivotal term of ancient Greek ethics, aretē is conventionally translated 'virtue', but is more properly 'goodness' - the quality of being a good human being. Philosophy came, largely through Plato, to recognize four cardinal aretai: wisdom (phronēsis), moderation (sōphrosynē), courage (andreia) and justice (dikaiosynē). Others, considered either coordinate with these or their sub-species, included piety, liberality and magnanimity. The term generated many controversies. For example, is aretē a state of intellect, character or both? Does it possess intrinsic or only instrumental value? Is it teachable, god-given or otherwise acquired? Is it one thing or many? If many, how are they differentiated, and can you have one without having all? In ordinary Greek, aretē functions as the abstract noun correlated with agathos, meaning 'good', and 'goodness' is in most contexts a correct translation. However, 'goodness', unlike aretē, lacks a plural, and so requires awkward periphrases such as 'kinds of goodness' or 'ways of being good'. Hence 'virtue(s)' (sometimes 'excellence(s)') is usually preferred. Similarly, 'vice(s)' is favoured for its opposite, kakia, more correctly rendered 'badness'. In early Greek, aretē has no narrowly moral use, but is contextualized to mean prowess in any field - athletic, military, political, and so on. Given the predominance of male values, it often approximates to 'valour'. This is reflected in its eventual Latinization as virtus, literally 'manliness', which has made 'virtue' the almost inevitable modern rendering. A specifically moral use of aretē emerged gradually in the fifth and fourth centuries BC. The centrality of civic obligations in the Greek (especially the Athenian) value system gave cooperative virtues such as justice and courage a special standing, even before philosophers like Socrates and Plato began to scrutinize them. Many of the Sophists professed to teach aretē to the young.