Devoir de Philosophie

Authority

Publié le 22/02/2012

Extrait du document

The notion of authority has two main senses: expertise and the right to rule. To have authority in matters of belief (to be 'an authority') is to have theoretical authority; to have authority over action (to be 'in authority') is to have practical authority. Both senses involve the subordination of an individual's judgment or will to that of another person in a way that is binding, independent of the particular content of what that person says or requires. If a person's authority is recognized then it is effective or de facto authority; if it is justified then it is de jure authority. The latter is the primary notion, for de jure authority is what de facto authorities claim and what they are believed to have. Authority thus differs from effective power, but also from justified power, which may involve no subordination of judgment. In many cases, however, practical authority is justified only if it is also effective. Political authority involves a claim to the obedience of its subjects. Attempts to justify it have always been at the core of political philosophy. These include both instrumental arguments appealing to the expertise of rulers or to their capacity to promote social cooperation, and non-instrumental arguments resting on ideas such as consent or communal feeling. Whether any of these succeed in justifying the comprehensive authority that modern states claim is greatly disputed..

« but instead make them irrelevant.

(It is, however, unclear how sharp a distinction between outweighing and excluding may be sustained.) The normative character of authority as content-independent and binding has misled some into thinking that genuine authority must always be justified and that 'illegitimate authority' is a contradiction in terms, but this is wrong.

'Illegitimate authority' is on a par with 'invalid proof' : while it purports to be or is accepted as valid, in fact it is not.

While 'legitimate authority' is thus not superfluous as a term, it is still the sense generally implicit in the term 'authority' : authorities are believed to be legitimate.

This is fully compatible with a sociological analysis of the structure and origins of such beliefs, like Weber's three ideal types of rational-bureaucratic, traditional or customary, and charismatic legitimacy (the latter resting on the personal virtue or knowledge of an extraordinary leader) (Weber 1922 ). 2 Political authority Three important features distinguish the authority of the state.

First, the state claims and enforces compulsory jurisdiction over everyone within its territory.

Some, such as the English jurist John Austin , consider that the authority of a sovereign state must also be legally absolute (Austin 1832 ).

In fact, however, while the authority of most states is supreme - that is, binding on all other authorities in its territory - it is normally subject to constitutional limits, although these may consist of the absence of a power to legislate in a certain manner or field rather than the presence of an enforceable duty not to do so. Second, even when limited the authority of the state is always serious, and it regulates the most vital interests of everyone within its territory.

Political authority, as Locke ( 1690 ) states, includes the power to regulate life, liberty and property, and to impose any penalties up to and including death. Finally, political authority claims to impose obligations of obedience.

Hobbes doubted this, maintaining that political authority consists only of a liberty to coerce.

Friedrich Hayek goes further and states: 'The ideal type of law… provides merely additional information to be taken into account in the decision of the actor' (1960 ). However, neither of these views can explain the nature of political authority as it is seen by state officials and by many subjects.

The state is not indifferent to its citizens either obeying its directives or disobeying while suffering the prescribed penalty; it prefers obedience.

It is true that not all authoritative government action purports to create obligations - the state also grants permissions, makes declarations of status, and so on - but creating obligations is central to its other activities. 3 Justifications Anarchists deny that political authority is justifiable at all (see Anarchism §§1-2 ).

Some of their arguments hold that governments are inherently unjust.

Others focus on the subordination that is at the heart of authority relations. William Godwin (§3) and, recently, Robert Paul Wolff argue that there is a deep conflict between personal. »

↓↓↓ APERÇU DU DOCUMENT ↓↓↓

Liens utiles