Devoir de Philosophie

Blasius of Parma

Publié le 22/02/2012

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Blasius of Parma was an important Italian philosopher, mathematician and astrologer who popularized the achievements of Oxford logic and Parisian physics in Italy. He questioned the Aristotelian foundations of medieval physical science, mechanics, astronomy and optics, thus helping to open the way to the mathematics, optics and statics of modern times. His teaching influenced the artists of the Florentine Renaissance in their rediscovery of linear perspective, and his discussion of proportions influenced the Paduan mathematicians up to the time of Galileo. He presented an atomist and quantitative account of physical reality, and a materialist account of the human intellect. His consequent denial of the immortality of the soul won him the title of 'diabolical doctor' (doctor diabolicus). His position on the human ability to avoid astrological determinism was equivocal. Though his work was scholastic in style, he enjoyed good relations with such Italian humanists as Vittorino da Feltre, whose request for lessons in mathematics he refused. In Florence, he took part in conversations between humanists and scholastics.

« qualities which are dispositions to become this or that individual form, such as human being or horse.

With the death of the individual, these forms disappear by returning to prime matter.

Prime matter, however, is only a conjoint cause of the generation of forms.

The other universal cause of generation is the universal movement of the heavens which, through the influence of their motion, activate the dispositions of prime matter, and bring individual forms to birth. 3 Human beings A corollary of Blasius' metaphysical views and his desire to unify all observable phenomena is his inclusion of humans among those natural beings whose generation is accounted for in terms of prime matter, individual dispositions and heavenly influences.

For Blasius, even the intellective soul of human beings is a naturally generated form, a material power which results from prime matter disposed to receive it by the movement of the stars.

In this Blasius shows himself not a follower of Averroes (see Ibn Rushd §3 ), but rather of Alexander of Aphrodisias (§2) .

This materialist account was reinforced by Blasius' epistemology, which led him to argue that the existence of the intellect could be known only through inference from observation of the intellect's operations, and that such observable operations could not be independent of the body and matter in general.

As a result Blasius denied the immortality of the human intellective soul.

He was reprimanded by the Bishop of Pavia in 1396, but the reprimand was a mild one, without financial consequences or any effect on his teaching, which he pursued without hindrance until his retirement.

Nonetheless he showed greater caution in his later writings, and made reference to the priority of faith. Blasius' materialist metaphysics raised obvious difficulties for human freedom, since the doctrine that humans can make free choices seems incompatible with astrological causality.

Blasius resolved this problem of individual freedom by arguing that the human contains dispositions to act in one way or another, even when confronted with two objects which are equally attractive to reason, and that in providing these dispositions the stars incline but do not necessitate.

As a result the individual is always confronted with freedom of choice ( libertas differentiae contradictionis ), though it is the impulse and not rationality that is impartial in the face of a decision.

Blasius added in his later writings that the stars are only secondary instrumental causes.

God is the true first cause, though his activity is only known through the activity of his instrument, the heavens. 4 Epistemology and science Blasius adopted the English empiricism of William of Ockham (§§4-5) and his followers as filtered through the French teaching of John Buridan (§3) and Albert of Saxony .

He thus held that we know only the singular, present individual (Peter, for example) whom we perceive in visual cognition ( intuitio ) by means of a repeated sensible experience.

Through this sensible experience, a general image is formed in the memory, and this is the universal concept of some individual (Peter viewed as this man).

Thus the difference between the intuitive cognition of the. »

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