Chillingworth, William

« (Chillingworth 1638: vi.56 ). Chillingworth saw Knott 's position as resting on two fundamental confusions - that of infallibility with authority, and of infallibility with certainty.

Not all certainties are the same - indeed two quite separate kinds need to be distinguished.

Metaphysical certainty belongs to direct revelations from God, to self-evident propositions and their logical consequences, and to the direct testimony of the senses.

Faith cannot have this kind of certainty - if it could it would no longer be faith, but knowledge; it can, however, be morally certain - that is, probable to the highest degree.

This is the only certainty that historical propositions can ever possess.

Chillingworth naturally rejected Knott 's scriptural and patristic arguments for papal infallibility, but he also insisted repeatedly that, even if successful, they could give the doctrine moral certainty only, not the infallible, metaphysical certainty that Knott 's position required. Chillingworth's approach to theology was unswervingly rationalist: 'neither God doth nor man may, require of us as our dutie, to give a greater assent to the conclusion, than the premises deserve' (Chillingworth 1638: ii.154 ). Blind faith is in no way meritorious: 'God hath given us our Reason to discern between Truth and Falshood, and he that makes not this use of it, but beleeves things he knowes not why, I say it is by chance that he believes the Truth, and not by choice: and that I cannot but feare, that God will not accept of this Sacrifice of fooles ' (ii.113 ).

It is hardly surprising that this did not find favour with Chillingworth's opponents, either Catholic or Protestant. Their doubts about the reality of Chillingworth's own faith were quite unfounded, as his sermons made plain, but suspicions that he might not be the safest of allies were more understandable.

As Hobbes, who had met him at Great Tew, sardonically observed, 'he was like a lusty fighting fellow that did drive his enemies before him, but would often give his owne party smart back- blowes' (Aubrey 1898 vol.

1: 173 ). Locke greatly admired Chillingworth, and the two men had much in common ( Locke, J.

§7 ).

Both were accused by hostile critics of Socinianism, wrongly in Chillingworth's case ( Socinianism ), and both can more fairly be regarded as credal minimalists: 'wee suppose that all the necessary points of Religion are plaine and easie, & consequently every man in this cause to be a competent Iudge for himself' (Chillingworth 1638: ii.16 ). They shared a deep loathing of religious persecution, not merely for its cruelty, but for its presumption: 'God hath authoriz'd no man to force all men to Unity of Opinion ' (Chillingworth 1638: ii.85 ). A few months before The Religion of Protestants appeared, Descartes ' Discourse on Method was published in Holland.

Chillingworth had no knowledge of Descartes ' work and their two projects were utterly dissimilar; the fundamental congruence of their epistemology is therefore all the more striking ( Descartes, R.

§3 ).

Both take as basic the cognitive sovereignty of the individual.

Authority may be accepted, but has first to be judged by reason, and this is something that each one of us has to do alone.. »