Encyclopedia of Philosophy: AVICENNA

« is to say, whose essence includes that mark of necessity which is lacking in all other things and which can also beexpressed as the identity in it of essence and existence.

In this way, the cosmogony sketched above is given aphilosophical basis.

Just as the whole system of the world comes about from the thought which the Necessary Beinghas of itself, so this being, in thinking itself at the same time thinks everything in the universe: it thinks ‘the higher(that is, heavenly) beings, each in its individuality, and the being of the sublunary world in the universals underwhich they are classified' ([2.6]).The distinction between essence and existence is another feature of Ibn S(n&'s thought which is his own; he didnot take it from al-F&r&b(, as was long thought because of the misattribution of a short treatise (FuU*U al-h.

ikam,which might be translated as Precious Aphorisms) which continues Ibn S(n&'s own formulation of the distinction.

Inall contingent things, Ibn S(n& differentiates, on the one hand, the fact of having a certain quiddity (m&hiyyah: m&is translated into Latin as quid, thus producing the word quidditas) or, as he is also willing to say, a h.

aq(qah,meaning ‘truth'—what this thing which exists really is; and, on the other hand, the very fact that it exists, its wuj*dor huwiyya.

(The word huwiyya is made up from the pronoun huwa which means ‘him' but also acts as the copula inattributive propositions; al-Kind(, who also uses wuj*d, had already used huwa as the basis for another word,tahwid, as noted above.) The standard contrast essence and existence in Western philosophy is, then, a goodrendering of Ibn S(n&s distinction between m&hiyya and wuj*d.

In existing things essence does not imply existence,otherwise they would exist necessarily.

The one exception, as we have seen, is God, and this structural distinctionhas its place at the level of the ultimate origin of things.

But it also gives rise to an idea relevant to the ontology offorms.

What sort of being does essence have? It has no effect on existence as such, but essence determines itsstatus in each existing thing.

In itself, essence is neither universal nor particular, neither singular nor plural, neitherpresent in existence nor just a concept in the mind: but it can be any of these.

To use Ibn S(n&'s own example:the universal ‘horse' signifies something which is distinct from its universality: ‘horseliness' (equinitas in the Latintranslations) or ‘just horseliness' (equinitas tantum).

This horseliness can be attached to the ‘conditions' ofexistence in actual horses, or not: in itself, it is removed from any condition and only a ‘divine being' can beattributed to it, as Ibn S(n& says in an enigmatic comment which should certainly be linked to what he says aboutthe origin of the world in God's thought.

Methodologically, this doctrine of being supports one of Ibn S(n&'s favouriteprocedures.

He engages in an imaginary experimentation with combinations of forms, an inspection of the ‘thingness'(his word too) of a given object, from which one can see what is or is not compatible with its nature and so whatshould be thought about it.

In this theory of essence, Ibn S(n& can be seen to be following on from the theologicalspeculations about non-existing things mentioned above in connection with the Mu‘tazilites ([2.32]).There remains one area where Ibn S(n& is close to al-F&r&b(: the theory of prophecy, its nature and function.Prophetic revelation is an outstanding example of the joining of the human soul with the separated Intelligences.Intellectual understanding is the most common instanceof this joining, but whereas ordinary men proceed through discursive thought, the prophet is, he said, ‘informed ofwhat is invisible; an angel speaks to him'.

The function of prophecy is to ensure the social ties which are necessaryfor men by giving them laws and laying down religious obligations.

But it can only inculcate the truth which itcontains through symbols which are accessible to simple minds.

It is not a matter of the prophets' hiding the truthbut of expressing it in another language.

Thus the descriptions of the happiness of heaven are allegories of thespiritual pleasures of the separated soul.

Besides its use in interpreting prophecies, Ibn S(n& uses his idea ofsymbolic expression in two ways.

Sometimes he employs it to give philosophical readings of verses from the Qur'&n:for instance, in Instructions and Remarks he interprets the famous verse about light (Sourate 24, Light, v, 35) as animagistic description of the intellectual faculties of the soul and their hierarchy, from the material intelligence up tothe intelligence in act which is in contact with the Agent Intellect.

In the same work, Ibn S(n& refers to the Storyof Sal&m&n and Abs&l (about which he also wrote a letter): they are two figures, he says, who represent the soulof man (‘yourself') and its level of mystical knowledge, a subject treated in detail in the Instructions.

Or again—thisis the second way in which he treats symbols—he himself composes stories which put into the form of images theadventures of the soul desiring ‘light' (H.

ayy ibn Yaqz.a-n) and in search of truth (The Story of the Bird) ([2.1],[2.7], [2.36]).. »