Encyclopedia of Philosophy: ERIUGENA

« Christian when ‘Plato' and Augustine interpret the world soul as principle of life (III.

727C–728D), and Latin secular,Greek Christian and Latin Christian when ‘Aristotle', pseudo-Dionysius and Augustine discuss the ten categories.35Disagreement on the denotative level overcome by shifting to the connotative level of one or both texts isinstanced among Latin Christian and Greek Christian authors when Ambrose, Augustine, pseudo-Dionysius andMaximus describe the indirect perception of God through theophany;36 disagreement on the connotative levelovercome by concentrating on the denotative level of one text only is illustrated among Latin Christian and GreekChristian authors when pseudo-Dionysius and Maximusbut not Augustine discuss the threefold division of the soul into substance, power and activity,37 and among LatinChristian and Latin secular authors when Pliny and Martianus Capella but not Augustine calculate the measurementsof the cosmos (III.

719A, 721C.

Cf.

III.

724A–C).Eriugena obviously exploits the notion of multiple meanings in texts.

That this is in the late twentieth century partof the definition of literariness would hardly be questioned,38 and that it is nowadays also a fundamental problem inphilosophy is the legacy of Gadamer, Derrida and others.39 But it is important to find the exact coordinates ofEriugena's position.

Of the theoretically possible views of meaning which are relevant here, one would connect thepolysemy of individual texts with an ultimate monosemy—metaphysical truth—and establish a limit for hermeneuticalactivity and a distinction between denotation and connotation.40 This was the attitude of medieval theologians.41Another view would connect the polysemy of individual texts with an ultimate polysemy—a linguistic ‘reality'—andestablish no limits for hermeneutical activity and no distinction between denotation and connotation.

Such is theposition of modern deconstruction.42 A careful study of Eriugena's philosophical methodology reveals him supportingneither the first nor the second viewpoint exclusively but oscillating between the two: a most unusual approach fora Western medieval thinker.The evidence for Eriugena's concept of polysemy consists primarily of various statements about thought andlanguage.43 Clearly the notion that polysemy is a property to be exploited rather than a defect to be overcome inthe pursuit of philosophy requires a fusion rather than a separation of the cognitive and the verbal.

Eriugenaexplicitly advocates such a fusion in several instances while commenting on Martianus Capella and Maximus theConfessor.Among Eriugena's comments on the text of Martianus Capella, those dealing with the meaning of its initial allegoryare particularly relevant.

This narrative depicts the god Mercury's search for a bride, culminating in his choice of themortal Philology, and then the preparations for the marriage of Mercury and Philology, including a ritual of Philology'sdeification.

Since Eriugena quite plausibly interprets Mercury and Philology as figures of language and reasonrespectively, the marriage of the two protagonists for him indirectly signifies the fusion of discourse and thinking.44Naturally, this represents a primary rather than exclusive meaning of such an inherently polysemous text.45Among Eriugena's developments of Maximus the Confessor's teaching, those concerned with a threefoldpsychological process are particularly important.

Here, Eriugena sometimes contrasts two inner cognitive functions:intelligence and thinking with an outer expressivefunction: sensation=sign-manipulation,46 but sometimes describes three inner cognitive and expressive functions:intelligence=non-interpretation, reason=expression, and interior sensation=quasi sign-manipulation.47 The shiftbetween the first and second formulations— tantamount to replacing the traditional contrast of thought andlanguage with a more unusual combination of the two—results from the contextual pressure of a Trinitarian analogyin the latter case.48 Just as God expresses himself to himself and to creation through his Word, so does man reflectthe same processes on a lower level of being.In order to appreciate these developments, one should pause momentarily to recall Aristotle's theory in OnInterpretation that spoken words are signs—symbola or s%meia—of mental affections and that, although mentalaffections are identical for all mankind, spoken words are different.49 Thanks to Boethius' translation andcommentary on this text, the radical cleavage between thinking and language which it advocated became amedieval commonplace.50 However, modern linguistic theory in the tradition of Saussure's Cours de linguistiquegénérale would insist that the acoustic image—the signifier, and the concept—the signified, are inseparablecomponents of one wholly arbitrary linguistic sign.51Further evidence for his concept of polysemy is provided by the writer's practice in connection with etymology.Here, Eriugena follows the doctrine, established by the Stoics and transmitted to the Latin West by Isidore ofSeville, that study of the forms and derivations of words leads to knowledge of the things which they represent.52The Periphyseon contains numerous examples of simple etymologies exploited in this way.

Because metoch%(‘participation') is composed of meta (‘after') plus echein (‘to have'), it indicates the derivation of an essence from asuperior one (III.

632B) and because stereôma (‘firmament') is composed of ster% (‘solid') plus hama (‘together'), itindicates the common boundary of all corporeal things (III.

694B).

Similarly the noun ousia (‘substance') comes fromthe verb eimi (‘I am') and therefore signifies subsistence of each thing in its transcendent causes whereas the nounphusis (‘nature') comes from the verb phuomai (‘I am born') and therefore signifies the generation of each thing insome material substratum.53 When Eriugena alternates etymologies of a single term, the fusion of real and verbalbegins to predominate over the separation of the two.54 For example, the word theos (‘God') is derived both fromthe verb theôrô (‘I see'), so that God is the one who sees all things in himself, and from the verb theô (‘I run'), sothat he is that which itself runs through all things.

(I.

452B–C).

The word angelos (‘angel') is connected both withthe preposition engus (‘near'), meaning that angels are the creatures immediately after God, and with the verbengigno (‘I engender'), meaning that they are the creatures who transmit divine illuminations.55 When Eriugenaconnects etymologies of different terms, the fusion of real and verbal completes its ascendancy over the separationof the two.

Because bonitas (‘goodness') comes from the verb bo) (‘I call'), while bo) is synonymous with kal), fromwhich comes the adjective kalos (‘beautiful'), the God who is both goodness and beauty can be understood ascalling all created things from non-existence into existence.The writer's practice in connection with metaphor provides yet more evidence for his concept of polysemy.57 ForEriugena, ‘metaphor' (metaphora/translatio) represents the application to something of a name normally applied to. »