Aristotle (384-322 BC)

« to support any detailed intellectual biography of Aristotle.

A few points, however, may suggest a partial chronology.(1) Some of Aristotle's frequent critical discussions of Plato and other Academics may have been written (in someversion) during Aristotle's years in the Academy.

The Topics may reflect the character of dialectical debates in the Academy.

(2) It is easier to understand the relation of the doctrine of substance in the Categories and Physics I-II to the doctrine and argument of Metaphysics VII if we suppose that Metaphysics VII is later.

(3) The Organon (see §4) does not mention matter, perhaps because (a) Aristotle had not yet thought of it, or because (b) he regarded itas irrelevant to the topics considered in the Organon.

If (a) is correct, the Organon precedes the works on naturalphilosophy.

(4) Some of the observations used in Aristotle's biological works probably came from the easternAegean.

Hence, Aristotle probably pursued his biological research during his years away from Athens.

We mighttrace his biological interests to the Academy (see Plato's Timaeus); he may also have acquired them from his fatherNicomachus, who was a doctor.

Probably, then, at least some of the biological works (or versions of them) are notthe latest works in the corpus.

(5) The Magna Moralia (if it is genuine) and the Eudemian Ethics probably precede the Nicomachean Ethics (see §21).

The order in which Aristotle's works appear in the Greek manuscripts goes back to early editors and commentators (from the first century BC to the sixth century AD); it reflects their view notabout the order in which the works were written, but about the order in which they should be studied.

This entrygenerally follows the order of the corpus, except that it discusses On the Soul after the Metaphysics (see §17), not among the works on natural philosophy (where it appears in the manuscripts).

3 Appearances The general aim of rational inquiry, according to Aristotle, is to advance from what is 'better known to us' to what is 'better known bynature' (see Physics I 1; Posterior Analytics 71b33 ; Metaphysics 1029b3 ).

We achieve this aim if: (1) we replace propositions that we thought we knew with propositions that we really know because they are true and weunderstand them; (2) we find general principles that explain and justify the more specific truths that we beganfrom; (3) we find those aspects of reality that explain the aspects that are more familiar to us.

The things betterknown to us in a particular area are the relevant 'appearances' (phainomena).

Aristotle presents them throughdetailed collections of empirical data, reached as a result of 'inquiry' (historia; for example, Parts of Animals 646a8 ). Empirical inquiry proceeds from particular observations, by means of generalizations through induction (epagōgē)from these particular cases, until we reach experience (empeiria).

Experience leads us to principles that are betterknown by nature ( Prior Analytics 46a17 ); we also rely on it to test principles we have found ( Generation of Animals 760b28 ).

Philosophical inquiry also relies on 'appearances'.

However, the appearances that concern it are not empirical observations, but common beliefs, assumptions widely shared by 'the many and the wise'.

The critical andconstructive study of these common beliefs is 'dialectic'.

Aristotle's method is basically Socratic.

He raises puzzles inthe common beliefs, looking for an account that will do them justice as a whole.

Among common beliefs Aristotleconsiders the views of his predecessors (for example, Metaphysics I; On the Soul I; Politics II), because the puzzles raised by their views help us to find better solutions than they found.

Inquiry leads us to causes and to universals.Aristotle has a realist conception of inquiry and knowledge; beliefs and theories are true in so far as they grasp thereality that we inquire into (see Realism and antirealism §2 ).

Universals and causes are 'prior by nature'; they are not created by, or dependent on, any theory, but a true theory must fit them.

If we attended only to Aristotle'sremarks on what is better known to us and on the process of inquiry, we might regard his position as a form ofempiricism (see Empiricism ).

But in his remarks on what is better known by nature, he insists on the reality of universals and on the importance of non-sensory forms of knowledge (see §15 on universals, §19 on thought).

4 Thought and language One means of access to appearances, and especially to common beliefs, is the study of what words and sentences 'signify' (sēmainein).

This is part of 'logic' (logik ē, derived from logos, which may betranslated 'word', 'speech', 'statement', 'argument' or 'reason': see Logos ), which is discussed in the first section of Aristotle's works ( Categories , De Interpretatione , Prior Analytics , Posterior Analytics , Topics ).

This section of the corpus came to be called the 'Organon' ('instrument'), because logic, as Aristotle conceives it, concerns statementsand arguments in general, without restriction to any specific subject matter; it is therefore an instrument ofphilosophical inquiry in general, rather than a branch of philosophy coordinate with natural philosophy or ethics.

TheOrganon includes some elements of philosophy of language, as well as formal logic (syllogistic; see §5) andepistemology (see §6).

According to Aristotle's account of signification (see especially De Interpretatione 1-4 ), as commonly understood, the word 'horse' signifies horse by signifying the thought of horse; in using the word, wecommunicate thoughts about horses.

When the thoughts about horses we communicate are true, we communicatetruths about the universal horse; even when our thoughts are not completely true, we may signify the sameuniversal horse.

To understand the signification of a name 'F', we look for the corresponding definition (logos,horismos) of F.

Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Version 1.0, London and New York: Routledge (1998) Aristotledistinguishes nominal definitions, stating the beliefs associated with the name, from real definitions, giving a trueaccount of the universal that underlies the beliefs embodied in the nominal definition (see Posterior Analytics II 8- 10.

Aristotle himself does not use the labels 'nominal definition' and 'real definition'.).

Not every name corresponds toone nominal and one real definition.

Some names correspond to no genuine universal; 'goatstag' signifies (in oneway) animals that are both goats and stags, but it does not signify a genuine universal, since there is no naturalkind of goatstag.

Other names correspond to more than one universal, as 'chest' signifies both a container and apart of an animal.

Chests are 'homonymous' (hom ōnyma) or 'multivocal' (pollach ōs legomena; 'spoken of in manyways'); more than one definition is needed to capture the signification of the name.

By contrast, since only onedefinition corresponds to the name 'horse', horses are 'synonymous' ( Categories 1).

Other philosophers make serious errors, Aristotle believes, because they suppose they can give a single account of things or properties that arereally multivocal.

Once we see that different Fs are F in different ways, we see that different, although (in manycases) connected, accounts of what it is to be F must be given.

Some philosophically important cases ofmultivocity are cause (Aristotle's doctrine of the four causes; see §9), being (the doctrine of the categories; see§7) and good (the criticism of Plato's belief in a Form of the Good; Nicomachean Ethics I 6).

5 Deduction Part of logic, as Aristotle conceives it, is the study of good and bad arguments.

In the Topics Aristotle treats dialectical arguments in general.

In the Prior Analytics he examines one type of argument, a 'deduction' (syllogismos; literally,. »